Estonian National Minorities’ Cultures: Successes and Failures of Policy Goals, Instruments and Organization

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Declaration: Hereby I declare that this doctoral thesis, my original investigation and achievement, submitted for the doctoral degree at Tallinn University of Technology, has not been submitted for any other degree or examination.

Aleksandr Aidarov

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The dissertation is based on the following original publications:


INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Estonia, a 1.3 million country at the North-East corner of the European Union (EU), just South of Finland, has been in European and global news during the past decade mainly because of its technological leadership, especially in the IT field and e-Governance, and because of its tough but on many levels quite successful, austerity-oriented fiscal and economic policies (But cf. Raudla and Kattel 2011; Kalvet 2012). However, the most recent geo-political developments in the region, which represent Russia's interest in former Soviet republics (Menkiszak 2014; Kurowska 2014; Rogoża 2014) to “protect” the Russian population (Burke-White 2014), has put one specific feature of Estonia back on the agenda – how Estonia deals with its own Russophone minority to prevent potential interethnic conflict between the Estonian and non-Estonian population, which is a matter of both internal and external security in Estonia (Government of the Republic Estonia 2008, 29; Government of the Republic Estonia 2014, 8, 23).

The very quality of national minorities’ protection in Estonia has always been framed by the interplay of internal and external factors\(^1\) (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 16-17) that by today have created the peculiar situation in which Russian-speakers find themselves. The Russian (-speaking) minority has made up, over the past quarter-century, around 30 % of the population, and they are concentrated in Ida-Viru County, bordering Russia in the North-East, and Tallinn, the capital of Estonia (Statistics Estonia 2011a). Some of them pre-1918 settlers\(^2\) but most of them were workers transplanted to Estonia, not least by design, during Soviet times. After Estonia, independent between 1918 and 1940, re-emerged as a nation again in 1991 and joined NATO and the EU in 2004 (Parliament of Estonia 2005; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014).

After decades of Soviet dominance and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (1940-1991), Estonian independence was generally seen as the restoration of an ideally ethnically homogeneous nation-state of the Estonian people that in fact has not been accomplished – the total of minorities has not declined essentially for almost a quarter of a century (Järve 2005, 68; Brubaker 2013, 18). And by 2011, 52% of Russophone population had acquired Estonian citizenship, 23% have

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\(^1\) The former means international, intersocietal and intercultural influence on Estonia. The latter refers to the mutual interrelations of institutionalized values and social structure (social classes, ethnic groups, generations, etc.) (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 2).

\(^2\) National minorities constituted 12% of the total population of Estonia before World War II. Russians, Germans, Swedes, Latvians and Jews were the biggest minority groups (Tammaru and Kulu 2003, 108).
Russian citizenship, 21% have undetermined citizenship and 3% have citizenship of some other state (Statistics Estonia 2011a). Drawing on Estonian citizenship and language policies, the Russian Federation has continuously criticized Estonia for insufficient protection of human rights, lack of democracy and the Estonization of the public sphere, which would lead to the assimilation of non-Estonians into the Estonian language and culture (Ambrosio 2009, 92). Such statements do seem to resonate with many Russian-speakers’ understanding of Estonian citizenship and language policies as assimilative (Kruusvall et al. 2009, 4-5). This appears to be especially plausible if one takes into the account the fact that Estonian citizenship and the knowledge of Estonian do not automatically improve the socio-economic situation of Russian speakers and their representativeness in the public sphere, which is a typical “glass ceiling” effect (See only Lauristin et al. 2011, 12).

So far, Russian-speakers, who have a sense of insecurity, a lack of positive self-esteem, little representation in the public sector and politics and a less advantageous socio-economic situation compared to Estonians, have not been politically mobilized (Vihalemm and Kalmus 2008, 922-924; Ehala 2009, 140, 155; Duvold 2014, 70). However, in 2007, the “Bronze Soldier” crisis – the first large-scale ethnic riot in Estonia that addressed the interpretation of history and cultural values between Estonians and Russian-speakers – seemed to signal to Estonia, which before this incident had enjoyed a peaceful transition from communism to capitalism, and from an authoritarian regime to democracy, the possibility of interethnic conflict in Estonia (Cf. Ehala 2009, 140). And, as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 showed to Estonia and the rest of Europe, the Russian Federation may, and actually does, use internal tensions to pursue its own geopolitical goals (Gill 2014).

At the same time, by joining the EU but also by self-definition as a liberal European country, Estonia is faced with the Kantian claim to treat all citizens equally, consider all people living in the country prima facie as citizens to create one civic nation and protect national minorities (Parliament of Estonia 2006; Duvold 2014, 40). But citizenship and language policies aimed at integrating Russian-speakers into Estonian society are not the only way the Government strives to sustain good interethnic relations in Estonia. The preservation of national minorities’ cultures is considered one of the important prerequisites of genuine integration. Since 2000, support to the preservation of national minorities’ cultures has been an important part of integration policy and also cultural policy (Parliament of Estonia 2014). As officially phrased in all integration programs, Estonia offers to and creates for all national minorities the opportunity “to learn their mother tongue and culture, practice their culture, and preserve their ethno-linguistic identity” since 2000 (Government of the Republic of Estonia 2000, 44; Government of the Republic Estonia 2008, 19, 22). These opportunities represent not only Russian public education or media but also various “smaller” solutions, e.g. financial support to hobby schools, national cultural autonomy, cultural
While all national minorities are eligible to use these opportunities, Estonian Russians, non-Russian Russian-speakers (non-Russians) and Russian Estonian Old Believers (EOB) are the main target groups in practice. Estonian Russians, including the EOB, represent 25% of the Estonian population; non-Russians 4%, e.g. Ukrainians, Chuvashs and many others, and 1% of the minorities can be called “Western”, e.g. they arrived in Estonia after 1991 and do not originate from the areas and/or cultures influenced by either Russian colonial history and/or Soviet Union membership, e.g. Germans, Finns, etc. (Statistics Estonia 2011a). Regarding the assimilation of these three groups, the following is just mentioned now and will be specified later. Non-Russians have continued to assimilate into Russian culture and language since Soviet times. The EOB assimilate into the mainstream Estonian secular culture. The assimilation of Estonian Russians into Estonian culture is a highly controversial issue. It is related to the process of Estonian nation-state-building, which is considered a disadvantage to the Russian language as mentioned supra, the historically unfriendly relations between Estonia and Russia, within which the image of a “national enemy” is ascribed to Estonian Russians (Mertelsmann 2005), and the fact that only 1% of Estonian Russians do not speak Russian as their mother tongue but still have a Russian ethnic identity as of 2011 (Statistics Estonia 2011a).

Taking the above situation into account, this thesis aims to analyze the successes and failures of Estonian cultural policy regarding the preservation of national minorities’ cultures via policy instruments and their organization. It focuses on the three protagonist groups, looks at the Estonian Government coping with the issue of the preservation of their cultures on the public-policy level and takes a perspective that evaluates this policy according to whether the goals as set have been achieved or not via opportunities and what might have caused this. Nowadays, only quite little is known about this. What we do have is, on the one hand, analyses by Estonian sociologists of integration process. They offer profound sociological insights into who integrates into Estonian society and how, but they do not touch policy implementation (Kallas et al. 2011; AS Emor et al. 2011). On the other hand, the Government itself informs national and international actors, like the European Council or the United Nations, about existing opportunities, i.e. legislation prohibiting ethnic discrimination, public school education in Russian, support to Russian media and cultural activities of national minorities, to mention but a few (Council of Europe 1999; Council of Europe 2004; Ernst and Young 2009, 14; Council of Europe 2010; U.N. International Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2013).
The main body of this thesis is developed in three original articles. The article “The Law & Economics of the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities and of Russian National Cultural Autonomy in Estonia” (I) (co-authored with Wolfgang Drechsler) analyzes why Russian National Cultural Autonomy in Estonia has not been established, regardless of the fact that Estonia has a Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities. The law can be named as declarative because it has no legal mechanisms of realization of NCA. So, in practice the law is used symbolically to demonstrate the continuous democratic nature of Estonia since 1918 and to allocate financial support to NGOs via project-based financing. The reasons behind this can be twofold. On the one hand, legal solutions, which somehow institutionalize national minorities in the public sphere, challenge the Estonian nation-state. On the other hand, complex legal solutions challenge minorities themselves because they demand representative leaders, common goals, mobilization, etc. that the socially and economically fragmented Estonian Russians do not have nowadays. The second article, “Estonian Russification of Ethnic Minorities in Estonia? A Policy Analysis” (II) (co-authored with Wolfgang Drechsler) addresses various forms of support that non-Russian Russian-speaking minorities use for their cultural activities and education. It shows that economic incentive is the main policy instrument that is organized via project-based financing. This solution has several deficiencies, which implies a pessimistic rather than optimistic future for this target group in Estonia who continues to Russify in Estonia since the end of the USSR. The article also explains that the popularity of project-based financing might be related to ideological and administrative peculiarities of Estonian Public Administration (PA). The third article, “Tourism and the Preservation of Old Belief in Estonia: The Frontstage and Backstage of Estonian Old Believers” (III) analyzes project-based tourism organization and its affect on the preservation of the EOB’s religion. This case shows that it does not suffice to allocate money to tourism development and use Old Belief as a tourism attraction. One should also pay attention to the organization of such support. Depending on the quality of the organization, tourism may either improve the preservation of culture or create additional obstacles. This is, however, a complex task that demands coordination between cultural and tourism policy-makers to find legal administrative solutions, which does not exist yet in a sufficient amount to address and solve this problem.

Based on these three articles, the current thesis investigates, first of all, the opportunities that the Government offers to minorities. According to the definition of policy instruments by Bemelmans-Videc et al. (2007, 21), they really represent economic incentives, i.e. money, annually allocated to the cultural organizations of national minorities. And this policy instrument is organized via project-based financing (I, II, III). Taking into account the very specifics of national minorities’ sociocultural and demographic peculiarities, this would be misleading to expect that all minorities per se are interested and motivated to preserve their cultures in
Estonia – a form of groupism. Nevertheless, this economic incentive, as the practice shows, motivates around 300 cultural societies of NGO status to try to preserve various cultural practices. These societies tend to have a small number of active members, but these are the people on whom the virality of various languages, traditions, etc. depends. So, the analysis takes into prominent account the experience of these NGOs in preserving culture to evaluate the successes and failures of the relevant policy (II, III).

Second, the evaluation of the successes and failures of cultural policy is conducted by means of McConnell’s (2010) policy-success framework as specified below. Briefly, the implementation of economic incentives via project-based financing implies policy success in terms of a) implementation in line with objectives and b) implementation meeting policy-domain criteria. Regarding the former, having money and projects at all means success because this is the actual goal the Government pursues and measures against inputs and outputs. Then, two policy-domain criteria, which represent a combination of neo-liberal and nationalist ideology, and project-based financing as the main organizational form of Estonian PA not only legitimize but also rationalize the usage of economic incentive and project-based financing without questioning outcomes (I, II, III). Thus, this explains why the Government widely uses this approach, but it does not help to comprehend how well cultural societies of national minorities actually are able to preserve their cultures.

By investigating this, our analysis shows that the organization of economic incentives via project based-financing can and actually does also lead at least to conflicted success: a) The availability of money is a certain benefit for the target groups that helps them to run various cultural activities, from teaching children less spoken languages to the organization of festivals. However, project-based organization of this instrument has several deficiencies that undermine the effectiveness of support; b) The achievement of outcomes is debatable because of the generation gap, i.e. cultural practices are not transmitted from older to younger generations; c) Opposition to policy means from the Government’s and from minorities’ points of view exists (II, III).

Drawing on such observations the thesis indicates the conflict of two policy goals. The first goal is to allocate economic incentive and organize its usage via project-based financing, which is successful according to its own standards. By fulfilling this goal the Government expects minorities to preserve their cultures in Estonia. So, the preservation of cultures is the second policy goal. To put it simply, the Government is responsible for the former and minorities for the latter goal. Even if

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3 Brubaker (2002, 164) explains that groupism is “the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed. I mean the tendency to reify such groups as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes.”
to admit the preservation of cultures is the minorities’ task, the quality of opportunities to achieve this goal receives insufficient attention. The reason, as analysis shows, might be related to the fact that the Government considers policy solution to be good so that failure to achieve the second goal is interpreted not as a problem of opportunities but solely as one of minorities.

The thesis has the following structure: The theoretical framework of the thesis is explained first. As the interest of this thesis lies in policy implementation, the concept of policy instruments and their relation to organization by Bemelmans-Videc et al. (2007), and McConnell’s (2010) framework of policy-success evaluation with a stress on the program level of policy-making are used. The method of analysis is also briefly explained in this part. Second, the analysis of the results is presented, after which the policy instruments and organization are researched, and then the successes and failures of relevant policy are evaluated. Third, the results are summarized, and further research directions are suggested.
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POLICY SUCCESS AND FAILURE, INSTRUMENTS AND ORGANIZATION

The very interest towards the achievement of policy goals via instruments and their organization can be summarized in Plato’s question: “This is what the law-maker must often ask himself: What is my purpose? Do I indeed achieve this or rather miss my goal?” (Nomoi, 744a; see Drechsler 2003, 219). Many different approaches, from classical ones to Law & Economics, try to answer this question, i.e. why and how policies succeed or fail (Bovens and ’t Hart 1996; Dollery and Worthington 1996; Backhaus 1999; Dunn 2007; Howlett 2009). The availability of objective and constructivist approaches to policy analysis not only creates conceptual ambiguity but also hampers the practical evaluation of policy successes and failures. Recently, several attempts have been made to overcome this problem, though.

McConnell (2010; see also Czaika and de Haaz 2013) suggests differentiating between policy-making levels where policy can be evaluated by means of both objective and subjective data. These policy levels are politics, process and program. At each level policy can be “successful if it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or support is virtually universal”. And policy can fail if “it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts criticism of any significance and/or support is not virtually universal.” What is more, intermediate variations of success and failure can exist not only at one policy level but also between policy levels. In other words, one policy can succeed, fail or be a simultaneous combination of both (351). Let us survey these policy levels and then look at the program level in detail, as it is related to the very interest of this thesis.

First, the politics aspect means that the interpretation of policy outcomes in terms of success and/or failure has important political consequences for politicians and policy makers. For example, by achieving goals, politicians have more chances to be re-elected than if they fail to achieve goals; politicians may blame policy actors or other politicians for not achieving objectives to raise their own public popularity, or offer alternative solutions to the problems, etc. (See also Howlett 2012, 550). Second, process is related to policy formulation, i.e. the Government specifies policy problems, formulates policy goals, sets agendas, evaluates alternatives, chooses policy instruments, evaluates outputs, etc. To put is simply, this is the analytical capacity of the Government to diagnose problems and work out solutions to solve them. Third, the program aspect addresses policy implementation or the application of the chosen policy instruments and their
organization to achieve formulated policy goals. In the interest of research, let us now explain the meaning of policy instruments and how it is related to organization in detail and after that proceed with policy-success explanation at the program level.

In general, policy instruments are techniques the Government uses to change human behavior via incentives and/or disincentives in order to achieve its goals (see Schneider and Ingram 1990; Howlett 2005; Bobrow 2006). Or as Bemelmans-Videc et al. (2007, 21) define it, “policy instruments are the set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and affect or prevent social change.” It should be stressed that instruments are not merely policy means or solutions which help to achieve formulated goals. Nowadays, many scholars maintain that the availability of instruments and their usage per se can be a policy goal. This phenomenon can be a result of various context-specific factors, e.g. ideology, symbolic performance, “path dependency”, culture, etc. (Lasswell 1951; Peters 2005, 354; Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, 41).

Bemelmans-Videc et al. (2007, 21) differentiate three basic types: regulations, economic means and information. Regulations or laws oblige people to act according to the Government’s needs and limit their discretion, choices, freedom, etc. On the one hand, this is done via negative sanctions, e.g. fines, imprisonment, obligations, etc. On the other hand, regulations can be leges imperfectae, i.e. legal acts without sanctions to affect conduct (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, 31). As Mautner (2009) specifies, “such laws are devised in such a way that no remedy or sanction would be invoked following violation of a legal norm.” The main purpose of such laws is to reaffirm and support the stability of official values and beliefs that the political elite considers important for ideological reasons (511). In other words, these are declarative or performative laws. Second, economic instruments provide actors with certain material (grants, allowances, taxes) and nonmaterial resources (services) or deprive them of resources. Unlike regulations these instruments do not prescribe specific actions or oblige to do something. Rather, they make certain actions cheaper or more expensive in terms of money, time, etc. For example, higher taxes on alcoholic beverages do not prohibit alcohol consumption as such, but higher price should discourage people from drinking (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, 32). Third, information instruments influence people through knowledge, communication of reasoned arguments, etc. (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, 33). Such instruments aim to change human understanding of social problems via social advertisement, bulletins, fliers or training and education programs, etc.4

4 It should be added that instruments have different levels of coercion (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007). First, regulations are the most coercive instruments. Legal proscriptions oblige people to comply with norms as written in law to escape punishment, fines, etc. For example, persons are imprisoned for selling illegal drugs. Prescriptions, in turn, determine that an individual may gain or lose his or her rights in some situation or after a specified
Further, many scholars consider organizations a fourth type of policy instruments (Christensen et al. 2007, 20; Howlett 2011, 64), but for analytical reasons organizations can be separated from policy instruments (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, 37) because organizations are “structures to coordinate work of skilled people with knowledge to achieve specific goals” (Cunliffe 2008, 4). In other words, organizations are not policy instruments but help to put instruments into action.

To specify, an organization, as the word implies, can be a “unit”, say, a group of skilled people working together, or a “process”, i.e. a certain logic of human behaviour based on rationality but also values and norms to pursue common goals. The former, for example, means a jail that imprisons criminals by enforcing regulations; agricultural agency that develops small farming via the allocation of subsidies, etc. Regarding this, Peters (2005, 305) explains that the results of policy instruments depend on how well organizations function. Nowadays this is an especially relevant argument, as not only the governments but also for-profit and non-profit organizations implement policies, i.e. employ certain policy instruments. Besides that, as Peters argues, depending on the professional orientation, staff and experience organizations may prefer certain instruments and disfavor others, e.g. lawyers may prefer regulations, economists economic incentives, etc. Thus, organizations are not neutral to policy instruments and their choice (360).

Then, concerning organization as a “process”, Bemelmans-Videc et al. (2007, 39, 265-266) differentiate two forms of organization: a) “process oriented management”, i.e. the Government determines conditions and rules under which organizations should function, e.g. the composition of board directors, management guidelines, control over budget and audit, etc. This can also be the organizational strategy on policy implementation, e.g. the delegation of public tasks to the private sector, privatization, coordination, networking, etc. Another way to understand organizations as a process is to see at how an organization as a group of people puts a certain instrument into action to achieve public goals. From this perspective a particular interest one may have is to analyze, for example, how ministerial agency allocates start-up grants (economic means) via specific procedures, rules and bureaucracy to develop innovative business activity among entrepreneurs and

period of time, e.g. termination of parental rights, right of superficies, etc. Second, economic instruments are less coercive as do not oblige people to behave explicitly as some law may demand. However, as this type of instrument provides or restricts access to resources, certain behaviors become easier or more difficult. For example, subsidies to farmers make farming less economically expensive and potentially more attractive for newcomers. Third, information instruments do not coerce or deprive actors from resources. They represent “symbolic” influence through which the Government tries to encourage or warn people about certain behaviors. For example, social advertisement warns people about fire safety at home or encourages donating (34).
how procedures of application affect entrepreneurs (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, 39, 265-266).

So, both understandings of organizations show that organizations and policy instruments are closely interrelated during policy implementation, which creates a certain “policy practice”. Depending on the quality of the organization “policies and their intentions will very often be changed or even distorted; its execution delayed or even blocked altogether” (Werner and Wegrich 2007, 51). In 1980-1990, various top-down and bottom-up theories of policy implementation addressed this phenomenon (Pülzl and Treib 2007, 91). For instance, analyzing the reforms in the U.S. social welfare provision on limiting or enhancing the discretion of “street-level bureaucrats”, Brodkin (2000) shows that discretion, which is an integral part of social-services organization, creates a complex and ambiguous process of achieving political goals.

Returning to the program level of policy and the question of how to evaluate its success the above discussion shows that if policy instruments and their organization are an integral part of policy implementation, then their analysis helps to comprehend policy success and/or failures. At this level of policy-making the spectrum of policy success can be described as a) program success, b) resilient program success, c) conflicted program success, d) precarious program success and e) program failure (McConnell 2010, 353-354). Let us overview a) and e) in detail. The remaining three forms of policy-success criteria are summarized in Table 1 (See Appendix for details).

To specify, by definition policy is successful if

a) it is implemented in line with objectives;
b) the desired outcomes are achieved;
c) the program creates benefits for a target group;
d) the program meets policy domain criteria;
e) opposition to program aims, values and means of achieving them is virtually non-existent, and/or support is virtually universal.

And, as failure is the opposite of success, a policy fails if

a) the implementation fails to be executed in line with objectives;
b) the desired outcomes are not achieved;
c) damage is done to a particular target group;
d) an inability to meet the policy domain criteria exists;
e) opposition to program aims, values, and means of achieving them is virtually universal, and/or support is virtually non-existent (McConnell 2010, 354).
Broadly based on this framework, which is particularly helpful for the current research interest, as explained supra, the thesis focuses on three policy-target groups, Estonian Russians (I), Non-Russian Russian-Speakers (II) and Estonian Old Believers (III), to whom the Government offers and creates opportunities that in the end should help to preserve their cultures in Estonia. A qualitative method is used in all three articles. Information used for analysis is collected via semi-structured personal interviews the author made with public servants and representatives of national minorities. Official policy documents (laws, official reports and analysis, policy programs, stenograms) and official descriptive-statistics analysis are also used. The information collected reflects the situation as by the end of 2013, i.e. the end of the implementation of the Estonian integration policy 2008-2013 (I, II, III).
2. ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF ESTONIAN CULTURAL POLICY

2.1. Policy instruments and their organization

Before analyzing what policy instruments the Government uses and organizes for national minorities it is important to understand the cultural context within which this is done. Estonian cultural policy does not formally refer to assimilation. However, public debates and research on the vitality of minorities’ cultures show that this is a problem.

To begin with, according to the population census 2011 – the last one available – the total proportion of non-Estonians in Estonia is 30% (Statistics Estonia 2011a). Estonian Russians represent 25% of the total Estonian population. Depending on their historical connections with Estonia, they represent two subgroups: a) Russians who migrated into Estonia in Soviet times (1945-1991) and b) Russians who have lived in Estonia at least since the First Republic (1918-1941). Nowadays, the total of the latter is probably around 37,500-50,000 (Mihhailov 2007, 2-3). Around 10,000-15,000 of them are Estonian Old Believers (EOB). The EOB have lived in Estonia since the 18th century and practiced Old Belief, i.e. a conservative branch of Russian Orthodoxy, which appeared in the 17th century as a result of the Schism in the Russian Orthodox Church (III). A third group are non-Russian Russian-speaking minorities (non-Russians), e.g. Ukrainians, Belarusians, and many other former “Soviet nations” who immigrated into Estonia in Soviet times. While many speak Russian as a mother tongue and/or second language, they have a non-Russian ethnic identity, more about which later. They represent 4% of the total population. And less than 1% of the minorities can be called “Western”, e.g. those who arrived in Estonia after 1991 and do not originate from the areas and/or cultures influenced by either Russian colonial history and/or Soviet Union membership, e.g. Germans, Italians (II).

Assimilation of Estonian Russians is a highly controversial issue for political reasons. The Government refers to the Constitution, laws prohibiting ethnic discrimination, integration policy and free Russian public education to claim that assimilation is not in the interest of Estonia (See only Council of Europe 2010). At the same time, Estonian citizenship and language policies, the disadvantaged socioeconomic situation of Russians as compared to Estonians and, most recently, the transition in Russian upper secondary schools to implementing Estonian as the language of instruction are used to claim that Estonian Russians face involuntary and state-imposed assimilation (U.N. International Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2013, 40; cf. NGO Russian School in Estonia 2014, 6).
From a sociological perspective the majority of Russians has not been assimilated, though.\textsuperscript{5} By 2011 1\% of all Estonian Russians speak Estonian as their mother tongue but still identify as ethnic Russians (Statistics Estonia 2011). 10\% of Estonian Russians who are Estonian citizens by birth and live in Estonia permanently at least in the second generation voluntarily assimilate via mixed marriages. So, the remaining 90\% still have a strong intergenerational Russian ethnic identity (Mihhailov 2007, 10). Disregarding this fact it is possible to assume hypothetically that if Russian is less used in education as a result of “language reforms” opportunities like the law on national cultural autonomy (Lagerspetz 2014) will become a more important in terms of sustaining Russian education in Estonia.

Then, assimilation of non-Russians and the EOB is a less ambiguous issue. Today, partially assimilated, but still having their own ethnic identity the older, “Soviet generation” of non-Russians, e.g. Ukrainians, Tatars and many others does not transmit their languages and identities to their Estonian-born descendants. This process started already in Soviet times. Besides that, many non-Russians live with Russians, not only in the same cities, e.g. Tallinn and Narva, but also in ethnically mixed families where Russian is used as the \textit{lingua franca}. Thus, Estonian-born generations of non-Russians tend to develop an “Estonian Russian” or “Russian” ethnic identity (II). Finally, the EOB assimilate into Estonian mainstream secular culture. The decline of religiousness and interest towards Old Belief is explained via secularization, generation gap, mixed marriages, which were already documented in Soviet times, and the disadvantaged socioeconomic situation that forces EOB to migrate into different cultural environments. While the total estimated number of all people originating from EOB families, i.e. “EOB by birth” is around 10,000-15,000 only 2,605 persons reported that their religion is Old Belief in 2011. The latter group represents “EOB by faith”, i.e. persons who have the religious identity of an Old Believer and practice Old Belief. Their congregations are small, lack younger generations and men, who should traditionally head congregations as spiritual leaders; the vast majority of members are elderly women (III).

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{5} Two theoretical perspectives on the assimilation of Russians exist. First, Laitin (1998, 217) argues that Estonian Russians can culturally assimilate in order to get higher-status occupations and improve their economic situation due to their living among Estonians for a long time and especially in places where Estonians dominate (Southern Estonia, Pärnu and Tartu) and also because Estonians resist accepting Russian as the second official language in Estonia. Ponarin (2000, 1535-1539) disagrees with Laitin, arguing that Russians cannot assimilate because Estonians do not recognize Russians as Estonians; Russians may gain political power to change minorities’ policy, and the majority of Russians lives compactly in monolingualistic environment, e.g. Tallinn and Ida-Viru county. At best, Ponarin concludes, Russians may become bilingual.}
So, assimilation has either already happened or is at least theoretically possible, which justifies the availability of opportunities to help minorities to preserve their own cultures for whatever reasons they consider urgent. Knowing this, let us see the policy instruments and their organization.

In general, the Government annually allocates money from the state budget to cultural societies of national minorities. The total amount of this support is 12% of all integration expenses made in 2008-2013 (See Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The total of</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>integration policy expenses</td>
<td>8,031,998</td>
<td>9,031,958</td>
<td>7,455,986</td>
<td>5,848,869</td>
<td>7,231,799</td>
<td>7,195,206</td>
<td>44,795,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support to the preservation of cultures and multicult.</td>
<td>1,146,402</td>
<td>953,218</td>
<td>754,888</td>
<td>832,321</td>
<td>735,447</td>
<td>786,000</td>
<td>5,208,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of support to the preservation of cultures</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ministry of Culture 2014)

According to the typology of policy instruments this money can be termed as non-coercive economic incentive, i.e. it does not oblige minorities to preserve their cultures, but it is a resource that by the definition of policy instrument should make cultural activities easier and motivate national minorities to preserve their cultures in Estonia if for whatever reasons (as shown supra) minorities think that their culture is potentially endangered or experience assimilation. If so, it is possible to assume that this policy instrument ensures self-selection of individuals among minorities who are interested and want to preserve their culture though the Government support available.

Then, several laws\(^6\), including the law on NCA, exist in Estonia so that one may argue that another type of policy instruments – regulations – is also available to serve the cultural needs of minorities. It should be noted, however, that the law on NCA has no legal means of establishing NCA (I), and other relevant laws which minorities use regulate the establishment and working of private organizations such as the above-mentioned cultural societies which are of NGO status. So, this is the organization of minorities as “units” or groups of people that should be briefly

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specified here. The number of active members in cultural societies is not officially collected, and it is difficult to estimate their actual size. According to the best information available the number of active members tends to be small (II, III) but they have been preserving their cultures already since 1988 when the first associations of national minorities started to work in Estonia (www.etnoweb.ee). Of course, it would be a form of groupism, as already explained *supra*, to expect all national minorities *per se* to be motivated or interested to preserve their cultures in Estonia because they speak one language, have a common identity or face either potential or actual assimilation. Minorities are different socially and economically, may have different life plans and interest towards cultural activities (I, II). However, what we have nowadays are 22 umbrella organizations that unite 214 cultural societies of national minorities, including 17 hobby schools that run various cultural activities from the organization of festivals to teaching languages. And regarding the EOB, 11 EOB congregations registered as NGOs, and there are around 7 non-religious NGOs, as well, which are run either by the EOB or non-EOB trying to help the EOB. Therefore, it is more precise to argue that the availability of money should help these already functioning, around 300 cultural societies to sustain certain traditions, identities, etc. And by doing so, they could hopefully attract more members, raise cultural awareness as much as is possible in the current situation.

Regarding the organization in terms of process there is one distinctive feature. All cultural societies receive project-based financing, which is the practical organization of the policy instrument. So, it is possible to argue that minorities’ culture is mainly preserved via projects and not “naturally” in families (II, III). According to the definition project-based financing represents “process-oriented management”, i.e. it defines the rules under which the Government allocates money to national minorities and the rules under which they receive and exploit money to preserve their own cultures. For example, cultural societies annually participate in project competitions evaluated by the commissions, write reports, which are controlled by donors, etc. One of the particular rules applies to the definition of culture, which is important to know for the analysis of successes and failures. The data available shows that the formal requirements and conditions of projects support the preservation of culture “retrospectively” or in “ethnic terms”, e.g. practice of traditions, folklore singing and dancing, but also linguistically, i.e. teaching languages. This requirement helps to differentiate ethnic cultural societies.

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7 Besides, as Estonia, similar to many other states, has a negative population growth, the majority of “Soviet” minorities, including Estonian Russians, do not grow in numbers with some minor exceptions, e.g. Azerbaijanis, Georgians or Lithuanians, which is a result of the new immigration process, as a comparison of data from the Population Census in 2000 and the Population Census in 2011 shows (Statistics Estonia 2011a; Statistics Estonia 2011b).

8 The total of all cultural societies run by national minorities, including those that have no clear ethnic agenda, e.g. sports, arts, is around 400 as of 2014 (see www.etnoweb.ee).
from societies that deal with “modern” culture, e.g. contemporary arts, hobbies, sports, etc.9 (See only Migration and Integration Foundation Our People 2013a; Migration and Integration Foundation Our People 2013b).

Now as one knows the very specifics of the organization of policy instruments as a process but also the organization of minorities themselves as groups of people working together in cultural societies, it is possible to doubt the effectiveness of solely one economic incentive and project-based financing and projects implemented by cultural societies to preserve minorities’ cultures and their communities in Estonia. Vihalemm (2011) maintains such skepticism. She says that

The goal of ensuring the preservation of ethno-cultural identity cannot be covered simply by supporting societies of national culture, as their activities have rather limited impact. Other measures should be developed to achieve that goal and to communicate those activities to a wider audience.10

However, as analysis shows, this is exactly what the Government does. So, let us now analyze the success of cultural policy in achieving the goal of cultural preservation via economic incentive and project-based financing allocated to NGOs.

2.2. Cultural policy-success evaluation

According to McConnell (2010) the program aspect of policy success can be evaluated by means of five criteria: 1) implementation in line with the objectives, 2) achievement of desired outcomes, 3) creating benefits for target group, 4) meeting policy-domain criteria and 5) policy actors’ support for policy means.

First, let us look at the implementation in line with the objectives. The availability of economic incentive and its organization via the system of project-based financing are used as the main indicators of program success, i.e. the number of implemented projects, the number of supported cultural societies and the total amount of money allocated to these societies from the state budget. Besides that, one may argue that as the support has been stable and always available for national minorities, the policy is successful (see Table 2 above).

Such an evaluation of success rests on measuring inputs and outputs. As one may see from the official reports (Council of Europe 1999, 2004, 2010), and as

9 These organizations are not excluded from financial support. They apply for money for their projects from different programs.

10 This translation is taken from the English summary of the monitoring.
maintained by some researchers of Estonian integration policy, as well (Kallas 2013), this is how the Government measures integration policy success as such. So, it is possible to conclude that the very availability of opportunities is the policy goal. If so, then according to its own standards this implies program success, i.e. the economic instrument and its organizations via project-based financing are implemented. However, this does not clarify the interest of this thesis – the ability of minorities to preserve their cultures via opportunities offered. The success of policy implementation remains unclear, as well (II). So, the next step is to analyze the outcomes.

Second, regarding the achievement of desired outcomes the analysis denotes conflicted success. To see this let us differentiate the goal of cultural preservation in short- and long-run terms. The former means that the “Soviet generation” of minorities, which started their cultural activity in the 1990s after the collapse of the USSR, has managed to sustain their traditions and identities as much as is possible, and this can be measured by the activity of cultural organizations. If this is correct, it can be interpreted as success. In the long run, however, the situation is less optimistic and implies a certain conflict between expecting minorities to preserve their cultures and the ongoing situation. Namely, the EOB and non-Russian minorities have a generation gap – traditions are not transmitted within older and younger generations. Regarding the Estonian Russians research shows that the younger generation of Estonian Russians may be not motivated and interested in “ethnic cultural activities” (See Vihalemm and Kalmus 2009 for the discussion). Again, while the total number of cultural organizations might be impressive, as shown supra, the total number of active members in these organizations tends to be small. Thus, it is not clear who will actively participate in the work of cultural organizations established by “Soviet generation”, and how, because organizations lack younger generations of leaders and active members (II, III).

Third, economic incentive and project-based financing are a specific benefit for the target groups because they need money to run various cultural activities that sustain cultures. For Estonian Russians this seems to be an additional opportunity that can be used along with Russian public education and media in Estonia. In the case of the EOB and non-Russians this appears to be the main policy instrument to resist assimilation. Nevertheless, analysis indicates various problems of organizing this incentive, which in turn implies a conflicted success, as explained below (II, III).

According to the minorities’ experience, project-based financing is given to organizations for too short a period (one year), which undermines their financial stability and multi-year activities; volunteer work is not always sustainable and reliable; activities are underfinanced; project application and report tend to be bureaucratic; money is transferred with delays; as donors have no overview about the quality of organizational work money is also allocated to nonfunctioning
(fictive) cultural societies; the system of project-based financing is decentralized among ministries and their agencies so that societies are overburdened with different rules of project applications and reports (II). Research also shows that it is not enough to offer money via projects. It is also important to organize such instrument according to the needs of minorities. Depending on the quality of organization, instrument may either improve the preservation of culture or create additional obstacles. This is, however, a complex task that demands coordination between policy-makers and minorities to find effective legal administrative solutions. This can be a problem because Estonian PA is highly fragmented and lacks coordination (III; Sarapuu 2011, 70). Then, from the Government’s perspective, minorities lack incentives to use policy instruments via the system of project-based financing as their communities as such are not “strong” and self-sufficient (II), e.g. the number of active members is small; younger generations are not interested in culture and do not participate in cultural activities; cultural societies lack effective leadership because the older generation of leaders is not active anymore as it was in the 1990s; leaders of the same national minority do not cooperate with each other because of ideological conflicts; organizations are not able to write good projects, which weakens their financial stability; the outcome of many organizations’ work is low.

In other words, the Government stresses the “weakness of community”, which does not allow the full use of economic incentive via project-based financing. Minorities, on the other hand, stress the problems of project-based financing, which do not receive sufficient attention in policy-making (II, III). The next section shows that this phenomenon might be related to the policy-domain criteria that legitimize and rationalize project-based financing and economic incentive as the main solution, without substantial debate over the quality and ability of such support to preserve minorities’ culture in Estonia.

Fourth, the organization of economic incentives via project-based financing meets at least two policy-domain criteria. According to the analysis these are neo-liberal and nationalist ideologies, and project-based financing as the main organizational form of Estonian PA (II). According to their own standards, both these criteria imply program success.

The organization of economic incentive via project-based financing does in fact not belong to the very specifics of national minorities’ support. This is the way Estonian PA as such performs so that “the logic of project-based financing” can be considered an important part of PA culture. According to the hypothesis this can be a result of economic uncertainty from the beginning of Estonian independence and economic crises, which undermined the capacity of long-term planning. Or, this can be a result of “European conditionality”, as various international organizations, and since 2004 various EU structural funds, always give project assistance not general budget support. This means that the Government itself has to fulfill project
rules and demands (II). In order to test whether or not EU conditionality influences the spheres of policy making which are not financed from EU funds, further analysis is required. Anyway, at the moment it is clear that project-based financing is a fully legitimate and dominating form of the organization of economic incentives, not only in culture but also in other policy fields (See only Raudla et al. 2014).

Another explanation of this phenomenon might be related to neo-liberal ideology, which Estonia is internationally famous for, and the application of this ideology as New Public Management (NPM) not only in Estonian PA but also in the NGO sector (Tõnnisson and Randma-Liiv 2008; Kala 2008). As is well-known, NPM prioritizes private-public partnerships, grass-root initiative, agencification and competitive projects. And neo-liberalism considers the individual to be highly rational, motivated and autonomous so that he/she is able to make rational decisions a priori in all spheres of human life, including the preservation of traditions, resistance to assimilation, etc. Indeed, analysis shows that the Government expects minorities to respond to neo-liberal values, i.e. self-sufficiency, autonomy, etc. So, non-coercive policy instruments and project-based financing reconfirm the core values of NPM (II).

The case of the Estonian law on NCA shows that the popularity of non-coercive instrument might also be explained via nationalism – another important ideology of the Estonian nation-state project (I). Leaning at the typology of policy instruments it can be assumed that unlikely economic incentives regulations challenge the Estonian nation-state that “shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages” (Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the Preamble). Due to their coercive character regulations imply a certain institutionalization of national minorities into public legal bodies, for example via the formulation of specific rights and duties, including the state obligations towards minorities. Besides that, taking into account that the vast majority of minorities are Estonian Russians and live in Estonia as a result of Soviet colonization and for this reason remind Estonians of Soviet occupation and the potential threat that the Russian Federation represents to Estonia nowadays at least symbolically, coercive instruments can indeed be considered too risky. This interpretation helps to understand why the law on NCA is a lex imperfect, as it only reaffirms the official values and beliefs of the Estonian political elite about the continuity of Estonian democracy since the times of the first Estonian Republic (1918-1941). In practice it is used symbolically to allocate, again, money to national minorities via project-based financing, which does not demand complex legal solutions that might be dangerous to the Estonian nation-state.

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11 The amount of money from EU structural funds was on average 34% of all integration policy in 2008-2013 and remains almost the same in 2014-2017 – 32% (Ministry of Culture 2014).
Fifth, support or opposition to program aims, values and means of achieving them is the last aspect addressed. In general, there is no open public opposition to the aims and values of cultural policy regarding the preservation of cultures as addressed in this thesis. However, the system of project-based financing has been widely debated between policy-makers and target groups. This implies conflicted success. It is already argued supra that while the availability of policy instruments is a certain benefit for minorities, the organization of this instrument via project-based financing has various deficiencies that both national minorities and the Government debated (II). From the official point of view the system functions well, and if problems exist, then national minorities are responsible for failing to use support efficiently. The Government is informed about the problems of organization, but this has not received sufficient attention to be solved (II, III). Remarkably, both the Government’s and minorities’ interpretation of the quality of support imply a pessimistic rather than an optimistic future for national minorities in Estonia (II). Nevertheless, “support to national minorities’ languages and cultures” is one of the integrations measures as written in the new Estonian Integration Strategy 2014-2020. It finances cultural societies to preserve multicultural society and ensure their sustainable work (Government of the Republic of Estonia 2014, 16). So, the question of how well economic incentive and its organization will attain the goal, remains urgent in this decade.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis evaluates the success of Estonian cultural policy regarding the preservation of national minorities by means of one economic incentive organized via project-based financing. Both the successes and the failures of this policy to achieve its goal exist, and they can be traced by the data available as follows.

According to the policy-domain criteria, this policy is fully successful. The very specifics of Estonian PA, which uses project-based financing as the main organizational strategy to implement policies as such, and the neo-liberal and nationalist ideologies of Estonian nation-state development, which prioritize non-coercive instruments and project-based financing as they help to reaffirm values deemed important for the Estonian nation-state, fully legitimize and rationalize the preservation of culture via projects. To have one economic incentive organized via project-based financing and ultimately a certain amount of projects by cultural societies of national minorities is successful as measured against inputs and outputs. So, according to its own standards, such a policy is successful.

At the same time, regarding the actual preservation of culture via economic incentive and project-based financing, which is the interest of this thesis, at least conflicted success is indicated in terms of outcomes achieved, benefits created and opposition to the policy means. The economic incentive is a benefit for minorities that helps them to implement various cultural activities, but project-based financing has various unresolved problems that hamper the instrument from being effective. Nowadays members of cultural societies are mainly the “Soviet” generation that has managed to preserve culture via the support offered. This work can be observed at different festivals or in hobby schools, where children of minorities have a chance to learn languages and so on. This is a remarkable outcome, but only for the short term, because in the long term, cultural societies still lack younger generations to ensure a sustainable preservation of their cultures. Both the Government and national minorities have questioned the achievement of desired outcomes. From the Government’s perspective, the policy as such does not fail but the minorities fail to use the policy solution created, as they are not economically and socially self-sufficient communities. Knowing the context of Estonian national minorities, but also taking into account the concept of groupism, it would be misleading (but this is what the prevailing Estonian ideology does) to expect that all minorities per se are or should be motivated to preserve their cultures, be socially coherent communities, etc.
Still, as we know, around 300 cultural societies and their members are motivated to preserve cultures and do this as much as possible. Their experience is important, as it helps to recognize that the Government does not pay sufficient attention to the organization of the policy instrument provided. So, the result, i.e. that this is a conflicted success, allows to be skeptical not merely about the ability of projects to achieve the policy goal, but more importantly, opens the discussion about why this remains the main policy solution, in spite of the problems mentioned before.

The analysis inductively shows that there is a conflict of two policy goals. The first goal is to allocate money and organize its usage – this is clearly understood to be the Government’s responsibility. By fulfilling this goal, which is successfully done, as shown supra, the Government expects national minorities to attain the second goal – the preservation of cultures. Even if we posit that this is exclusively the minorities’ responsibility, we cannot negate the fact that minorities themselves cannot change the rules of the game regarding the organization of policy instruments; but also the availability of instruments is the Government’s responsibility. In other words, it is possible to trace the implicit understanding of who is responsible for policy success and failure, i.e. the former belongs to the Government and the latter to minorities.

The conflict of policy goals, as the analysis shows, might be related to the fact that the Government considers a specific policy solution to be good a priori for ideological reasons and/or due to the specifics of Estonian PA. Administrative dependence on project-based financing and/or ideological preferences of such an organization cannot be easily overcome to offer alternative solutions how to support national minorities more effectively. At least from a PA perspective, in order to do this one should change Estonian PA as such, which is, of course, highly unlikely to happen even in the mid-run. So, the achievement of the first goal is easier in practice and politically more relevant as it shows success rather than failure. The question what the price of such success is remains open. Of course, the policy solution analyzed is not the only but one of many factors that in the end may influence the quality of minorities’ protection in Estonia. Still, the message is that even if one policy instrument and its organization is the only alternative available, which is still doubtful, it is not enough to offer support. It is also necessary to improve it to a meaningful level, because this influences the preservation of minorities’ cultures in Estonia, which, in turn, as explained previously, is a matter of Estonian internal and external security.

The thesis provides several avenues for further research. The first one is a comparative analysis of how the former Soviet republics from Latvia to Kyrgyzstan organize policy instruments to preserve Russian and Russian-speaking minorities within ideological and administrative contexts (II). Second, a comparative analysis of the organization of tourism in EOB settlements with other endangered Estonian minorities, like Setu and Kihnu, could provide better
contextual insight into the organization of economic incentives and their effects on culture, including the usage of economic incentives to develop culture as a part of creative industry (III). Third, the influence of EU conditionality on the areas of Estonian PA that are not related to EU funds is of particular interest (II). Fourth, Estonian policy-making represents an interesting case study for a governance-based approach which debates the objective nature of policy goals and the technical choice of policy instruments not only in cultural but also other policies, e.g. economic policy and innovation policy (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007, 2). Fifth, the influence of cultural policy on the acculturation process with a stress on how policy solutions influence the desire of minorities to preserve their culture, including the attitudes of the majority in constraining or promoting this goal, is of particular relevance (Horenczyk et al. 2013). In other words, how minorities should preserve their culture and how they understand it may depend on the Government’s decisions, which, in turn, depend on ideological and administrative factors. Finally, Hearn’s (2006, 166-169, 231-232) idea that power used via social organization creates culture is an intriguing research topic to analyze the preservation of culture via project-based financing or, to put it simply, projects. It can be argued that project-based financing represents a specific form of social organization with has a certain degree of power over cultural development, but it also has limitations, as this thesis implies. Within the nation-state context, this can potentially be a form of control over minorities to prevent their political mobilization via projects-based financing of culture, so that by receiving support, minorities do not debate the question to whom the state belongs but address rather technical issues of financial support (I).
### Table 1. Policy as Program: The Spectrum from Success to Failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Success</th>
<th>Resilient Success</th>
<th>Conflicted Success</th>
<th>Precarious Success</th>
<th>Program Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation in line with objectives.</td>
<td>Implementation objectives broadly achieved, despite minor refinements or deviations.</td>
<td>Mixed results, with some successes, but accompanied by unexpected and controversial problems.</td>
<td>Minor progress towards implementation as intended, but beset by chronic failures, proving highly controversial and very difficult to defend.</td>
<td>Implementation fails to be executed in line with objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of desired outcomes.</td>
<td>Outcomes broadly achieved, despite some shortfalls.</td>
<td>Some successes, but the partial achievement of intended outcomes is counterbalanced by unwanted results, generating substantial controversy.</td>
<td>Some small outcomes achieved as intended but overwhelmed by controversial and high-profile instances or failure to produce results.</td>
<td>Failure to achieve desired outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating benefit for a target group.</td>
<td>A few shortfalls and possibly some anomalous cases, but intended target group broadly benefits.</td>
<td>Partial benefits realized, but not as widespread or deep as intended.</td>
<td>Small benefits are accompanied and overshadowed by damage to the very group that was meant to benefit. Also likely to generate high-profile stories of unfairness and suffering.</td>
<td>Damaging a particular target group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continues …)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meets policy-domain criteria.</th>
<th>Not quite the outcome desired, but close enough to lay strong claim to fulfilling the criteria.</th>
<th>Partial achievement of goals, but accompanied by failures to achieve, with possibility of high-profile examples, e.g. ongoing wastage when the criterion is efficiency.</th>
<th>A few minor successes, but plagued by unwanted media attention, e.g. examples of wastage and possible scandal when the criterion is efficiency.</th>
<th>Clear inability to meet the criteria.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to program aims, value and means of achieving them is virtually non-existent, and/or support is virtually universal.</td>
<td>Opposition to program aims, value and means of achieving them is stronger than anticipated, but outweighed by support.</td>
<td>Opposition to program aims, value and means of achieving them is equally balanced with support for same.</td>
<td>Opposition to program aims, value and means of achieving them, outweighs small levels of support.</td>
<td>Opposition to program aims, value and means of achieving them is virtually universal, and/or support is virtually non-existent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(McConnell 2010, 354)
REFERENCES

All web links used in this article were valid as of 10 January 2015. Links cited in the text are not referred here.


Official documents, analyses and databases


SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Eesti vähemusrahvuste kultuur: politikakaeesmärkide saavutamine, instrumentid ning organisatsioon


On vähe teada, kui edukas on Eesti valitsus selle eesmärgi saavutamisel olemasolevate võimaluste abil (II). Integratsioonimonitooringuud käsitlevad teisest rahvusest inimest lõimumise edukust ning ametlikud aruanded vähemusrahvuste poliitika kohta kirjeldavad ühtmainitud võimalusi ilma analüüsimata nende mõju kultuuri säilitamisele. Seepärast on antud doktoritöö eesmärk analüüsida Eesti kultuuripoliitika edukust vähemusrahvuste kultuuri säilitamisel poliitiliste instrumentide ja nende organiseerimise abil. Töö keskendub instrumentidele ning nende organiseerimisele, kuidas nad aitavad säilitada vähemusrahvuste kultuuri ning millesse võib olla tingitud sellise poliitika edu või läbikukkumine.


Vastavalt andmetele on nn vabatahtlik majanduslik stiimul (ingl. non-coercive economic incentive) peamine poliitikainstrument, mida organiseeritakse


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I would like to thank my colleagues Prof. Tiina Randma-Liiv, Prof. Ringa Raudla, Dr. Külli Sarapuu, Riin Savi, and Dr. Erkki Karo for their comments regarding the articles. I would also like to express my respect to Prof. Rainer Kattel for his excellent leadership when he headed the Ragnar Nurkse School of Governance and Innovation, creating an excellent place to work, and to the current head of the school, Dr. Veiko Lember, for continuing this highly professional management style. And I thank the rest of my closest colleagues, especially at the Chair of Governance, for the friendly atmosphere: Egert Juuse, Leno Saarnit, Dr. Illimar Ploom, Aivi Remmelg and Piret Kähr.

The writing of this thesis has also benefited from cooperation with Prof. Donald B. Kraybill and Prof. Jeff Bach from the Young Center for Anabaptist and Pietist Studies at Elizabethtown College, Pennsylvania, USA. Financial support from the Estonian Research Council (grant number SF0140094s08), from the Ministry of Education and Research (grant no. SF0140063s12) and from the Estonian Science Foundation (grant no. 7577) are gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank the representatives of the Estonian national minorities and the Estonian civil service, who helped me to collect information about cultural policy and national minorities. Without their support, it would not have been possible to accomplish this thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to express my deep feelings of appreciation and gratitude to my wife Tatyana, my parents Yuri and Elena and my younger brothers Oleg and Maksim for their support of my academic career. And I thank my grandmother Valentina and, although they have unfortunately passed away already, also my grandparents Vyacheslav, Timofei and Raissa for their courage,
industriousness and commitment to family values, which they transferred to my parents, who in turn brought me up with dignity and helped me to become who I am. We are all the branches of one big tree.
PUBLICATIONS

Article I

The Law & Economics of the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities and of Russian National Cultural Autonomy in Estonia

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Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

Abstract

This essay analyses the 1993 Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities (LCANM), based on an earlier one of 1925 during the first period of Estonian national independence, as the potential basis for the National Cultural Autonomy (NCA) of the Estonian Russian community. The latter was in fact never established in Estonia – and the question would be, why not? Law & Economics analysis is used in order to find out more about this complex matter. First, we discuss the issue of whether the purpose of the LCANM has actually been to further (Russian or any) NCA in Estonia to begin with. Second, if it was, then the question remains whether it is a bad thing that this never worked, either from the perspective of the Estonian state or from that of the Estonian Russians.

Key words: national cultural autonomy; personal autonomy; cultural autonomy; Estonian Russians; integration; nation state; state continuity; Karl Renner; Estonian minority policy.

1. Introduction

In 1993, the Republic of Estonia, which had become an independent state again a few years before after decades of Soviet occupation, passed a Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities (LCANM), based on the Law on the Cultural Self-Government of Estonian Republic National Minorities passed during the first period of Estonian national independence in 1925. This is the – potential – basis for the National Cultural Autonomy (NCA) of the Estonian Russian community, which, comprising very roughly one-third of the population, is by far the largest, most important, and therefore most controversial one; one which is also made more tricky by potential links to Estonia’s largest, and not necessarily friendly, neighbouring country, and by the fact that it is the minority that used to be, USSR-wide, the majority and thus the dominating group. (For the purpose of this paper, we will use the term “Estonian Russian” for everyone residing legally within the Republic of Estonia who would define
him- or herself to a large extent via his or her cultural-linguistic-national roots from Russia and the former Russian Empire if it qualifies as Russia – the choice and definition of the term is a no-win situation, and so this one is just a working definition.)

Russian NCA, based on this law, has, however, actually never been established in Estonia – and the question would be, why not? To use Law & Economics (L&E) analysis in order to find out more about this complex matter seems to be particularly appropriate because of its objectivising nature in what can be described as maybe the number one mine-field of Estonian politics, especially after the Bronze Night événements in the spring of 2007. It is hoped that this will give us a clearer picture.

Looking at the matter from an L&E perspective, however, we cannot jump right away to the conclusion that the non-establishment of Russian NCA in Estonia is a failure of the law. In accordance with the Platonic question, “This is what the lawmaker must often ask himself: What is my purpose? Do I indeed achieve this or rather miss my goal?” (Nomoi, 744a), an important, if not the key question of L&E analysis (see the Introduction by Drehslcr and Raudla supra, with further references), we will first have to ask what the LCANM was actually for, and second, whether establishing Russian NCA is actually a good thing, either for the Estonian Russians or, ostensibly, for the Estonian state. First, however, we will briefly narrate the fate of Russian NCA in Estonia, so as to lay out the scene.

2. The actual fate of Russian National Cultural Autonomy in Estonia

At this stage, let us assume that the purpose of the 1993 Estonian LCANM, as well as of its 1925 predecessor, was to facilitate the establishment of NCA for minorities living in Estonia; that this includes the Estonian Russians¹; and that Russian NCA in Estonia is obviously a good thing for “Estonian Estonians” and Estonian Russians alike. (We will later discuss all those assumptions separately.) But Russian NCA was never established. Why not?

Concerning the 1925 law, leading Estonian Russian historian Isakov gives four explanations:

1. The law was composed to respond to the needs of small and compact minorities like Germans and Jews who lived mainly in cities. The Russian community was too big and dispersed in rural areas.

2. As a result of territorial dispersion, Russians could not easily cooperate to compose the national register required for the establishment of NCA.

3. The law gave no real advantage to Russians (contrary to other minorities) as the state already financed free primary Russian education.

4. Russians were generally poor and would not have wanted to pay any additional tax to maintain NCA, which the Russian NCA authority could indeed have levied. (2001, 44)

¹ According to LCANM § 2, NCA may be established by persons belonging to German, Russian, Swedish and Jewish minorities or by persons belonging to other national minorities with a membership of more than 3,000.
Estonian Russian historian Nikiforov also stresses the importance of wealth but adds another important aspect – level of social activity. He states that “as a result of poorness, Russians were more passive socially than Germans and this hindered the establishment of NCA.” (2008, 45) It should be added, as Isakov stresses, that in fact, Estonian Russians applied for NCA when Estonian minority politics became more nationalist. However, they did this at the wrong time – after the coup d’état in Estonia in 1937. So, the government informed Russian representatives that their application could be accepted only in 1938 after the new Constitution came into force. Soon enough, World War II put an end to this initiative. (2001, 45)

After the regaining of Estonian independence in 1991 and the passing of the 1993 LCANM, Russians have tried to establish NCA in Estonia three times. According to Nikiforov, Nikolai Solovey (1920-2006), the founder and former chairman of the “Union of Slavie Charity and Enlightening Organisations”, made the first attempt in 1996. Referring to his personal interview with Solovey, Nikiforov argues that the attempt failed, “not because Solovey’s organisation was not representative enough or the Minister of Culture was against it, but because the procedure of composition of national register had not existed at the moment.” (2008, 50) If this is correct, then Nikiforov must refer to the situation before 1 October 1996, when the Regulation of the Government of the Republic No. 238 (1996) came into force, which regulates the composition of national registers. (Briefly, a cultural society of a national minority or a union of such societies has the right to compose a national register. It should submit an application that it wants to do so to the Minister of Culture who refers the application to a committee composed of representatives of the Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of cultural societies of national minorities, which then informs the Minister of the quality of the application.)

Regarding the next applicants, representativeness became the key issue for the Minister of Culture and that commission. After the death of Solovei in 2006, Stanislav Cherepanov, a lawyer, local Russian politician from the “Russian Party in Estonia” and also the head of the NGO “Russian Cultural Autonomy” (NGO RCA), submitted an application to the Ministry on 30 March 2006 to receive permission to compose a national register. Cherepanov used the idea of Russian NCA in his campaign for the Parliament elections of 2007 by arguing that Russian NCA would help to preserve Russian education in Estonia. (Cherepanov 2007) As Cherepanov received no response to his application from the Ministry by 2008, he lodged a complaint with the Tallinn Administrative Court (2008) and the Tallinn District Court (2008). Both courts obliged the Ministry to take a final decision within 30 days, which the Ministry unsuccessfully tried to protest in the Supreme Court. (See also Chancellor of Justice 2008, 27-28). After the final analysis made by the Ministry’s commission, which contained the opinion of three Russian umbrella organisations, the Minister of Culture declined the application. The Directive of the Minister of Culture No. 69 (see

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2 In 2007, the Government launched the language reform of Russian upper secondary schools. According to Regulation No. 235 of the Government of the Republic (2007), Russian upper secondary schools have to teach 60% of subjects in Estonian by the year 2012.

3 Union of Russian National-Cultural Organizations “Sadko”, Tallinn Society of Slavic Culture, Union of Slavic Charity and Enlightening Organisations in Estonia. These are three umbrella organisations representing the vast majority of Russian cultural NGOs (around 150 of them). (See www.etnoweb.ee)
Ministry of Culture 2009) explains that neither Cherepanov nor the NGO RCA actually do represent the Russian community in Estonia. As the Tallinn Administrative Court (2009) did not satisfy Cherepanov’s complaint against the directive, he applied to the Supreme Court (2010), where the case is currently pending.

Subsequently, and finally so far, Sergei Churkin, another lawyer and member of the “Foundation Endowment for Russian Culture” (FERC), requested authorisation to compose the national register on 21 December 2009. The Minister replied that two applications cannot be simultaneously accepted. (Ministry of Culture 2010) Churkin disagreed with the Minister by pointing out that the law does not prohibit several applications (Churkin 2010), but unlike Cherepanov, he has not made further steps to challenge the decision of the Ministry of Culture.

Altogether, the above-mentioned three attempts to initiate a national register opened up the debate about who represents the Estonian Russian community, if there can be said to exist one, not only for policy-makers but for the Estonian Russian leaders themselves.

3. The Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities

But perhaps the purpose of the LCANM never was to further Russian NCA in Estonia? While this would sound disingenuous, mean-spirited or even outright seditious regarding a fully-democratic, liberal, and tolerant European Union member state like Estonia within many discourses, in the L&E context this is a perfectly legitimate question, because here, to hold that a law is supposed to accomplish what it says or even implies that it wants to accomplish is a rather bold assumption, as much as it would be bold to assume that a law actually does accomplish what it says it wants to accomplish.

3.1. Looking as if

The first, and rather simple and typical, explanation for a law could be that it was not meant to accomplish what it says it wants to accomplish, but rather, that it was supposed to look as if something should be accomplished, while this was never a priority or even not desired at all – in other words, a purely performative law. Again, in several discourses, this suggestion seems unfriendly, but the economic assumptions behind L&E suggest that such laws must not be terribly rare. In this case, what this would mean is that the LCANM was meant to look democratic, tolerant, liberal etc., especially towards friends and foes of Estonia alike who were interested in this matter and potentially important (European Union, Russia, the OSCE and so on).

In some sense, the scholarly literature on LCANM and Russian NCA points in this direction. Osipov, who wrote a monograph on the theory and practice of NCA in the Russian Federation and European countries including Estonia, has argued that while NCA has been realised in different places and under different names (personal autonomy, non-territorial autonomy, cultural autonomy, cultural self-government), it is in essence always a liberal declaration of minority rights protection, but rarely more. (2004, 408, 411)
It is not the purpose of this essay to discuss, let alone find out, whether this really was the case. Even if one argued so, naturally, this would be a simplistic and mono-causal and very likely wrong analysis. However, to assume this as part of the impetus for the law, and to investigate further into that direction, does not seem prima facie illegitimate from an L&E perspective. A similar thing has been argued by one of us about the famous Estonian e-Governance and especially e-voting (see Drechsler and Madise 2004; Drechsler 2004), after all. What is interesting regarding the L&E analysis, however, is that the consequence of this would be that the success of the LCANM would already lie in its passing, not in its implementation. Performative laws are by definition always successful if passed (ignoring public-relations problems if this fact becomes too glaring), and in this case, especially when looking at the literature, the fact that there is no Russian NCA does not touch upon the success of the LCANM at all.

3.2. Continuity

However, if we look at the specifics of the Estonian case, another, less usual reason for the LCANM beyond performativity presents itself, and this is the issue of state continuity. A basis of the Estonian state today is that the Estonian Republic did never cease to exist after Soviet occupation, but that it rather stayed intact and real and that national independence was just regained, not established again, in 1991. There is a large literature on that (see only Mäksoo 2003, but also Drechsler 1999 regarding a possible differentiation) but no matter what the outcome is (the consensus does point towards actual continuity), it cannot be doubted that in 1993, it was crucial for the majority of law makers in the Estonian Parliament, the Riigikogu, to establish and emphasise such a continuity. This could even go against the best interests of Estonia as perceived and against the ideological convictions of the politicians involved, as Raudla has recently argued comprehensively, also via an L&E approach, for the Financial Constitution of Estonia. (2010) How does this look regarding the LCANM?

As has been stated, the LCANM is the direct successor of a 1925 law from the then-independent Estonian Republic, and this law has always been highly regarded as proof for the liberalty and tolerance of that state. Isakov and another leading Estonian Russian historian, Shor, maintain that the law of 1925 was passed to celebrate democracy, tolerance and non-discrimination of minorities. Isakov argues that “the law demonstrated to the world the high level of democratic thinking Estonian politics had.” (2001, 44) Shor suggests that “Estonia wanted to support ethnic minorities according to the best democratic traditions.” (2005, 1) Finnish historian Alénius (2007, 458) and Isakov (2001, 34) explain such progressiveness in national issues by the ability of Estonians to understand the problems of minorities, as Estonians themselves had been a minority under foreign power. (To what extent these statements serve a tactical purpose as well is, of course, another matter; L&E analysis would suggest that there easily might be some.)

Concerning today’s situation, scholarly and political treatments seem to generally agree that the law of 1993 is a legacy of the “first Estonian Republic” and of the law of 1925 (e.g., Smith 2000, 12; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004, 6), and that the
point of the re-enactment was national continuity. (e.g., Feldman 2000; Ruutsoo 2000; Smith 2000; Aalto and Berg 2003; Smith et al. 2002; Kalmus 2003; Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009) In fact, pre-echoing Raudla, Smith reports precisely that the restitution discourse was so strong that the law was passed in spite of strong radical nationalist opposition in the Riigikogu. (2000, 31-43)

The answer regarding this point, then, is somewhat similar to the one supra regarding performativity. If the point of the establishment of the LCANM was to emphasise Estonian state continuity, the purpose was not to facilitate anyone’s NCA. In that sense, looking at the literature, the LCANM was definitely successful.

4. National Cultural Autonomy as such and per se

Let us assume now that the LCANM was actually designed to further NCA in general, and thus also Russian NCA, in Estonia after the regaining of independence. If so, then L&E-wise, we should assume that this would have to be either to the mutual benefit of “Estonian Estonians” and Estonian Russians or only in the interest of the former, because otherwise, it would make no sense. In order to be able to judge this, let us look at the concept of NCA and see what it is intended for, i.e. to which question it is an answer – one of the key perspectives for legal analysis generally. (See Drechsler 1998, 55)

4.1. Renner’s concept

NCA is one of those concepts that conveniently go back, or can be argued to go back, to one specific author. Thus, it is very easy to ascertain what it was designed for. Karl Renner (1870-1950) was a prominent Austrian political and academic figure: Social Democratic statesman, chancellor (1918-1920, 1945) and president (1945-1950) of Austria as well as an eminent constitutional lawyer. (Encyclopaedia Britannica; Osipov 2004, 35) For a long time, his context was the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1868-1918), which united about 53 million people representing 15 nationalities: Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Croats, Czechs, Ukrainians and so on. Depending on the specific territory, most of these groups were simultaneously majority and minority within one state. Growing nationalism fostered political conflict between many nationally mobilised groups who wanted to take over the state power to ensure official and public status of their language and culture within the Empire. (Osipov 2004, 35) In order to save the Empire, but also to ensure the preservation of all national cultures and languages, Renner developed the model of NCA in his essay “Nation and State” (2005).

To briefly sum up Renner’s argument, he declares the nation state to not be the only context within which national groups can interact with each other and even to be a particularly ill-suited one for his Imperial context. The nation state gives legitimate opportunities to only one national group to protect its own culture and language in the public sphere and on public expense. This creates conflict between the national majority and minorities who want to attain and exploit state power as well – arguably, the only guarantee of cultural and linguistic regeneration. A law which would stipulate as a rule the equality of all citizens according to liberal standards could not
solve this conflict either, as it would just be declarative in essence and would not provide public support to preserving the minorities’ culture and language. In order to reconsider the context and legal practice, Renner approaches state and nation separately as different phenomena. The state is denoted by territory, sovereignty, law and population (a classical definition of the state) with common interests like social welfare, security and economy. The nation, in contrast, is a cultural phenomenon, an association of individuals who share common sentiments, myths, history, emotions, comparable to religion. (Renner 2005, 17)

For this purpose, Renner develops NCA as a concept which generally rests upon legally defined principles of non-territoriality, personality, autonomy and multilingualism, to be realised through the public-administration system. Non-territoriality means that national cultures should be understood and supported as such, independent from a specific geographical area. Otherwise, territorial autonomy (TA) remains the only alternative, and TA threatens the territorial unity of the state, which is a key aspect of the latter. The personality principle refers to the idea that only a person himself or herself can define his or her nationality. Renner believes that this should create national communities naturally without state intervention. The state, however, should establish special registers in and by which all individuals can freely affiliate with their chosen nationality. After the individuals have so affiliated themselves, the state will grant them subjective public rights so that they can constitute a national community as a legal public body. This body should have financial, asset, administrative, cultural and representative autonomy to establish specific institutions and organisations, e.g. a tax-collection system, property, schools and universities with the national language as the language of instruction, elections and representative organs. (Renner 2005, 20-23, 27) Thus, the national community receives full control over its own culture and is responsible for both the failure and the success of its own development. Finally, as “national life is manifested mainly through the linguistic community” (Renner 2005, 21), one language should be official to ensure that everyone understands the state actions, but minorities’ languages should have official status as the local or regional language.

4.2. Problems with National Cultural Autonomy

NCA was never actually implemented in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and there are very few cases, e.g. Cyprus, where it could be argued that it has been. (Osipov 2004, 348) There are at least two groups of arguments related to peculiarities of modern society and community which point out what the problems with NCA would be today, conveniently represented, for instance, in a standard volume on the topic by Nimni. (2005)

First, it is argued that the nation state remains the dominating framework for majority-minority relationships, and the liberal approach is used to correct its failures in doing so. NCA can thus be seen as too challenging for the nation state and/or not far-reaching enough. Kemp claims that NCA may not be relevant because today, ethnic minorities are protected from discrimination via both international and national legislation and human rights organisations (2005, 209); Levey, that NCA is impossible when “jurisdiction over national identity is concerned” and that “national
identification, language and identity” are actually related to territory. (2005, 151) Kymlicka argues that, for example, nationally mobilised minorities in post-communist countries would simply not accept NCA as a substitute for TA because minorities would demand TA as the “Western” standard to solve minorities’ issues. (2005, 146) So, at best, as McGarry and Moore assume, NCA may suit dispersed, intermixed but not nationally mobilised groups. (2005, 88) In this case, as with any form of autonomy, NCA should be balanced with the state interests. (Kelly 2005, 215)

Second, it is pointed out that NCA rests upon the assumption that individuals of one nationality will cooperate with each other thanks to a common language and culture. However, Kemp highlights that in reality national groups are not as homogeneous as Renner seems to think. (2005, 214) Osipov also stresses that NCA is an example of essentialism or “group centrism” – the belief that communities are coherent social groups with a precise structure, organisation and leadership. (2004, 11, 424) Kemp’s and Osipov’s arguments are close to Brubaker’s (2002) well-known concept of “groupism” which stresses the “imagined” nature of national and ethnic groups.4 As a result, Kelly (2005, 176) and Nootens (2005, 58) conclude that if a community is heterogeneous, it may be difficult to find common representatives and ensure cooperation. But even if this were possible, NCA may create inequality among different ethnic groups. For example, Kelly states that individuals from quantitatively bigger national communities will pay lower marginal costs for goods deriving from NCA such as education than individuals from smaller ones. (2005, 176) In sum, NCA may be risky for socially passive or disconnected communities.

Finally, it may be argued that Renner’s concept of NCA simply assumes that denying minority rights to the minorities is not in the long- or at least mid-term interest of the national majority. This may well be the case, and it is quite certainly the more ethical position to take, but from an L&E perspective, a quick and tentative L&E analysis summation of Renner’s concept of NCA would show that NCA can be understood as a set of market-like mechanisms in cultural policy in order to address the problem of different groups within a nation state which is systemically homogenising:

- rationality – both majority and minority accept NCA as the most rational alternative to TA and the politicisation of culture;
- creating a “win-win” situation – NCA makes all national groups better off by ensuring power and resources to all of them, and the majority is spared ethnic strife and conflict without having to give up its dominating role within the state;
- individual choice of group adherence.

However, such an analysis reveals the weak points of NCA in the context of the modern state and community life as well:

4 Brubaker defines groupism as a tendency to see groups as internally bonded with common purposes, interests, agency and leaders. In practice, such homogeneity exists rather as image, stereotype or rhetoric that “ethnic entrepreneurs” create and support. Ethnic entrepreneurs claim to represent the interests of their ethnic group. In practice, these interests tend to be their own or at best their organisations’, though. (2002)
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- the majority holding the state power actually has no rational incentives to welcome NCA if the chance for genuine conflict is low enough;
- NCA has a normative background and objectives that can be understood to challenge the idea of the nation state;
- the “imagined” communities themselves, with a possible lack of inner solidarity, connectedness and cooperation, may not be able or willing to create or exploit NCA to begin with.

5. Russian NCA in Estonia

We will not address here the widely discussed question of how exactly the LCANM works, both as a law compared to other laws and international standards, and as regards those minorities which were actually able to establish NCA in Estonia, interesting though that would be. (See Kabanen 2006; Olle 2008; 2009; Osipov 2004, 364; 2008) Rather, as declared previously, we will now quickly look at how those problems would play out regarding Russian NCA in Estonia, first as pertains to the Estonian state, second, to the Estonian Russians.

5.1. Russian NCA in Estonia: Problems for Estonia

Estonia is sometimes characterised as a “nationalizing state” (Brubaker 1996, 105), “ethnic democracy” (Järve 2000, 1; Smooha 2001, 71) or even “ethnocracy.” (Yifmatchel 2006: 32) The current preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia is referred to as the official indicator of an ethnic nation state. (Rutsoo 2000, 52) Therefore, one may assume that Russian NCA challenges Estonia if it is indeed an ethnic nation state, efforts towards transformation towards a “civic nation state” (see Lauristin and Vihalemlem 2008) notwithstanding. The institutionalisation of Russian language and culture via NCA would then, subjectively at least, endanger Estonian culture and language. That means that Estonia is – or is perceived by a substantial part of “Estonian Estonians” and their leadership to be – a state in which not citizenship determines belonging but ethnic origin, and the purpose of which, clearly

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5 The debate might be summed up as follows: Official rhetoric has accepted Finnish and Swedish NCA (which are certainly seen as non-threatening to anything), and Estonian Finns and Swedes have composed their own national registers and conducted elections to their representative body – the Cultural Council – in 2004 and 2007 respectively. (See only Council of Europe 2004, 7; 2010, 8) It should be stressed that the LCANM actually does not define NCA and its juridical status. It regulates the organisation of cultural self-government, elections to representative organs, composition of national registeres, etc. The state annually allocates money to the two private organisations representing Estonian Finns and Swedes, the Foundation of Estonian Swedish Culture and the Union of Estonian Fins. (See only State Chancellery 2009a; 2009b). As a result, the legal status of cultural self-government (public or private) is an important issue in possible ammendments to the LCANM.

6 “... the state ... shall guarantee the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages ...” (Preamble, Constitution)

7 Smith shows such argumentation in the speeches of some Estonian members of parliament arguing against the concept of NCA in 1993. (2000, 32)
stated in the Constitution, is not the happiness of its citizens (let alone inhabitants) but rather the perpetuation of the Estonian nation and its cultural characteristics. This, of course, very much lowers the chances for minority NCA to succeed.

The second – not unique, but still highly important – feature of Estonia is that Russia is the old and recent colonial power that had occupied Estonia for centuries, most recently in the particularly anti-Estonian form of the USSR. The regaining of independence in 1991, singing or not, was not easy, and Russian rhetoric, sometimes more, sometimes less, certainly presents an atmosphere of threat that Russia might want to “reclaim” its *irridenta*.

Russian NCA may therefore simply be, and indeed is perceived as, a vehicle for Russians in Estonia to organise, to form a more cohesive group (as was stated and will be further explicated *infra*, it is remarkably incohesive so far), and, seeing that they are not infrequently perceived to be the “national enemy” (see only Mertelsmann 2005, 43), thus to turn more easily against the integrity of Estonia. In other words, Russians may mobilise themselves politically via culture – and that would be too high a price to pay for the advantages of Russian NCA. The fact that the Russian Embassy in Tallinn does cooperate closely with the Estonian Russian NGO’s on the cultural level (Russian Embassy in Estonia, see the Embassy’s website at http://www.rusemb.ee/relations/culture/), and Russia’s use of the Estonian Russians and their situation for various political purposes, most recently analysed by Schulze (2010), are well-known (if, for the impact it could theoretically have, astoundingly ineffective).

On the one hand, therefore, Russian NCA may appear as a “soft version” of Russian territorial autonomy (TA), which may be considered a direct threat to Estonian territorial integrity. (See only Miall et al. 2004, 99). On the other, as Russian NCA would not apply (just) to the specific territories where the majority of Estonian Russians live, but generally to Russian culture and language, it might be considered a possible solution exactly in the Rennerian sense to preserve simultaneously the integrity of the Estonian state territory and the Estonian Russian culture and language. Nonetheless, regardless of the differences between NCA and TA, the underlying issue is not what type of autonomy Estonia might give to Estonian Russians, but whether to give any autonomy at all, and so NCA can easily be seen, and obviously is, as a slippery slope towards TA or worse.

In sum, it may be argued that Russian NCA is not suited for Estonia from the majority and state perspective because it challenges the state model chosen in the form of the Estonian Republic and because of the specific *irridenta* issue. It may well be that in the mid- or long run, everyone would be better off if the state model was changed, including lowering the possibilities of Russia to utilise the Estonian Russians for their own purpose; however, from an L&E perspective, it is certainly easy to see why NCA in the Rennerian sense would not seem fully attractive to the “Estonian Estonian” side well beyond the unattractiveness NCA generally has for a majority.
5.2. Russian NCA in Estonia: Problems for Estonian Russians

Regarding the Estonian Russian side, the general problems with NCA mentioned above apply as well: The issue of “imagined community” and the one regarding the comparative apparent needlessness of NCA if the state already provides for minority protection and for cultural activities of the minority in question to a sufficient extent (which of course ignores Renner’s special impetus but may still be highly relevant psychologically).

The Estonian state does support Russian culture and language in both private and public spheres. Around 120-150 Russian cultural NGOs are registered in Estonia (www.etnoweb.ee). All of them have the opportunity to receive monetary support via various foundations such as the “Integration and Migration Foundation Our People”. Private Russian schools and Sunday schools can be established as well. Concerning public mechanisms, a Russian preschool, primary, secondary and upper secondary system of education has been publicly financed since Estonian independence. The state supports Russian-language media as well. (See Council of Europe 2004; 2010) In addition, legislation does exist which formally protects all individuals, including Russians, from ethnic discrimination, e.g. the Equal Treatment Act. (2009)

The transition of Russian upper secondary schools towards Estonian as the language of instruction to foster the integration of Russians has generated concerns about the future of public Russian education. The Estonian Ministry of Education and Research commissioned a study that analysed the attitude of Estonian Russians towards the transition, and generally, respondents thought that the transition will have a positive effect on Estonian society, e.g. via better language skills, easier access to academic education and the labour market for Estonians Russians. Most respondents, however, thought that the transition would threaten Russian language and culture (Emor 2008), i.e. they interpreted the Estonian minority policy as assimilative. (See Vetik 2008, 178; but see Lauristin and Vihlemmm 2009; cf. also Käosaar 2007) The transition might be understood as another tool of assimilation, which could be feared by NCA. On the other hand, the language transition clearly tallies with recent initiatives in “Western” Europe to cope with migration problems and the “failure of Multi-Kulti” as well (see just Kleine-Brockhoff 2010 on Germany), and Renner himself explicitly mentioned the need for one language in one country that is understood by everyone as a conditio sine qua non for an NCA setup. (Renner 2005, 21) So this very topic may be perceived as threatening Russian culture in Estonia, but NCA would not be a concept to solve this particular problem.

The second large issue here is that even if the Estonian Russians might need NCA, they are not so structured and led that they could easily attain it – well beyond any design on the state and majority part to prevent it for their own purposes. That is of course an especially tricky business, but we have some sociological data here to get a first idea about it anyway.

For example, over the years, some leading Estonian sociologists (Lauristin and

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8 The question was phrased as “How much do you agree that teaching subjects in Estonian threatens the preservation of Russian culture in Estonia?” Answers were as follows: totally agreed 19%, rather agreed 34%, rather disagreed 29%, disagreed 17% and absolutely disagreed 10%. (Emor 2008)
Heidmets 2000; Pettai 2002; Lauristin 2008) have discerned three socio-economic categories of Estonian Russians according to the level of their adaptation to Estonian society: Estonian citizens, citizens of the Russian Federation and persons with undetermined citizenship. Briefly, Estonian citizens or so-called “integrated Russians” (around 50% of all Estonian Russians) have succeeded in the new situation after the collapse of the USSR. Unlike Russians citizens and persons with undetermined citizenship, integrated Russians are wealthier, socially more active, more educated, speak Estonian and have close contacts with Estonians. If Nikiforov’s argument mentioned supra is correct that Russian NCA was not established during the first period of Estonian independence because Estonian Russians were poor and socially passive (2008, 45), then integrated Russians might be interested in Russian NCA. (Of course, they might also be the least interested precisely because of their integratedness).

But up to today, Estonian Russian political and civic activity has been very low. Remarkably, none of the “purely” Russian parties (Russian Party in Estonia, Russian Constitutional Party) have won seats in any recent Riigikogu elections. (See http://www.vvk.ee/index.php?id=11162, the website of the Estonian National Electoral Committee, listing “Elections and Referendums in 1992-2009”) And while it is true that many Estonian Russians cannot vote or be elected because they are not Estonian citizens, Estonian Russians with Estonian citizenship prefer to vote for Estonian mainstream parties (with some emphasis on the Centre Party which explicitly but by far not exclusively caters to the Estonian Russian clientele). And, according to Lauristin, only 2% of the Russians as compared to 12% of the Estonians belong to any NGO. (2008, 160)

An interesting additional perspective is brought by Estonian scholars who approach this issue by means of the originally social-psychological “individualism-collectivism” dichotomy. Lauristin and Heidmets (2000, 22) as well as Vihalem and Kalmus (2009, 111) find that values of individualism, pragmatism, hedonism and consumerism influence the formation of identities among “Estonian Estonians” and Estonian Russians. Vihalem and Kalmus specify that Russian identity is shaped by values of passiveness (global orientation, emancipation, consumerism, desire for capital) not activeness (adoptability, re-creation, social capital, reinforcement of success). (2008, 922-924) Vihalem and Kalmus find that the above-mentioned values do not support the reproduction of network identity and social capital among Russians. As a result, they conclude, Estonian Russians have not been mobilised after the collapse of the USSR, and this would hardly be possible today. (2008; cf. also Vihalem and Masso 2007; Pettai 2002)

And regarding leadership, the general perception, surely, is that Estonian Russians have no (overall, generally accepted) leaders, and the classic argument to explain this phenomenon is that the Russians who came to Estonia after World War II were mainly workers in state enterprises and that the layer of their intelligentsia, which was basically a technical one, was small. (See Sidelnikov 2000, 162; Lauristin and Heidmets 2000, 21; Heidmets and Lauristin 2000, 320; Järvi 2008 in a Riigikogu

9 In May 2010, 98,522 individuals residing legally in Estonia held the citizenship of the Russian Federation and 103,047 had an undetermined citizenship. (Statistics Estonia) Non-citizens with a permanent residence permit may vote, but cannot be elected, in local elections.
debate) The famous (by the 20th century) indigenous Russian minority of the Old Believers, loyal to Estonia, is by far too small and almost systemically without leadership (at least effectively; of course there are leaders on the micro-level, who, however, conflict with each other) to make a difference here. (See Aidarov 2006) And while there is the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia (35% of ethnic Russians affiliated themselves as Orthodox Christians in 2000, according to Statistics Estonia), and while the rich cultural activity of Russians in Estonia has been amply documented, most recently by Isakov (2008), the fact remains that all this is in the end not dominant within the Estonian Russian population.

To sum up, the analysis shows that while speaking one language and representing one culture, Estonian Russians have identities that rather sustain and develop social and political passiveness and individualism than activeness and solidarity. Local Russian parties are unpopular, and while some leaders who claim to represent Russian community interests exist, there are no real leadership figures to be seen who could make a difference and push NCA. The ambiguity related to the cultural-political representation of Russians and their ethnic-national nature further complicates the formation of common grounds that might unite all Russians in Estonia. Altogether, the Estonian Russian community can be said to be to a large extent “imagined” (as a community) in Brubaker’s sense. (2002) Chances for a successful push for Russian NCA in Estonia thus are fairly low even as regards the impetus from the Estonian Russian side.

6. Conclusion

L&E analysis has brought forth some interesting results regarding the LCANM and Russian NCA in Estonia. First, it is not clear that the purpose of the LCANM has been to further (Russian or any) NCA in Estonia to begin with – if it was designed to be purely performative or to emphasise Estonian state continuity, then it was successful and accomplished its goal regardless of NCA at all. If it was designed to further NCA, then the question remains whether it is a bad thing that this never worked – NCA is not an unproblematic concept, and it may be a “good thing” both for “Estonian Estonians” and Estonian Russians, or at least not surprising, even imagining optimal framework conditions, that it was never established in Estonia. For all inhabitants of Estonia, the counter-argument against NCA is that it undermines the nation state which Estonia still is and, if some reification is allowed, seems to be set and intent to remain for any foreseeable future; for Estonian Russians, it is that NCA is an inappropriate concept for what can be argued is a heterogeneous and passive community, if community even is the right word. These results are very likely to be unpopular with representatives of “Estonian Estonians” and Estonian Russians alike, which would mean by L&E standards, of course, that there might be something to them.
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Article II

ESTONIAN RUSSIFICATION
OF NON-RUSSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES IN ESTONIA?
A POLICY ANALYSIS

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Abstract. Non-Russian ethnic minorities, who immigrated into Estonia between 1945 and 1990 together with Russians, have been assimilating into Russian culture in Estonia after Estonia’s independence in 1991. We illustrate this and show why one can assume that this is not in the interest of Estonia, for both ‘idealistic’ and ‘cynical’ reasons. We then analyze the implementation of the six key policy instruments the Estonian Government uses to preserve ethnic peculiarities of non-Russian ethnic groups. Our findings imply a policy failure which has not yet been recognized. Finally, we suggest possible explanations for this failure.

Keywords: Russification, assimilation, non-Russians, ethnic minority policy, policy failure, neo-liberalism, project management

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1. Introduction

According to contemporary schools of policy analysis – from the classical American one (Dunn 2007) to Law & Economics (Drechsler and Raudla 2011:4–5) – policy measures intended to solve a problem may not actually do that or at least they have side-effects outweighing the positive impact of the measures. In the current essay, we address a phenomenon that is specific for Estonia but an interesting case study about how to deal with national or ethnic minorities in (Central and Eastern) Europe and beyond. We have termed this the ‘Estonian Russification of non-Russian non-Western ethnic minorities’, i.e. the phenomenon that policy instruments do not prevent the Russification of Russian-speaking ethnic minorities in Estonia who are seen as a part of the Russian cultural and linguistic sphere, but who not necessarily are. We refer to them as ‘non-
Russians. Their Russification would be a specific form of assimilation – not into the dominating (i.e. Estonian) culture, but into the Russian ethnic minority.

Why would that be a policy failure? We argue that whether one employs the ‘idealistic’ or the ‘cynical’ approach towards the relevant policies, this is a negative result for Estonia. In the ‘idealistic’ case, the reason for ethnic-minority policy is to preserve and develop the language and culture of ethnic minorities. This is actually the official rationale – in addition to teaching Estonian as the cornerstone of integration of non-Estonians (Council of Europe 2010:9, The Government of the Republic of Estonia 2008:5, 20, 22). The ‘cynical’ case means that Estonia still strives for an ethnically homogeneous nation state, endangered by Russia from the outside and Estonian-Russians from the inside. To specify, in the first case Estonia’s interest would be to support as many functioning ethnic minorities as possible, rather than to homogenize them under a ‘Russian’ label; in the second, the interest would be to divide et impera, i.e. to keep the ethnic minorities as fragmented and small as at all possible in order to prevent the rise of a more homogeneous larger and threatening Estonian Russian community. Thus, if it were so that the Estonian governmental policy would Russify all or most ethnic minorities, then whatever the rationale for ethnic-minority policy, the outcome would qualify as a failure because the policy goal would not be achieved.

To see whether this is true, we analyze the implementation of the six key policy instruments which represent the biggest and best financed field of the Estonian Integration Strategy 2008–13 – the field of cultural and educational integration. According to sub-goal No. 6, Estonia creates opportunities for ethnic minorities “to learn their mother tongue and culture, practice their culture, and preserve and present their ethno-linguistic identity” (Government of the Republic of Estonia 2008:22). Instruments are taken from the realm of the Ministry of Education and

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1 In 2011, 31% of the Estonian population was of non-Estonian ethnicity. While ‘Russians’ represent 25.5% of the total population, smaller ones like Ukrainians, Byelorussians and many others also live in Estonia. They represent 5.5% of the total population, i.e. within the total population of ethnic minorities, Russians represent 82% and others 18%, respectively. (Statistics Estonia 2011:56) As the Population Census 2000, the last one we have shows (Statistical Office), the more sizable part of the latter group or around 4.6% of the total population comes from the areas and/or cultures influenced by either Russian colonial history or Soviet Union membership or domination. To specify, the vast majority came into Estonia as economic migrants after World War II from various regions of the USSR (Katus et al. 2002:151–152), and, along with Russians, they represent the main target group of Estonian integration policy. ‘Western’ ethnic minorities like Italians or Dutch do not come from this background.

2 Municipalities with a big proportion of ethnic minorities, e.g. Tallinn and Narva, offer project-based support to the ethnic minorities. However, municipalities play a secondary role in the integration process and have different resources, objectives and approaches to integration. So, their support to ethnic minorities is fragmented and rather additional to the government support (see Sepp 2008:285). This is why we exclude municipalities from the current analysis, although they should be included in a larger, more comprehensive one.
Research (MER), the Ministry of Culture (MC) and Estonian Public Broadcasting (EPB)\(^3\), three from education policy and three from cultural policy:
1) Optional language and culture classes in public secondary schools,
2) Hobby schools (this is the official English term),
3) Private schools,
4) Cultural societies,
5) National cultural autonomy and
6) Publicly financed media.

The implementation of these instruments is approached from the state and the ethnic minorities’ perspectives, and available data on how the latter employ these measures is analyzed. Hence, the key question of this essay is, “Do the Estonian educational and cultural policy instruments regarding non-Russian ethnic minorities lead to their Russification in Estonia, and if yes, how?” Before we analyze policy instruments, we have to place them into the context of the Russification of ethnic minorities in Estonia, and of what the interest of the Estonian state is or should be.

2. Russification of non-Russian ethnic minorities in Estonia

In general, the term ‘Russification’ addresses the impact of the Russian Government’s policy regarding the assimilation of ethnic minorities in times of the tsars, Soviet Russia and the Russian Federation. It is often used to demonstrate that Russification was a deliberate and planned policy (see only Hirsch 2000). However, critics argue that it is an ambiguous concept because Russification was not an official policy objective or because scholars of Tsarist and Soviet Russia did not have sufficient data to fully prove it. It is conceded that such a policy might have existed, but only unofficially or was poorly coordinated (Weeks 2004), and that it finally failed because many former ‘Soviet nations’ have built their own independent states (Jansen and Ruutsoo 1999).

In our context, however, we mean by Russification a decidedly unintentional consequence of ethnic-minority policy by the Estonian Government. It is a process of homogenization of the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities into the Russian cultural and linguistic sphere in Estonia since 1991. This phenomenon was neither discussed in politics – as the analysis of Riigikogu stenograms shows\(^4\) – nor

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\(^3\) Until May 2009, the Office of the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs (OMPEA) implemented policies to support ethnic minorities together with MER and MC. The government headed by Prime Minister Andrus Ansip (Reform Party) closed OMPEA, which was headed by Minister Urve Palo (Social Democratic Party), after the Social Democrats left the Coalition. The tasks of OMPEA related to ethnic minorities and their integration were delegated mainly to the MC (Government Communication Unit 2009a, 2009b).

\(^4\) The Riigikogu database (http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=advsearch) was used for the analysis. Combinations of key words like Russification, ethnic minorities, national minorities, non-Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Tatars and their combinations, e.g. Russification of non-Russians (in Estonian) were used to find records related to the discussion of the Russification of ethnic minorities in Estonia in the period of 1992–2012.
addressed in policy programs and reports, but Estonian linguists documented it well, as will be shown later. Only Marju Lauristin, the Estonian academic and Social Democratic stateswoman, probably the most respected researcher of ethnic relations in Estonia, stated in 2000 in a parliamentary debate about the assimilation of Russians that “the only assimilation in Estonia, and not only in Estonia, which has happened and is still happening, is the assimilation of non-Russians by the Russian minority” (2000).

However, the public debate about assimilation of ethnic minorities in Estonia is mostly about Estonian-Russians, partially because of the extreme importance Estonians attach to their language and culture as the primary indicator of national belonging (Järve 2005:68–71), partially as a result of Estonia regaining its independence and the historically unfriendly relations with Russia (Mälksoo 2003), and partially because ‘Russians’ may think of the Estonian nation state in terms of involuntary assimilation imposed by the state via integration (Vetik et al. 2008:178). So, the issue of the assimilation of smaller ethnic groups has always been and has remained a less politically and academically important issue (Verschik 2005:378–379).

The terms ‘Russians’, ‘Russian-speaking population’ and ‘Russian speakers’ are widely used in Estonian academia, policy and media to sum up most of the 142 different ethnicities and 109 languages spoken in Estonia as registered by the Population Census of 2000 (except of course the Estonians themselves and ‘Western’ minorities). Such a ‘macro-sociological’ approach reflects the linguistic situation. 109 languages are spoken in Estonia as a mother tongue, whereas 67% of the population speak Estonian and 30% Russian and only around 3% of the population speak the other 107 languages (Appendices 1 and 2, Statistical Office of Estonia 2001:14–16). In such a situation, identifying ethnic minorities as Russians is convenient. However, from a perspective of ethnic identity which we may term post-colonial, to call people who speak Russian Russians perpetuates the result of their Tsarist or Soviet colonization (Hirsch 2000:225, Livezeau 1995).

In Soviet times, many non-Russians did not speak the language of the ethnic group they were affiliated with (anymore) (Statistical Office of Estonia 1995:106–111). There was a noticeable trend of ethnic assimilation by the end of the USSR (Anderson and Silver 1983, 1989:646). However, before and after 1991, there are prima facie individuals in Estonia who have affiliated themselves with non-Russian ethnic groups even if they do not speak the language of the ethnic affiliation or speak it as a second language, e.g. Russian-speaking Byelorussians etc. Urbanization and industrialization in Soviet times substantially enlarged inter-

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5 This includes all policy documents and reports referred to in this essay that address ethnic minorities, e.g. Council of Europe (2010, 2004, 1999), Ernst and Young (2009), Government of the Republic of Estonia (2008), etc., and we assume that this list is more or less exhaustive.

ethnic contacts (see Botev 2002:693, 698, Fisher 1977:408), and thus, many non-
Russians in Estonia live with Russians, not only in the same settlements, e.g.
Tallinn and Narva, but also in ethnically mixed families (Hallik 2010:12). This
explains to some extent why Russian has remained the lingua franca among ethnic
minorities even after Estonia regained independence in 1991.

Next, regarding the influence of religion on ethnic identity, it should be noted
first that Estonia has one of the most secularized societies and some of the most
liberal religious policies in the world (Ringvee 2008:181). In 2000, 31.8% of the
population affiliated with a certain religion (14.8% Lutherans, 13.9% Orthodox
and 3% others faiths) (Statistics Estonia 2001:29–30). The majority of non-
Russian ethnic groups belong to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), e.g. 86% of
the Ukrainians, 83% of the Byelorussians and 60% of other smaller ethnic groups.
Some very few Ukrainians belong to the Ukrainian Uniate Church (11 persons
officially registered), and Armenians have their own churches in Tallinn with
services conducted in their own native language. Tatars and Azeri as the biggest
non-Christian groups represent 1,387 Muslims who have one common congrega-
tion in Tallinn (Statistics Estonia). Russians and non-Russians are more religious
than Estonians because “religion and national identity becomes important for
people who live outside their historical homeland” (Statistical Office of Estonia
2001:31). If this is correct, then the ROC may rather sustain Russian ethnic
identity among Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other smaller ethnic groups belong-
ing to the ROC, e.g. Chuvash, Maris etc. Uniate Ukrainians, Armenians and
Muslims seem to have a more resistant position to Russification via religion, as
their ecclesiastic structures and worship are not based on the Russian language and
culture. In both cases, however, religious affiliation (especially among Soviet
generations who grew up in secular society) does not mean that people with a
certain religious affiliation per se perform religious activities. Rather, they may
have sentiments without practice. ‘Active’ believers, whose number is obviously
smaller than the officially registered one, may develop an ethno-religious identity
depending on the ‘religion’ of their families and parents, but the ROC as the
dominating one seems to have the most influence in our case.

Finally, concerning the future of non-Russian ethnic minorities in Estonia,
Estonian linguists have made some pessimistic prognoses. Rannut (2008:429)
estimates that “only 40% of members of ethnic minority groups have maintained
their language of ethnic affiliation, others shifted to Russian during the Soviet
times.” Then, non-Russians themselves do not think that their languages and
cultures will exist in Estonia in the near future because they have low ethnic
identity and do not speak the language of ethnic identification with children
(Džaparidze and Kolga 1999, Viktorov 1999). So, languages are lost already in the
third Estonian-born generation (Künn 2010:149–150, Rannut 2008:403) and the
children, as Künn (2008:189, 200–201) finds, develop a new ‘Estonian Russian’
identity (see also Fein 2005).

In sum, similar to the Soviet period, the vast majority of ethnic minorities has
continued to assimilate into the Russian culture and language in Estonia since
1991. The older, ‘Soviet’ generation of non-Russian ethnic minorities often has a non-Russian ethnic identity but does not necessarily speak the ethnic language as a result of their assimilation in Soviet times. Their children or the Estonia-born generations do not speak the language of their own non-Russian speaking parents and grandparents even if those do speak non-Russian, and tend to develop a Russian ethnic identity. Therefore, Russification seems to be an appropriate term to denote the homogenization and assimilation of ethnic minorities into the Russian cultural and linguistic sphere in Estonia.

3. Why should the Republic of Estonia support non-Russian ethnic identities and cultures?

So, if non-Russian Russian-speaking minorities tend to Russify in Estonia as we speak, one would assume that ethnic-minority policy is designed and implemented in order to counteract this trend. Before we look at the policy instruments that could do so, let us first deal with the argument of why this should be so, i.e. with both the ‘idealist’ and the ‘cynical’ perspectives, which represent the Estonian nation state in terms of ‘good’ liberal and ‘bad’ ethnic nationalism (Ruutsoo 2000).

3.1. The idealist perspective

The idealist perspective, which has recently been enriched by the multiculturalism discourse, is well known. It represents the official liberal-democratic explanation of the Estonian nation state’s building-process and the justification of state support for ethnic minorities.7 Estonia’s ability to influence Russian minority politics is beyond the scope of this essay, but the international aspect helps to draw attention to another important interpretation. According to this, resistance to Russification is not a ‘personal problem’ of Estonians with Russians. It is a

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7 Various forms of liberalism exist that lie between extreme individualism (hostile to collective associations including the state as limiting personal autonomy, self-determination, responsibility, freedom, etc.) and communitarianism (collective associations including state to help the individual to realize his or her autonomy, self-determination, responsibility, etc.). (Schwartzmantel 2008:55) In line with the general practice of Estonian liberalism, one may see both individualist and communitarian features of liberal thinking here. The former exists in politics. For example, Estonia does not prioritize any particular ethnicity and grants equal rights to everyone who wants to preserve their own ethnicity in Estonia. (Constitution §12, Government of the Republic of Estonia 2008), and Estonia protects the political and social rights of individuals regardless of their ethnicity and prevents their ethnic discrimination as the Council of Europe demands (2004, 2010). At the same time, the communitarian form of liberalism is directly related to the policy-making and implementation. The Government uses policy instruments to allocate budget money, not to single individuals but to ethnic minorities explicitly via their representative organizations in order to preserve and develop their languages and cultures. These minority organizations fall under the definition of non-Russians. This does not mean that other, e.g. Western ethnic minorities are excluded from the support. So, the universal approach to ethnicity exists in politics and the ethnicity-specific one in policy simultaneously.
global’ issue that Estonia as a state socializing into the ‘democratic West’ and the EU (Noreen and Sjöstedt 2004, Rütsoo 2000) wants to address. Hence, Estonians resist Russification not because they are afraid of Russians but because they genuinely support others to build their own states, in the name of democracy and national self-determination. But again, to then promote one’s own non-Russian ethnic groups would only make sense on any level.

3.2. The cynical perspective

The cynical perspective is related to the discourse regarding Estonian-Russians within the Estonian nation state. In spite of the socioeconomic and political fragmentation of Estonian-Russians, they are still perceived as a nationalistic and homogeneous community. Estonians are afraid of their own Russification, which they experienced in Tsarist and Soviet Russia (Nørgaard et al. 1999), and this is still considered possible to recur. Until today, Estonians tend to think about the loss of ethnic homogeneity in Estonia, which existed in ‘the First Period of Independence’ (1918–1940), as the origin of interethnic tension (Lauristin 2008a: 46). The rise of a homogeneous and powerful Estonian-Russian community is conceived as possible. The question how to protect Estonians from Russification still seems urgent. Estonians by and large still consider Russians to be a politically homogeneous community (which is not true; Smith and Wilson 1997:861, Vihalemm and Kalmus 2008:923) because it represents the not-always-friendly-to-Estonia Russia (Mertelsmann 2005: 43, Petersoo 2007:124–129, Ciziunas 2008, Schulze 2010).

Based on this fear, the attempt to ‘divide and govern’ the monolithic post-Soviet Russian-speaking population into smaller ethnic communities could be a solution to the problem. It would prevent the rise of a homogeneous power confronting the Estonian state and its homogenizing, ethnic thrust. It should be stressed that the comparatively low number of non-Russians makes one doubt their ‘physical’ ability to fragment the Russian-speaking population into distinctive ethnic communities and become an alternative to Estonian-Russians in politics. However, as regards the discourse, both at home and abroad, non-Estonian opposition against demands of Estonian-Russians may be powerful. Non-Russian leaders may easily prefer cooperating with the Estonian state rather than be in the opposition with nationalist Estonian-Russians, not only because of the experience of assimilation during Soviet times but because of the growth of anti-Russian sentiments nowadays (see Allison 2008, Giuliano 2011). While this is open to debate, the fact is that already today, the symbolic stress on ethnic peculiarities as such, regardless of quantity, seems to play a positive role for Estonia in the discussion about ‘friends and enemies’ of the Estonian nation state, i.e. ‘good’ cultural leaders who support Estonia and ‘bad’ ones who may do ‘Russia’s work’. Such more or less symbolic fragmentation would also help to

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8 The ethnic-minority proportion in 1934 was 12% as compared to 31% in 2007. (The Government of the Republic of Estonia 2008:5)
denote Estonia as truly multicultural, rather than a bicultural ‘Estonian-Russian’ society. And internationally, vis-à-vis the EU or, in the field of culture, the even more important Council of Europe or OSCE (Benedikter 2008:108–109), one could show that one is generally in favor of ethnic minorities, just excepting the Russians.

*In sum*, approaching the support of ethnic minorities as the objective of the Estonian Government by means of ‘idealistic’ and ‘cynical’ perspectives shows that it may have different rationales, but all of them share one common normative understanding – it is good for the state and government to support non-Russians in Estonia. Thus, it is possible to assume that the current government policy does not intend to Russify ethnic minorities. To the contrary, it strengthens their cultures, languages and identities. Let us see whether this is the case empirically.

### 4. Estonian cultural and educational policy and the prevention of Russification of ethnic minorities

The Estonian Integration Strategy 2008–2013 encompasses three areas: cultural-educational, socio-political and legal. The cultural-educational field is the biggest and best-financed one. According to sub-goal No. 6, state support is aimed at preserving and developing ethnic minorities’ cultures and languages. Therefore, we will now concentrate on the six key policy instruments in this field: 1) optional language and culture classes in public secondary schools, 2) hobby schools, 3) private schools, 4) cultural societies, 5) national cultural autonomy, and 6) publicly financed media. Our main interest is the implementation of these instruments from the government and ethnic minorities’ perspective with an emphasis on how minorities use these instruments for themselves.

#### 4.1. Non-Russians and education policy: optional classes, hobby schools and private schools

Public schools in Estonia have either Estonian or Russian as their language of instruction (Kirss 2010:9). So, non-Russians have to concede that their children will attain education in one of these languages. In order to resist Russification (and Estonization) within public education, non-Russians may establish their own 1) optional language and culture classes in secondary schools, 2) hobby schools and 3) private schools. The descriptive statistics used below was received by the MER from the Estonian Education Information System (EHIS, www.ehis.ee). The accuracy of information should be treated with caution as it solely relies on the schools’ reports.

The organization of *optional language and culture classes in public secondary schools* is financed from the state budget via MER. According to the Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act § 21 (5) the secondary school should organize the teaching of a language and culture to students who speak a language (either as their mother tongue or a second language spoken at home)
which differs from the language of instruction. See also Government of the Republic of Estonia 2003). Second, according to the Hobby Schools Act (HISA) § 3, “a hobby school is an educational institution in the area of youth work that provides hobby education and versatile development of personality, including the practice of native language and culture.” HISA regulates the work and establishment of all hobby schools, including ethnic ones. If registered in EHIS, hobby schools of ethnic minorities may apply annually for project-based support from MER and the Integration and Migration Foundation Our People (IMFOP). MER allocates basic financing (baasfinantseerimine) that covers such expenses as rent, teaching materials and salaries. IMFOP finances education for hobby-school teachers in their countries of ethnic origin. Third, the Private School Act § 15 stipulates that private schools specify the language of instruction in the statute. So, non-Russians may establish their own schools with the language they speak or want to speak as the language of instruction. In sum, non-Russians do have state-financed instruments that may be helpful to resist Russification. But how are these instruments utilized?

First, data on students’ mother tongues in public schools was not collected in Estonia until 2003. In 2003, the number of children who might represent non-Russian ethnic groups in public schools was relatively small, and these children studied in different schools (Appendix 3). Hence, only three schools had a sufficient number of students (Ukrainians, Latvians and Germans) to organize such classes. The period of 2005–2010 shows a similar situation (Appendix 4). According to the information available, which is not systematically collected, optional classes are not widespread (Kääsaar 2011a, Legal Information Centre for Human Rights 2009:2). If opened, they do not work consistently. The only exception of a sustainable arrangement is the Ukrainian class at the Kauuma School in Sillamäe (see Appendix 5). Second, the total of registered hobby schools, their students and financial support has grown during the last decade.9 So, nine hobby schools were open in 1999, around 10 in 2002, approximately 30 hobby schools were in operation in 2004 and 32 in 2010 (Council of Europe 1999:57, Council of Europe 2004:57). It should be noted that the number of ‘fully operating’ hobby schools may be smaller than officially registered. Consider, for example, that only 17 out of the 32 registered hobby schools had students and received financial support in 2010–2011 (13 and 12 hobby schools in 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 respectively). The number of students varies across hobby schools from 6 to 40 children per school as registered in 2011. Additionally, the total number of students in non-Russian hobby schools grew from 131 to 340 in 2008–2011. Such a rapid growth has not been researched and deserves attention because in many cases, it was remarkably large, e.g. the Kabardian hobby school had 2 students in 2008 and 27 in 2011 (in 2000, 14 Kabardians lived in Estonia), and the Narva Uzbek Sunday School had 7 and 26 students, respectively. Still, the total of students in non-Russian schools in 2011 was very small – around

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9 MER allocated to Hobby schools € 29,028 in 2008, € 71,090 in 2009 and € 92,244 in 2010. (Kääsaar 2011b)
0.5% of the whole non-Russian population in Estonia (Käosaar 2011b). Finally, in 1998–2009, Estonian, Russian, Finnish and English were the languages of instruction in private schools (Council of Europe 1999:51, Council of Europe 2004:62, Council of Europe 2010:43). EHIS does not contain information about any private schools with non-Russian languages of instruction in its database. So, it appears that none of the non-Russian ethnic groups have established their own private schools since 1991.

The situation of the hobby schools and optional classes has sparked a debate about the effectiveness of these instruments. From the government perspective, optional classes are not popular because parents have no incentive to establish or sustain them; the number of students is not sufficient to open such classes; and students do not study compactly in one or several schools (see Council of Europe 1999:57, Council of Europe 2002:13, Council of Europe 2004:56). According to the ethnic minorities, hobby schools cannot fully function because they are under-funded; they receive project-based support, which undermines financial stability and multi-year activities; and work only thanks to volunteers (Council of Europe 2005:8, 30–31, Poleštšuk 2007:9, 15, 27). Besides that, HSA does not take into consideration the specifics of hobby schools opened by ethnic minorities, e.g. if hobby schools in Estonia generally offer to children recreational opportunities, then ethnic minorities establish hobby schools in order to teach and learn their own languages and cultures (Krimpe et al. 2002:17–18). Nevertheless, some commentators disagree that this law has deficiencies and think that the work of hobby schools depends on ethnic communities first and foremost.

For example, Mütripeal (2006:20) argues that HSA can respond to the needs of ethnic minorities only if people unite into a strong lobby group. And former president of the UEN Jaak Prozes (2001:1) argues that hobby schools should not be understood only in terms of insufficient state support “because the work of hobby schools depends on the activeness of the ethnic group, the strength of the ethnic identity, the number of families and intelligentsia speaking the ethnic language, the density of connections with the home country.” Regarding private schools, the content analysis of stenographic records of the Parliament sessions shows that private schools of non-Russian ethnic minorities have apparently never even been discussed.10 Rather, private schools for ethnic minorities were addressed as a too expensive alternative to public schools (Issakov 1996). Russians and the Russian-speaking population are less wealthy and have a higher risk of poverty and unemployment than Estonians (Lindemann and Võõrmann 2010). This observation can probably be transferred, perhaps even a fortiori, to the non-Russians. Namely, if the cost of private education is an important factor, then it may explain why non-Russian ethnic minorities have not opened any private

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10 The Riigikogu database (http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=advsearch) was used for the analysis. Combinations of key words like ethnic minorities, national minorities, private school and private education were used to find records related to private schools and ethnic minorities in the period of 1992–2012. Five documents were found. None of them contain information about non-Russian ethnic groups and private schools.
school in Estonia. Public schools are available for free, and it is too expensive for small non-Russian ethnic groups to open and run their own private schools.

To sum up, the quantitative data on optional classes, hobby schools and private schools show low activity in the usage of these instruments, and the qualitative data show the debate about who is responsible for this. From the government perspective, the preservation of language and culture by means of given instruments fully depends on ethnic minorities. According to the ethnic minorities’ point of view, instruments are prima facie deficient, i.e. undermine the ability of ethnic minorities to preserve their own language and culture. Both perspectives allow making pessimistic rather than optimistic prognoses about the future of non-Russian languages and cultures in Estonia.

4.2. Cultural policy: cultural societies, national cultural autonomy and publicly financed media

Cultural policy offers financial support to cultural societies, national cultural autonomy (NCA) and publicly financed media. Support is allocated via MC and its agency, the Integration and Migration Foundation Our People (IMFOP).

First, the Non-profit Association Act regulates the establishment and work of cultural societies. The number of members in 236 NGOs registered as ethnic cultural societies whose majority represents non-Russians (see www.etnoweb.ee)\(^{11}\) is not systematically collected. As an exception, OMPEA and IMFOP demanded of the applicants for basic funding from IMFOP to submit a declaration of the total number of members in 2008 (Appendix 6). The accuracy of data received has never been controlled and should be treated with caution. For example, applicants might declare more members to demonstrate a bigger size of their organization.\(^{12}\) Thus, the actual number of members is probably much smaller, which accords to macro-sociological surveys showing low participation of Russians and Russian-speakers in NGOs (2% as compared to 12% among Estonians) (see Lauristin 2008b:160).

Second, national cultural autonomy (NCA) is regulated by the Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities (LCANM) (on NCA in Estonia, see generally Aidarov with Drechsler 2011). According to LCANM, cultural autonomy may be established by persons with Estonian citizenship belonging to German, Russian, Swedish and Jewish minorities and persons belonging to minorities with a membership of more than 3,000. So, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and potentially Tatars might establish their own NCA, the way that Finns and Swedes did in 2004 and 2007 respectively.

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\(^{11}\) 29% represent Estonian Russians, 62% non-Russians and 9% Western ethnic groups.

\(^{12}\) According to Appendix 6, 106 out of 495 Chuvashs (as registered in 2000) belong to cultural societies, which formally implies a level of sociocultural activity. Nevertheless, interviews with two leaders of Chuvash societies from Narva and Tallinn show a different situation. Around 7–9 Chuvashs in Tallinn and 10–12 in Narva participate in the work of societies on a weekly basis. More Chuvashs visit societies mainly during festivals but do not contribute to the work of societies substantially (Aidarov 2011a, 2011b).
It should be noted that the declarative nature of LCANM has already been diagnosed in scholarship (Aidarov with Drechsler 2011, Osipov 2004, Smith 2000) and in Estonian integration policy (Council of Europe 2010:7). For example, the law does not specify the juridical status of NCA, the rights and duties of representative organs of NCA, the delegation of rights and duties to a national minority, methods of allocation of resources, etc. Moreover, the three failed attempts that Russians have made since 2006 to establish their own NCA show that the ethnic community as such can be socially and culturally passive, and lack common leaders and cooperation among individuals of the same ethnicity (see Aidarov with Drechsler 2011:53–55). Interviews with the key community leaders of the two concerned minorities, Vira Konõk (Congress of Estonian Ukrainians) and Nina Savinova (Association of Byelorussians in Estonia), who have been in their positions already since the early 1990s, confirm this phenomenon once again (Aidarov 2012a, 2012b).

Third, publicly financed media is regulated by the National Broadcasting Act. Estonian National Broadcasting broadcasts television (channel ETV2) and radio programs (Raadio 4) in Russian. Additionally, Raadio 4 offers broadcasting opportunities for non-Russians in their own mother tongue (Council of Europe 2010:33–37). So in 2012, seven ethnic minorities have their own programs in Estonia. Programs are financed annually via projects. Depending on the ethnic group, programs last around 25–40 minutes, either once a week or once a month. Byelorussians, Tatars and Ukrainians broadcast in their own native language, Chuvashs in Russian, Armenians and Azeris do this partly in Russian and partly in their own language (see Appendix 7). The Chief Editor of Raadio 4, Mary Velmet (2011), states that “by the end of each broadcasting period, it is difficult to predict who will continue broadcasting in the next year” because “broadcasting depends on the potential and interest of the ethnic group” (Reimaa 2011).

Similarly to education policy, cultural policy instruments have also been debated. From the government side, Estonia has established good instruments to preserve ethnic minorities’ languages and cultures, and their usage depends on the ability of ethnic minorities (Ernst and Young 2009:7–8). This ability is considered to be low, however, and the arguments include:

1. Cultural societies cannot include new and younger members to ensure their own work because a majority of ethnic minorities and their Estonia-born children are not interested in ethnic culture and language.
2. Leadership of cultural societies has weakened because ‘leaders are tired’ (Ernst and Young 2009:75), i.e. leaders may not contribute to the work of cultural societies as actively as they did it in the 1990s.
3. Cultural societies are not able to write good projects and reports, and this weakens their financial stability.\(^{13}\) (Praxis et al. 2010:16).

\(^{13}\) Training in management for cultural societies and project-writing skills are regularly organized, e.g. IMFO explain to applicants the rules of basic financing and accounting (IMFO 2007, IMFO 2008). Enterprise Estonia (EAS) offers free consultations about NGO legislation, taxation, project management etc. (see www.eas.ee)
4. Leaders of the same ethnic groups lack consensus because of ideological disagreements and hence do not cooperate with each other sufficiently (Sepp 2009:6).

5. Cultural societies do not work well, the output of many cultural societies is low, and fictive organizations misuse the status of cultural society to attain resources from the state without contributing to culture (see also Kõlvart 2004:12, Ministry of Culture 2008a:3, Ministry of Culture 2008b:2, Sepp 2009:6).

Regarding the ethnic minorities’ view, the system of financial support based on project-writing has been of concern most of all. In 2007–2009, basic funding by IMFOP was criticized for a too bureaucratic procedure of application; delays in money transfer; support to nonfunctioning (fictive) organizations, and too short a period of support (one year) that excludes multi-year activities (Ernst and Young 2009:69, Ministry of Culture 2008b:3, Savisaar 2008, Praxis et al. 2010:16). Earlier, the centralization of financial support was discussed as the alternative to the decentralized system (Krimpe et al. 2002:37). Up to today, however, support is decentralized among ministries, agencies and municipalities.

In fact the problems non-Russians have with financial support are not necessarily unique because the state support to the Estonian NGO sector as such has various deficiencies (Praxis 2008b). The Ministry of the Interior (2009) wants to improve the system of financial support, but this may not be an important issue in politics. For example, in the last Parliament elections of 2011, Estonian political parties claimed the need to enlarge support to cultural societies of ethnic minorities, but paid little attention on how to actually improve it (Hinsberg et al. 2011:1, 6). The need for improvement was already voiced in the previous decade, when the idea of the law on ethnic minorities was introduced to regulate financial relations between cultural societies of ethnic minorities and the Government (The Cultural Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu 2004, Council of Europe 2005:9). The state considers such a law unnecessary, though (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2010:16).

All in all, relatively small groups of non-Russians work in cultural societies. The implementation of cultural policy instruments has opened up the debate about who is responsible for the continuity of cultural particularities, and how this should be implemented. On the one hand, the low socio-cultural activity of minorities is acknowledged. According to this interpretation, the state instruments cannot be successful because the ethnic minorities themselves are not able to utilize them. On the other hand, from the ethnic minorities’ perspective, financial support based on project management is deficient. Both arguments imply something of a dead end of the development of non-Russians’ cultures and languages already today and in the near future as well, just as in the education sector.

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14 Reacting to the proposals by ethnic minorities organizations, OMPEA altered the basic funding system in IMFOP (Council of Europe 2010:19). The result is not clear, though.
4.3. Implementation of educational and cultural policy instruments as a policy failure

Summarizing the previous sub-chapter, we can say that the six key policy instruments function according to the ‘logic of project management’. Surely without this cannot prevent the Russification of non-Russian ethnic minorities that Estonia ‘inherited’ from Soviet times. However, if we have identified the prevention of Russification of ethnic minorities as a key policy goal, and if there are policy instruments which either do not work at all or at least in the way that they are implemented, then by definition what we have here is a policy failure (see Birkland 2005:191).

The government can criticize the minorities for failing to exploit the instruments for various reasons – lack of leaders, lack of interest, general trends and legacy of Soviet times etc. However, the policy instruments have to successfully address the achievement of the goals. If they do not do so, then they either need to be improved or new ones devised in order to reach or at least get closer to the goals. If the community is passive, how to make it more active? If younger people are not interested in ethnic cultural activities, how to make them more interested? By definition of a policy problem, if the policy tools do not work, then this is precisely not ‘the minorities’ own fault’. The goal of the Estonian Government, either for ‘idealistic’ or for ‘cynical’ reasons, is to foster not simply the preservation of what has been left but the development of non-Russians ethnic minorities’ cultures and languages in Estonia. Hence, the task of the government would be to improve the existing policy or create new ones in such a way that this goal is achieved to a meaningful degree.

Otherwise, there is a risk of continuing to implement performative policy. Today the very success of the support of ethnic minorities seems to be measured and understood solely in terms of the amount of money allocated to cultural societies of ethnic minorities and the number of projects they implement. In the end, however, these criteria do not address how effectively ethnic minorities are able to prevent their own Russification in Estonia thanks to state support.

5. Why this policy failure? Two hypotheses for further research

If one agrees with our findings, then the question is why project management is the only way ethnic minorities are supported in Estonia, regardless of the deficiencies, of which the government is informed, and of the performative nature of a policy based on the six policy instruments investigated. This is one of the key questions for policy analysis that goes beyond the scope of the current paper. Nevertheless, we will suggest here two possible explanations that could serve, together or separately, as hypotheses for further research to investigate the outcome, i.e. why in spite of the implementation of policy aimed at preserving and developing ethnic minorities, Russification still happens.
5.1. Framework vs. instruments

If we look at both the governmental arguments in favor of the six policy instruments and at the governmental critique of ethnic minorities, it clearly emerges that ethnic minorities should: have full agency; be sustainable and autonomous; already be fully organized and highly motivated; be able to complement governmental initiatives with private ones; and (perhaps the strongest giveaway) be able to get funding based on competitive project applications for short-term projects in order to sustain long-term development.

The ideas behind this approach can best be described as a neo-liberal ideology, which assumes an already autonomous individual, able at all times to rationally choose between existing options in a profit-maximizing way (Engartner 2012, Schwarzmantel 2008:49–50, 59). In public administration, this ideology became manifest in the paradigm of the New Public Management (NPM). During the last two decades, NPM has been a carryover of (simplified) economic ideas and (older) management concepts into the public sector and civil society; it strongly privileges competitive project-writing, ‘grass-roots’ initiative, private-public partnerships, agencification, etc. as a means of public policy (Drechsler 2005, with further references). The Republic of Estonia and its political and administrative elite have, certainly in theory if not always in practice, always been very strong protagonists of NPM, and it has often been argued that since its founding neoliberalism has been the generally prevailing ideology of the Republic of Estonia not only in politics (Feldman 2005, Frane et al. 2009) or public policy (Sarapuu 2011) but also in the NGO sector (Kala 2008). These attitudes, if one will, can be called constitutive for Estonia, as obsolete as NPM may generally be – and it has partially come back globally because of the economic crisis (see Drechsler 2011).

From the perspective of classical development economics (cf. Nurkse 1952: 264–265), the Estonian Government demands of the minorities to behave in such a way that it would be possible to support them much less than is necessary. Hence, the first hypothesis would be that the six policy instruments fail to prevent Russification because of the ‘ideological-managerial’ framework (see Peters 2002: 563) used to design policy instruments. To specify, neo-liberal ideology and NPM dominate the discourse on how the government should support ethnic minorities by continuous self-reference to the latter’s own values. These underlying assumptions exclude alternatives based, for example, on the socio-cultural situation of ethnic minorities as the starting point to improve or develop new policy instruments.

5.2. The culture of project-based support

In the discussion on the preliminary results of this study and the previous hypothesis with colleagues and former and current Estonian senior civil servants (March/April 2012), it was assumed that the lack of alternatives to project-based support might be related not to ‘ideology’ but to ‘culture’.
It was speculated that the validity of such an explanation might be two-fold. First, it may be rooted in the fact that from the beginning of the Estonian independence in 1991, and now again during the crisis — and also in between under conditions of sometimes abrupt, heavy budget cuts and alterations (Raudla and Kattel 2011) —, there was a great reluctance in the Estonian Government to commit any financial resources for longer than one year, because it was indeed not clear whether there would be any. Second, likewise since 1991, Estonia’s policies have been strongly supported by international, bilateral and by now mostly European sources, lately especially by the Structural Funds (see European Union Structural Assistance to Estonia). This kind of support is always given as project assistance rather than as general budget support (Jain 2007, Tatar 2010:205). Its specifics are conceptualized under the term ‘conditionality’, i.e. the donors establish the rules recipients are obliged to fulfill in order to receive support and ensure that the support is used effectively. MER and MC including IMFOP have been receiving vital support from EU structural funds (see MC, MER, IMFOP).

We can therefore hypothesize that the reason for not considering alternatives to project-based support to the ethnic minorities in Estonia in spite of the policy failure may have been, instead of or in addition to ideological reasons, a strong and entrenched culture of project-based support that stems a) from the continuous experience of financial uncertainty and/or b) from the respective institutions and people being shaped by being recipients themselves in a completely project-based matrix. In order to test this hypothesis, one could, for instance, investigate by studying, first, to what extent the ministries have adopted the rules of, for instance, the EU Structural Funds and copied them into their own organizational structures; second, how these rules are related to the six policy instruments financed from the state budget as analyzed supra.

6. Conclusion and outlook

This essay has shown that non-Russian ethnic minorities, which immigrated into Estonia during Soviet times, have been assimilating into Russian culture in Estonia since 1991 but that this is in fact not in the interest of Estonia, for both, as we called them, ‘idealistic’ and ‘cynical’ reasons. Looking at the policy of the Estonian Government regarding the six key policy instruments used to preserve ethnic groups, we see that the effect is at best weak and that, indeed, this very much looks like policy failure. Hence, we may conclude that the on-going Russification of non-Russian ethnic minorities in Estonia is real, and that the Estonian Government, although it is in their interest to do so from whichever (Estonian) perspective one may take, does not effectively act against this process. The practice of support can be characterized as performative because the real goal that is achieved and measured is the allocation of budget money to ethnic minorities. The effectiveness of organization of this support based on ‘the logic of project management’ is not measured against the ability of minorities to preserve
their own languages and cultures in Estonia, which after all is the main policy goal. If one agrees with the observation, then the next research agenda would be to test two hypotheses to investigate the origin of this policy failure: neoliberalism and NPM on the one side, and the culture of project management as the main method of support for ethnic minorities on the other. Additional further research that would be interesting in this context would be comparative, i.e. how this issue, both as regards minority support and policy conflicts, looks in formerly Soviet-dominated countries with the same phenomenon – from Latvia to Kazakhstan, say – or even in countries which have similar problems but not with a dominating Russian minority.

APPENDIX 1

Figure 1. Total and Percentage of Ethnic Minorities in Estonia by their Mother Tongue in 2000

Source: Statistics Estonia.
APPENDIX 2

Figure 2. Total and percentage of ethnic minorities in Estonia who do not speak the language of ethnic affiliation by mother tongue in 2000

![Bar chart showing ethnic minorities in Estonia by mother tongue 2000](image)

Source: Statistics Estonia.

APPENDIX 3

Table 1. Total of students with native language different from the language of instruction in public secondary schools, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language spoken at home</th>
<th>Language of instruction in school</th>
<th>Total of ethnic group in 2006*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>3,752</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,860</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 4

Table 2. Total of students with native language different from the language of instruction in public schools, average for 2005–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language spoken at home</th>
<th>Number of students in schools</th>
<th>Total of ethnic group in 2000*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abkhaz</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>53,999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total of students representing various ethnic groups in public schools is 6,928. Western ethnic groups and Russians are excluded.
Source: *Statistics Estonia.

APPENDIX 5

Table 3. Optional language and culture classes in public secondary schools in 1992–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>2004–</td>
<td>Kannuka School, Sillamäe City, Ida-Viru County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>Tartu Rahvusvaheline Kool, Tartu City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>Tallinn Lilleküla Upper Secondary School, Tallinn City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians</td>
<td>2010–</td>
<td>Kohila-Järve Ühisgümnaasium, Kohila-Järve City, Ida-Viru County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeris*</td>
<td>2011–</td>
<td>Juhkentali Gymnasium, Tallinn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Total of members in cultural societies of ethnic minorities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Total of members</th>
<th>Total of ethnic group*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeris</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkirs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>17,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvashs</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>2,707</td>
<td>2,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardins</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>2,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maris</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordvins</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossetians</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmurts</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>29,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>59,954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total of the ethnic group as registered by the Population Census 2000

APPENDIX 7

Table 5. The average number of listeners of non-Russian ethnic minorities’ programs per year, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of broadcasting</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Language of broadcasting</th>
<th>Total of listeners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Wednesday, 19.30–20.00</td>
<td>1. Georgians</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Azeris</td>
<td>Azerbaijani/Russian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Tatars</td>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Chuvashs</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Saturday, 19.15-20.00</td>
<td>5. Ukrainians</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Byelorussians</td>
<td>Byelorussian</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Sunday, 19.15-20.00</td>
<td>7. Armenians</td>
<td>Armenian/Russian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Velmet 2012.
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Tourism and the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia: the frontstage and backstage of Estonian Old Believers

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Tourism and the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia: the frontstage and backstage of Estonian Old Believers

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The Estonian Old Believers (EOB) are a culturally endangered small Estonian national minority. Thanks to the government’s support to tourism development some secular and religious aspects of the EOB’s cultural heritage have been used to organize ‘tourism of Old Belief’. The organization of such tourism and its effects on the preservation of Old Belief have not been addressed in the relevant policy-making. Analysis shows that project-based tourism organization, which lacks coordination and the application of sustainability in the context of this community, has only a minimal economic effect. And due to the effect of commodification, tourism challenges the EOB culturally. This raises a question about the limits of tourism organization, which is understood in terms of a differentiation of the frontstage and backstage of EOB life.

Keywords: commodification of religion; cultural policy; Estonian Old Believers; tourism policy; tourism organization

1. Introduction

The Estonian Old Believers (EOB) are ethnic Russians, living in what is now the Republic of Estonia, and what were then the Imperial Russian provinces of Estland and of Livonia, since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The EOB live in their nine historical settlements along the Western shoreline of Peipsi Lake, and they have one community each in Tartu and Tallinn. The EOB appeared in Estonia as a result of the schism in the Russian Orthodox Church in the seventeenth century, when the Nikon Reforms of 1653–1666 thoroughly changed its rites. As both the state and the Church discriminated heavily against the Old Believers to the point of capital punishment, many of them escaped to the peripheral areas of the Empire like the Urals or Estonia (Paert 2010, p. 884). Up to this day, the EOB practice rituals of Orthodox Christianity as before the schism (Ponomarjova and Šor 2006).

Having lived in Estonia for five centuries already the EOB have accumulated a rich cultural heritage, which is well known in Estonia thanks to their religion, Old Belief. However, the survival of the EOB during the next 20 years is uncertain. Congregations are very small and composed mainly of older people; religious traditions are not transmitted from older to younger generations as a result of assimilation, secularization, and migration into cities; congregations are poor and located in

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socioeconomically disadvantaged municipalities. In order to help the EOB to preserve their culture, the government has implemented several policy programs (see Ministry of Culture 2003, IMFOP 2012, Ministry of Interior 2012, Ministry of Culture 2013). At the same time, the government is interested in Old Belief not only for cultural but also for economic reasons. The tourism development plan 2006–2013 considered Old Belief one of the main tourism resources in Southern Estonia, and various tourism projects were implemented in Peipsiõer. The new tourism plan does not mention this any more (The Parliament of Estonia 2006, p. 12, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication 2013). Southern Estonia’s tourism development plan until 2020 (SA Lõuna Eesti Tourism 2009) considers the ‘cultural heritage of EOB’ an important cultural sight and tourism attraction, however (pp. 9, 17).

In can be expected that thanks to the government’s interest in and support for ‘tourism of Old Belief’, as it is termed in this analysis, has been and will be organized in the near future. Regarding this, both old and new tourism-development plans lean on the concept of ‘sustainable tourism’, which implies a symbiotic interrelation of culture and tourism (The Parliament of Estonia 2006, pp. 1, 10–11, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication 2013, pp. 17, 22). However, the organization of such tourism and its effects on the preservation of Old Belief have been addressed neither in Estonian politics’ or policy nor in academic research yet.

This essay aims to fill this gap by answering the question of how tourism of Old Belief is organized and what effect it has on the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia. The analysis has the following structure. First, effects of tourism and tourism organization on culture/religion are reviewed. One of such controversial effects is the commodification of culture/religion via tourism. Commodification may have both positive and negative side effects on the preservation of traditions, rituals, etc. Tourism organization that keeps apart the frontstage and backstage of the host community’s life (MacCannell 1976) can be used to understand these side effects. Two groups of factors can be found in the relevant literature to understand the failure and success of this differentiation in terms of: (a) ‘macro’ policy factors (formulation and definition of sustainable tourism policy and policy-implementation barriers) and (b) ‘micro factors’, i.e. tourism-management practice. Finally, the results of qualitative analysis conducted in 2005–2006 and 2012–2013 are presented. The analysis rests on 33 personal semi-structured interviews with representatives of EOB, tourism developers and public servants to see the self-sufficiency of EOB, the organization of tourism of Old Belief and its effects on the preservation of Old Belief.

Results show that tourism organization is challenged by differentiating the frontstage and backstage of EOB life. Project-based tourism organization lacks coordination and a policy approach to how tourism and Old Belief may co-exist. By 2013, such tourism had a minimal economic effect, so that one may advocate further usage of the frontstage and backstage of EOB life. This can be done as the practice shows. Still, cultural issues of the preservation of Old Belief should not be negated.

2. Tourism organization and its side-effects on culture and religion

Nowadays, many governments have either explicit or implicit tourism policies aimed at preserving cultures that modern socioeconomic developments and the nation-state have endangered (Jeffries 2001, p. 10, Coates 2004, OECD 2010,
The popularity of tourism is explained by the fact that globally it is one of the industries that rake in the most profit and develop the fastest. Since 1950 the number of tourist arrivals has grown from 25 million to 1035 million in 2012. By then, tourism accounted for 9% of the world-economy GDP and provided 120 million jobs directly and another 125 million jobs indirectly (UNWTO 2013, p. 2). And according to estimations the tourism industry will grow, e.g. by 2030 the number of international arrivals will be 1.8 billion (UNWTO 2011b, p. 14).

Economic and cultural effects of tourism on host communities, which are used for ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ tourism, can be understood in terms of ‘cultural optimism’ and/or ‘cultural pessimism’ (see Cowen 2004, pp. 10–12). According to the former, tourism and culture are symbiotically interrelated. Culture gives an impetus to tourism, and tourism helps to solve socioeconomic and cultural problems of host communities endangered by poverty, migration, and cultural assimilation. Case studies show that tourism may help to create new jobs and improve the standard of living; it develops local enterprises and infrastructure (Mbaiwa 2005, Shackley 2006, Enemuo and Oduntan 2012, Meekaew and Srisontisuk 2012, Zaei 2013). Regarding cultural impact, it is found that tourism enriches cultural relations via intercultural dialog and exchange, improves cultural life, e.g. revitalizing a cultural identity that helps to resist assimilation and, therefore, sustain traditions (Dyer et al. 2003, Little 2004, p. 227, Abrahams 2014). In contrast, cultural pessimism stresses negative effects of tourism by recognizing ‘the truth of tourism’. Tourism may not improve economic development or alleviate poverty as expected. Tourism leads to a ‘musealization’ of religion, a ‘loss of authenticity’, a trivialization of religions’ meaning and practices, diminished spiritual experience and religious privacy, a deliberate destruction of religious objects, vandalism, and theft (Olsen 2003, p. 113, Stausberg 2011, p. 73). It forces communities to create or practice a culture that only attracts tourists and is not authentic; it may also change the traditional lifestyles of people (Chhabra et al. 2003, Fagenne 2003, p. 62, Reinfeld 2003, Magnoni et al. 2007, McKercher and Ho 2012).

Both optimistic and pessimistic understandings are related to one specific dilemma of tourism – the commodification of culture in general and religion in particular. Religious commodification has arguments both pro and con regarding the use of religion as a tourism resource (Kitiarsa 2010). Taking into account the ‘inevitability of tourism’, which also implies a de-privatization of religious life and its privatization as a counter reaction (see Casanova 1994, p. 36), a pragmatic perspective on commodification (see Shepherd 2002) can be used to see that not tourism as such but its organization has either positive and/or negative effects on religion.

One tourism-organization model can be derived from the concept of ‘staged authenticity’, as originally explained by MacCannell (1976), who differentiated the ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ of cultural life. The latter means a consumption environment created for tourists via the commodification of religion, where tourism turns religion into a public spectacle to make a profit, e.g. restaurants, hotels, food, etc. (Stausberg 2011, p. 73). The former represents the private life of the host community, to which tourism has no access and which allows individuals to have the lifestyle or to practice the traditions that they find appropriate culturally, historically and so on. The differentiation of these two stages implies borders or limits of the organization of tourism in the host community. If tourism organization properly
differentiates these two stages, then this may have positive side effects for both tourists and the host community (Mohamad et al. 2010).

‘Amish tourism’ in the US is an illustrative case. The Amish are North American Anabaptist Christians that emigrated from Europe to America between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries to find religious freedom (Kraybill et al. 2013, p. 156). Old Order Amish (OOA) is one Amish affiliation with 33,000 members living in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania (Kraybill et al. 2013, pp. 13–14, 139, 146). In order to live a true Christian life, the OOA strive to be self-sufficient and less dependent on the larger society. They practice Christian traditions in family and communal life; they speak Pennsylvania German; they wear uniformed plain dresses; they have big families (a mean of 7.2 children per family); and 85% of their children become church members (Kraybill 2001, pp. 15, 53, 333). Also they have a conservative attitude toward technology, e.g. they do not own and drive cars but use horses with buggies; they do not use tractors for plowing; and they restrict the usage of telephones, to mention but a few (see Kraybill 2001, pp. 15, 53, 333).

Thanks to their ethno-religious peculiarities OOA attract many non-Amish, and Lancaster has the most highly developed ‘Amish tourism’ (Kraybill et al. 2013). It is found that tourism disrupts the daily life of the Amish, e.g. picture-taking, traffic, tourists’ wishes to witness real Amish life; however, tourists accept commercial substitutions of original Amish culture, etc. (Fagence 2003, pp. 69, 71, Meyers 2003, Hawley 2005, Biesecker 2008, p. 115, Trollinger 2012). Tourism also changes the traditional Amish values into ‘modern’ ones via work in and for the tourism industry, e.g. profit-making, competition, individualism, acceptance of technology, etc. (Lowery and Noble 2000, Kraybill and Nolt 2004, p. 16). However, in the end Amish tourism is ‘staged authenticity’, which mainly has a positive influence on the OOA because, as the leading scholar of Amish studies, Kraybill (2013), says in the interview, the front- and backstages are separated.

To specify, non-Amish entrepreneurs organize Amish tourism that commoditizes the Amish, their restaurants, horse-and-buggy rides, etc. ‘The Amish experience’ (AE) is a well-developed non-Amish-run private business of this kind in Lancaster (see www.amishexperience.com). As the president of AE, Brad Igou (2013), says in the interview, while having the goal of making a profit, AE also tries to ‘balance amusement with education’, but the majority of tourists visit AE for amusement first and foremost. And, for example, if souvenirs in the gift shop were authentic, i.e. Amish-made, they would be too expensive for the tourists. One member of the OOA, Ben Riehl (2013), explains in the interview that the Amish themselves do not develop Amish tourism because it is not allowed for religious reasons. However, they still benefit from it economically (also Kraybill 2013, Kraybill et al. 2013, p. 394), considering that farming (the traditional economic activity of the Amish) has declined since the 1950s because of growing land prices, shrinking farmlands and the growth of the Amish population (Kreps et al. 1997, p. 365). So, only 36% of OOA household heads in Lancaster are farmers. The rest run small family firms that sell their products to the tourists and not only to them e.g. furniture production, retail, bakeries; some also work in the tourism industry (Kraybill et al. 2013, pp. 276, 282).

So, the backstage of the OOA remains inaccessible for the majority of tourists. This helps to maintain the cultural borders between the non-Amish and the OOA. Nowadays, the OOA are a self-sufficient community, thanks to their strong
interrelation of family, community, private education, business, and the church (Igou 2013, Kraybill et al. 2013, pp. 231, 250). Besides that, their backstage is additionally protected by the government. This helps to reduce the influence of mass culture on OOA lifestyle. Namely, the Amish received several rights by lobbying the government, e.g. Amish children do not attend school above the eighth grade; the Amish are exempted from the Medicare program and Social Security, to mention but a few (Kraybill 2003).

The available literature on tourism organization allows deducting two groups of factors to understand why the differentiation of the frontstage and backstage may fail or succeed. First, ‘macro policy factors’ are related to government policy-making. Since 1990 ‘sustainable tourism’ has inspired policy-makers and academics to develop ‘good’ forms of tourism to reduce its negative side effects and to enhance positive ones. The definition of ‘sustainable tourism’ can be ambiguous and lacks clear evaluation criteria (McMinn 1997, Sharpley 2000, p. 14, Day 2012), so the government should work out indicators of sustainability and monitor them (see UNWTO 2004, 2007, Miller and Twining-Ward 2005, p. 175). Some stress, however, that it is insufficient because of ‘policy implementation barriers’: lack of policy coordination, unclear allocation of roles among policy-implementing agents, short-term focus, lack of support to stakeholders (Dodds and Butler 2010, p. 47), or lack of legal regulations for tourism developers (Shindea 2010, 2012, p. 523).

Then, second, ‘micro factors’ are related to the internal and external management practices (Olsen 2006), e.g. the conflict of interests over religious issues, resources or power; the ability of small communities to resist or cooperate with regional, national, or global tourism actors (Blackstock 2005, p. 45, Zeppel 2010; also Hall 2011, pp. 649, 655, Li and Wall 2011); the availability of social, human, physical, and financial capital (Koutra and Edwards 2012); the protection of the community’s values to balance cultural and economic goals (McIntosh et al. 2004, Salazar 2012, p. 19); the regulation and control of tourists’ behavior (Poudel and Nyaupane 2013); the production and marketing of services and goods and image-making of the host community (Sartori et al. 2012).

Leaning on tourism organization in terms of frontstage and backstage factors that may affect the differentiation of these two stages in practice and the self-sufficiency of the host community at the backstage, let us now look at the case of the EOB.

3. Method

The question of how tourism of Old Belief, i.e. tourism that uses both secular and religious aspects of EOB culture, is organized in Estonia and how this affects the preservation of Old Belief has not been addressed academically, nor in policy-making and politics.7 Regarding this, a qualitative analysis is chosen to investigate this issue. The analysis comprises two parts.

The first part rests on the available ethnographic and historical research on EOB by Estonian scholars and 12 personal semi-structured interviews by the author that took place in 2005–2006. The interviews were conducted in Kallaste, Mustvee, Kolkja, Varnja, Piirissaar and Tartu in environments that were natural for the respondents (work, home, worship house) and in their native language (Estonian or Russian). On average an interview lasted 1 h per respondent. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. ‘How’ and ‘what’ questions were mainly used to
understand the self-sufficiency of the EOB and attitudes towards tourism, e.g. ‘what is the economic situation of your congregation’, ‘how does tourism help the preservation of Old Belief’, etc. The sample was generated by a snow-ball technique. This helped to find respondents who strive to develop the EOB community via different organizations: members of EOB congregations; some interviewed EOB are also public servants or used to work in local governments; and the third group is NGO sector leaders who run community development projects in Peipsiveer.

The second part of the analysis concentrates on changes in the socioeconomic and cultural development within the last 7–8 years with a stress on tourism development at the expense of religious and non-religious aspects of EOB culture. Twenty-two semi-structured interviews by the author were conducted in 2012–2013 in Kallaste, Varnja and Suur-Kolkja (these three settlements have important projects on tourism of Old Belief; the Mustvee and Raja congregations refused to give interviews); several interviews were conducted in Tallinn and Tartu, as well. The interviews were conducted in the natural environment of respondents and in their native language (Estonian, Russian). The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The sample comprises three groups: (a) members of congregations and non-religious representatives of the EOB, which were contacted thanks to the previous research in 2005–2006; (b) representatives of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Interior and EAS, which were chosen according to their expertise, i.e. the implementation of the government programs on tourism development and the preservation of Old Belief, and (c) tourism and community development leaders. Open ‘how’ questions were mainly used to understand the interviewees’ experience concerning the organization of tourism and its side effects, e.g. ‘how is tourism organized in your settlement’, ‘how does tourism influence the preservation of your religion,’ etc.

Before presenting the results, let us briefly give an overview of the EOB and the policies on tourism and the preservation of Old Belief. After that, the first part of the analysis on the self-sufficiency of the EOB is given. Then, tourism, as it was organized by the end of 2013, and its side effects on the preservation of Old Belief are presented, including some policy recommendations.

4. Organization of tourism of Old Belief and its side effects

4.1. The EOB and the policies on the preservation of Old Belief and tourism organization

The EOB are ethnic Russians, living in what is now the Republic of Estonia and what were then the Imperial Russian provinces of Estland and of Livonia, since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Today, the EOB still live in their historical settlements along Peipsiveer (Kallaste, Mustvee, Suur-Kolkja, Väike-Kolkja, Kükita, Raja, Kasepää, Varnja, and Piirissaar) and have one community each in Tartu and Tallinn.

The EOB appeared in this area as a result of the schism in the Russian Orthodox Church in the seventeenth century when the Nikon Reforms of 1653–1666 thoroughly changed its rites according to the Greek practice that many believers and clergy considered heresy. They were called old ritualists (Russian staroobrjadcy) or Old Believers for this reason. As both the state and the Church discriminated heavily against the Old Believers to the point of capital punishment, many of them escaped to the peripheral areas of the Empire, like the Urals or Estonia (Paert 2010, p. 884). Up to this day, the EOB practice rituals of Orthodox
Christianity the way they were before the schism and split up in several affiliations as a result of internal conflicts.\(^9\) (Ponomarjova and Šor 2006). Nowadays within the Estonian nation-state, the EOB have the positive connotation of an Estonian national minority.\(^10\) As the government states: ‘[We] highly value the long-term input of Estonian national minorities (Jews, Baltic Germans, Russian Old Believers) into the development of Estonian culture.’\(^{11}\) (Government of Estonia 2011, p. 41)\(^{12}\) To specify, EOB have a rich cultural heritage in Estonia: worship houses, icons, rituals, local dialect of Russian with an Estonian influence, folklore, etc.

In times of constitutional religious freedom, Estonia is not interested in an assimilation of the EOB comparable to Tsarist or Soviet Russia (see Plaat 2005, p. 14), to which the region belonged almost all of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, most notably with the exception of the independent years 1918–1940 (before 1710, it belonged to Sweden).\(^{13}\) However, the survival of the EOB and their religion during the next 20 years is uncertain. Congregations are very small and composed mainly of older people; religious traditions are not transmitted from older to younger generations; congregations are poor and located in socioeconomically disadvantaged municipalities (Ministry of Interior 2005, Narusk 2013).

In order to help the EOB to preserve their culture, the government has several policy programs where the EOB apply for financial aid to renovate their worship houses, publish books, do research or organize festivals via small cultural projects. Project-based aid is allocated by the Ministry of Culture via its several agencies (see Ministry of Culture 2003, IMFOP 2012, Ministry of Culture 2013). These programs are not designed exclusively for the EOB so that the EOB are one of several target groups in Peipsiveer. Then, regarding tourism the government has a particular interest in Old Belief, and among other tourism projects it has, again, supported activities on the organization of tourism of Old Belief in the EOB settlements via project-based financial aid (see Ministry of Interior 2012). One may expect further development of such tourism in the near future for economic reasons.

In general, Estonian tourism has been growing since 1991 and can be considered a well-developing one nowadays and in the forthcoming decade. According to the tourism, competitiveness index Estonia is ranked 30th (see Blanke and Chiesa 2011, p. 162). In 2014, the direct contribution of Estonian tourism to GDP is 4.3%, and the direct contribution to employment is also 4.3% (Turner 2014, p. 10). Estonian tourism is mostly developed in Tallinn but also in some smaller cities like Tartu and Pärnu. In peripheral rural areas like Peipsiveer, tourism has various obstacles, e.g. poor infrastructure, insufficient housing for the tourists, tourism is seasonal during summer, etc. (Peipsi Alamvesikonna Kalurite Liit 2004, p. 36, SA Lõuna-Eesti Turism 2009, pp. 15–17, 20, Peipsiääre Parish Council 2010, Eesti Uuringuveskus 2012). So, the availability of cultural heritage is considered an important advantage of tourism development. The earlier tourism development strategy 2006–2013 (The Parliament of Estonia 2006, p. 12) considered Old Belief one of the tourism resources in Southern Estonia. The new tourism plan for 2014–2020 does not mention this (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication 2013), but the Southern Estonian tourism development plan until 2020 (SA Lõuna Eesti Turism 2009, pp. 9, 17) does. Among other goals it aims at enlarging the number of tourists, raising it to 20% in Southern Estonia via the usage of ‘authentic cultural and historical objects’ and their preservation (p. 19). Both old and new tourism plans lean on the popular concept of ‘sustainable tourism’ so that either explicit or implicit economic usage of Old Belief tends to be understood.
optimistically (The Parliament of Estonia 2006, pp. 1, 10–11). Taking into account the recent interest of the government in the usage of national cultural heritage (Ministry of Economics and Communication 2013, p. 18), one may expect further development of the tourism of Old Belief.

Before going into the analysis of tourism organization let us analyze the self-sufficiency of EOB at the backstage, because this helps to understand the interrelation of tourism and Old Belief.

4.2. The backstage of EOB: lack of self-sufficiency

Historically, all Old Believers strived to be socially and economically self-sufficient to preserve their religion and practiced certain ‘closeness’ in interactions with larger society, e.g., industriousness, stress on community survival and mutual help, private religious life, charity, mutual help, etc. (Vorontsova and Filatov 2000; Kromonov 2005). In order to understand self-sufficiency today, ‘EOB by birth’ and ‘EOB by faith’ should be differentiated (see Plaat 2005, pp. 22–24). The former implies people from EOB families. Their total might be around 10,000–15,000. The latter refers to the 2605 persons who have indicated their religion to be Old Belief in 2011 (Statistics Estonia 2011). The number of religiously active EOB as estimated by the EOB themselves in 2006 is even smaller, i.e. around 15–35 persons per congregation (Fomina 2005, Korotkov 2005, Kutkina 2005). And while the number of persons affiliated with Old Belief has increased, membership of congregations has not grown as of today.

Nowadays, congregations lack people who represent and practice Old Belief as a ‘living tradition’ (Poljakova 2012, Varunin 2013). Like 7–8 years ago, active members of congregations still are mainly elderly women. The lack of men is a substantial problem – only men can be preceptors, i.e. community-chosen spiritual leaders who know the Bible, perform rituals etc. Besides that, as some younger persons who are ‘EOB by origin’ (Kartashova 2012, Sharmina 2012) explain, traditions are not transmitted between older and younger generations in families because of the generation gap, secularization, immigration to cities, and mixed marriages. So, by 2010 only Tallinn’s congregation practiced the ‘full circle’ of services on Saturdays and Sundays (the evening service, the morning service, lessons, and sermon) (see Plaat 2005, pp. 19–23, Plaat 2011, pp. 80–83). Some EOB return to Peipsi in their older age and become community leaders. This ‘community-development model’ has its own disadvantages, though, e.g. older leaders concentrate on the internal life of their congregations and are not always able to establish effective communication, networking with potential supporters and partners because they lack skills and energy (Fomina 2005, Korotkov 2005, Poljakova 2005, Varunin 2005). And various leaders have interpersonal conflicts related to how Old Belief should be preserved, which hampers their cooperation (Lampmann 2012, Varunin 2012, 2013). Finally, besides internal problems the EOB live in very disadvantaged municipalities: aging population, migration of population, traditional fishing and agriculture of low productivity, poverty, etc. (Kuznetsov 2005, Ministry of Agriculture 2008, p. 34, Ministry of Interior 2013).

Today, the main goal of the EOB is a community regeneration at the expense of younger generations and a rejuvenation of cultural/religious life. For poor congregations to achieve their goal, they depend on projects as a source of their economic wealth to sustain cultural life. This means that unlike in the past the EOB have to sustain their traditions ‘artificially’, i.e. not in the family and/or
worship houses but via the projects to foster intergenerational connections inside their congregations (Varunin 2005). All congregations of the EOB are NGOs, and there are also some non-religious NGOs run either by the EOB (the Society of Old Believers’ Culture and Development) or non-Old Believers (NGO Peipus, NGO Piiripeal). These organizations write and implement projects to preserve Old Belief, e.g. the renovation of worship houses, research, publishing, organization of festivals, etc. Regarding younger generations, Võlkja Secondary School teaches children the basics of Old Belief, and since 2008 two groups of EOB have independently organized project-based children’s camps to teach children traditions. Some respondents hope that this creates in-depth interest in Old Belief and religiousness among these children, who will hopefully become active members of congregations as adults (Varunin 2012, 2013). Still, it is hard to predict today how many of them will become active members of congregations and when.

Finally, some representatives of the EOB are skeptical whether tourism will help the EOB to attain their key goal. Rather, tourism may exploit their religion without helping the EOB (Kutkina 2005, Maspanov 2005). And some non-EOB maintain that poorly managed tourism may harm the religious life of the EOB (Jukk 2005, Miik 2005, Tuubel 2005). At the same time, respondents were not against tourism as such. The question they raise is about ‘limits’ of tourism in the context of Old Belief. As it is phrased in the only relevant but still brief notion about tourism of Old Belief:

Old Belief is an intrinsic worldview of one particular group that cannot be changed into an external form (‘Disneyland’). This means that public exposure of their culture should not exceed a certain limit. (Peipsiveere Arengu Sihtasutus 2007, p. 18)

So, leaning on this perspective on tourism of Old Belief within the community, which is endangered at the backstage, allows us to see how such tourism is organized and how it affects the preservation of Old Belief.

4.3. Organization of tourism and its effects on the preservation of Old Belief

By the end of 2013, the government did not apply ‘sustainability’ toward tourism within the context of Old Belief, and it remains unclear how to organize such tourism as a specific form of ‘sustainable tourism’ (Loode 2013, Maasing 2013, Müürsepp 2013). Tourism of Old Belief was and is organized via projects that the government annually allocates to NGOs and private firms.17 (see Appendix 1 for details).

Thanks to these projects, tourists do visit the settlements of the EOB.18 However, some interviewed tourism and community developers explain that the organization of such tourism is problematic for three reasons, which also serve as an additional explanation of the structural problems of tourism development in Peipsiveer. First, the local population, including the EOB, have no skills, including knowledge of Estonian and/or foreign languages, to serve tourists and initiate tourism projects. Second, the local population has not accepted tourism as an alternative to traditional fishing and agriculture yet, and some tourism developers were not able to hire the local population to work in their tourism projects. Third, the development of infrastructure, recreation facilities, or modern housing would bring more tourists, but the local population has no money to invest in such large-scale
projects (Güsson 2012, Lampmann 2012, Kookmaa 2013, Loode 2013). As a result, by the end of 2013 tourism of Old Belief has had a minimal economic impact on Peipsiveer as such and EOB congregations in particular, so that it is not even statistically documented (Loode 2013, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication 2012). For example, the Varnja congregation charges visitors for entering their worship house and also collects donations, but that is insufficient. The Kallaste congregation has made a similar experience (Varunin 2013). Another important example is related to the few job opportunities created, e.g. one person works in the Kolkja Old Believers Museum, four in the Onion and Fish restaurant of the Old Believers of Kolkja, and one in the Varnja Museum of Living History. Therefore, one may argue that tourism of Old Belief has not realized its economic potential and should be actively promoted. If so (and disregarding structural obstacles to tourism development as explained supra) the cultural perspective should be analyzed next.

Depending on the content, tourism of Old Belief uses both the ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ of EOB life. For example, the already mentioned Kolkja Old Believers Museum and the Onion and Fish restaurant of the Old Believers of Kolkja represent the former, and the latter is related to the worship houses open for the tourists. Interviewees point to two controversial activities of such tourism organization: (a) the ‘openness’ of worship houses to non-Old Believers and (b) entrepreneurial activity on tourism organization outside of the worship houses. ‘Openness’ refers to the usage of worship houses as tourism objects, i.e. showing worship houses to visitors in order to make a profit of it. Entrepreneurial activity refers to the symbolic usage of Old Belief to produce goods and services for tourists. Interviews show that both activities give rise to a conflict of interests, which is related to the de-privatization of Old Belief as explained above.

The interviewed EOB explain that their worship houses should not be used as tourism objects, because this is against the traditions and spirituality of Old Belief (Baranina 2012). One EOB specifies that tourism (a) provokes the secularization of the sacral meaning of religious practices and worship houses among the EOB and (b) imposes a new task to the worship houses that congregations should fulfill – profit-making of religion (Varunin 2012). Some interviewees suggest that tourism should be focused on secular aspects, the way it is already done by means of the frontstage (history museum, restaurant, and handicraft), and they envision the future of tourism as ‘nonreligious’, e.g. a virtual but not real tour of the worship house, a theme park about local fishing, ecotourism etc. It is expected that this solution does not affect the religious life of the congregation but can still be interesting for tourists and the local population (Avdejeva 2012, Baranina 2012, Prigozeva 2012, Varunin 2012). Unlike the congregations in Suur-Kolkja and Kasepää, the majority of congregations, such as Varnja, Raja, Mustvee, Kükita and Kallaste, organize tourist-group visits to their worship houses (Varunin 2012). Two members of the Varnja congregation think that this is economically beneficial for their poor congregation. Still, they suggest developing tourism not at the expense of religion, but by using local nature instead (Antropova 2012, Poljakova 2012). One member of the Kallaste congregation thinks that tourism challenges their congregation, as it has to find the right balance between spirituality and commercial activity (Varunin 2013).

Knowing that ‘openness’ is a sensitive matter, interviewees help to understand how congregations decided to show their worship houses to the visitors and to try to make some profit of it. On the one hand, this can be an earlier decision of the
congregation to show Old Belief in order to educate the public and by doing so diminish some misinformation or stereotypes about Old Believers (Antropova 2012). On the other hand, regarding the government’s support it appears that the ‘openness’ of worship houses can be a public interest. Namely, the Peipsiveer program aims at developing entrepreneurship and tourism in Peipsiveer. However, in practice, some religious congregations, including EOB, received money to renovate their worship houses and churches. Since 2011 religious organizations which receive financial support must participate in the Wayfarer Churches project (Kirkal 2012). Despite controversial demand, which had been explained to the EOB, the Mustvee, Kallaste, Raja, Kükita and Varnja congregations accepted the conditions of the financial aid (Maasing 2013). Interviewed officials know that ‘openness’ is a sensitive issue (Aun 2012, Œöbik 2013, Toomning 2013). Still, from the government perspective, ‘openness’ can be an important public interest, i.e. if worship houses are renovated from the state budget, then excluding the public from seeing the results is unjustified (Aun 2012).

Further, four cases illustrate that tourism entrepreneurs have a different ‘religious sensitivity’, and this may be a source of conflict, as well. First, the Museum of Samovars and Old Believers was opened to prove to the Kükita congregation that the congregation may benefit from tourism. At the exhibition of samovars, ‘Russian tea drinking ceremonies’, teas and sweets under the brand ‘Varvara Gourmet’ as well as some souvenirs, like key chains styled as the Old Believers’ praying beads, which one EOB made, were sold. As it was a success, the entrepreneur donated the earned profit to the congregation (Kookmaa 2013). However, some EOB criticized the project because according to their understanding the key chains imitate praying beads for commercial reasons (Varunin 2012). Second, the Museum of Mustvee Old Believers’ History started as a small ethnographic exhibition about the EOB. As the museum has grown, the vast majority of the exhibition represents the local population (Korobova 2013). So, it is debatable whether the name of the museum should mention Old Believers or not, because the Kolkja Old Believers Museum is operated by the EOB and is explicitly dedicated to the EOB (Lampmann 2012). Third, cooperation with SOBCD helped the organizers of the Peipsimaa Visitors Center to raise their religious and cultural sensitivity to develop ‘non-religious’ tourism, e.g. workshops on gilding, bicycle rental and sledge competitions in the winter. Some, however, think that this center is kitsch, as its renovated building is not ‘authentic’ (Gissson 2012, Lampmann 2012, Varunin 2012). Fourth, the famous onion and fish restaurant run by the EOB serves traditional ‘Old Believers food’, but as a secular activity it is not considered a misuse of Old Belief.

The content of tourism projects and the conflict of interests show that the EOB have come closer to the commodification of their religious and non-religious culture. Nowadays, the potential of such tourism to achieve the key goal of the EOB, i.e. the rejuvenation of congregations and the preservation of already endangered traditions, should be critically evaluated. Consider, first, that congregations already practicing ‘openness’ are not better off economically. They are still located in socioeconomically disadvantaged municipalities. Such tourism cannot per se solve the structural problems of Peipsiveer. In order to do this, infrastructure, hotels, recreation facilities, or the local market should be developed to attract more tourists. Neither the poor EOB nor the local population can make such investments. And it is questionable whether it can be achieved by means of small projects. So, at best,
as some respondents say, Old Belief is one resource, but hardly the main tourism resource (Güsson 2012, Loode 2013). Second, opening worship houses for tourists does not per se attract younger generations into congregations (Poljakova 2012, Varunin 2013). This is done via children’s camps that the EOB organize. Third, some respondents doubt that even if congregations accept the idea of running their worship houses as small tourism enterprises, their aged and small congregations do not have enough educated and motivated people to do this (Varunin 2012). As an alternative, congregations might include non-members to develop tourism. This may have controversial results, though, because people unfamiliar with Old Belief have a different level of ‘religious sensitivity’ that shapes their entrepreneurial solutions.

4.4. Policy recommendations

To begin with, the EOB are endangered at the backstage, and this can be a preliminary point of discussion about tourism of Old Belief. If a community is self-sufficient at the backstage (as OOA experience shows), then the usage of culture at the frontstage may have positive economic side effects on the host community. In other words, the community can be ‘closed’ culturally but not economically. Nowadays, the EOB are not self-sufficient, and their goal is to preserve the backstage, which is original and authentic Old Belief, as it is known in Estonia. Tourism challenges this goal, though.

The commodification of Old Belief occurs via tourism projects at the backstage and frontstage. In both cases, this has minimal economic effect. If the very idea of tourism of Old Belief is to help the EOB (and the local population) to become at least richer so that individuals could use capital to pursue their own goals, including cultural ones, then the question of how to develop tourism of Old Belief without commodifying Old Belief at the backstage but with economically and culturally relevant solutions at the frontstage is of particular interest. It should be noted that potential solutions and answers to this question will obviously be framed by the context. First, ineffective Estonian regional policy cannot solve, e.g. structural problems of tourism and regional development problems in Peipsiveer during the next decade (see Raagmäa et al. 2013, pp. 2, 15). Second, solutions will be framed by the logics of project management. Projects are the underlying logic of how the government supports various development activities, including the preservation of cultures of Estonian national minorities. Problems of such support are well-documented, e.g. the inability of small projects to achieve long-term goals, project-based activity is unstable, resource allocation is bureaucratic (see Aidarov and Drechsler 2013), and some interviewed respondents state this as well (Güsson 2012, Kookmaa 2013). Taking this into account, how could tourism of Old Belief be organized during the implementation of the governments’ tourism plan 2014–2020 so that both EOB and non-Old Believers could benefit from it?

Two practices mentioned in the interviews might stimulate thinking about legal-administrative solutions to the application of sustainability in the context of tourism of Old Belief. First, the National Heritage Board helps EAS to control congregations’ activity in the renovation of their worship houses to prevent damage. Second, the Setu representative organizations, in cooperation with EAS and MI, have created a quality and authenticity mark. This ensures the authenticity and control over the production to prevent misuse of Setu culture. Besides that, the Setu have
organizations that regulate tourism development in their region (see www.kogo.ee, www.setomaa.ee). Additionally, some interviewees think that one solution might be a ‘mystery of Old Belief’, e.g. the backstage of the EOB being inaccessible for tourists at all, but with relevant substitutes to it offered to tourists (Pärtelpoeg 2012, Looode 2013).

It should be stressed that not tourism as such but its limits deserve attention. This can be a challenge, though. Tourism organization needs coordination between the ministries and their agencies, which support both culture and tourism, representing organs of the EOB and tourism developers from NGOs and the business sector, which could help to organize sustainable tourism of Old Belief. However, Estonian public administration, as documented, lacks coordination, and public administration is fragmented (see Sarapuu 2011). So, economic incentives and ‘openness’ of worship houses as a public interest can still dominate in the policy discourse as the solution to cultural and economic problems of the EOB. And the EOB have leadership problems, which may hamper the coordination and representation of their community (Varunin 2012, 2013).

5. Conclusion
The government has not yet implemented the concept of ‘sustainable tourism’ in the context of Old Belief, and policy implementation lacks coordination between cultural and tourism policy makers to address this issue. So, if Old Belief is a tourism resource, then ‘sustainability’ only formally implies a positive interrelation between Old Belief and tourism in economic and cultural terms, i.e. the usage of EOB cultural heritage to organize tourism improves the socioeconomic situation of the EOB; this enhances their self-sufficiency at the backstage, and ultimately the EOB have more resources to preserve their traditions, rituals, lifestyle, etc. In this situation, this qualitative analysis helps to see how tourism of Old Belief is organized and what effect it has on the preservation of Old Belief.

The small, aging, and poor congregations of the EOB are not self-sufficient at the backstage to resist socioeconomic processes that endanger their cultural vitality. Looking for opportunities to be more self-sufficient, the EOB face the dilemma of ‘openness’. In order to attain economic resources to develop culturally, should historically ‘closed’ congregations accept and practice solutions that the larger society, including the government, offers, or should they not? Tourism of Old Belief is one such controversial solution. Tourism of Old Belief is organized at the ‘frontstage’ and the ‘backstage’. Interviews show that this has some effect of commodification. Disregarding various structural problems of tourism organization in Peipsiveer and problems of regional development, which hamper tourism development as such, such tourism can still be organized, thanks to the government’s interest and project-based support to tourism initiatives, which attracts tourists into the EOB settlements. Such tourism has had minimal economic effect, so that one may suggest that Old Belief should be actively used to reveal its full economic potential. At the same time, cultural aspects should not be negated, as the analysis shows.

Tourism of Old Belief is related to the conflict of interests. This conflict is not about tourism in the EOB settlements as such. It is about its limits, i.e. the differentiation of the frontstage from the backstage. According to a cultural perspective, the usage of worship houses as tourism objects implies the privatization of religious life and challenges the backstage of the EOB, e.g. the privacy of spiritual life, the
inappropriateness of using religion for profit-making purposes, adherence to traditions, etc. Congregations have started practicing such ‘openness’, though. If observations are correct, then it is possible to argue that the commodification of the backstage may hardly help to attract already assimilated younger generations of ‘EOB by birth’. Rather, cultural projects and especially cultural/religious summer camps for children of the EOB can achieve this goal. Thus, the commodification of the frontstage deserves attention. Old Belief can be symbolically used to brand and produce certain tourism products, as it is already done. Old Belief as a symbol or, if you wish, a brand does not, in fact, belong to anyone. So, all entrepreneurs may use Old Belief to develop their own products and services. As people have different religious and cultural sensitivities, some of their entrepreneurial solutions may lead to the commodification of religious aspects of Old Belief, while others do not.

If the very idea of tourism is to help the EOB and their congregations to become at least richer via tourism, then interviews imply other profit-making alternatives which do not commodify the backstage, but might still be good (economically and culturally) at the frontstage; some projects already function this way. How can the frontstage be used more effectively during the implementation of the tourism development plan for 2014–2020? Legal-administrative regulations and coordination between the government, tourism developers, and representative organs of the EOB can be a useful but also a challenging way to organize tourism of Old Belief. For the government, one such challenge is to address and understand tourism and Old Belief within the context of socioeconomic problems and the chronically underdeveloped tourism infrastructure in Peipsi, the commodification of Old Belief and the distinction of the frontstage from the backstage. On the EOB side, there is a leadership problem that may hamper their representation and internal cooperation with the government.

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Notes
1. The Parliament of Estonia database (http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=advsearch) was used for the analysis. Combinations of the words Old Believers; culture of Old Believers; Old Believers’ tourism; Old Believers and tourism; influence of tourism on Old Believers; influence of tourism on Old Belief; influence of tourism on the Old Believers’ culture were used to find any records of tourism of Old Belief.
2. Tourism is a private-sector activity aimed at making profit by creating entertainment for the tourist that has a tendency to over-consume resources and create negative externalities (see McKercher 1993, p. 6).
3. The total number of the Amish has grown from 6300 in 1901 to 273,710 in 2012 (Kraybill et al. 2013, p. 156).
4. Pennsylvania belongs to the top 10 tourism destinations in the USA (U.S. Census Bureau 2011, pp. 774–775). The number of tourists in Lancaster grew from 500,000 in

5. In 1950, 90% of the Amish were farmers (Kraybill 2013, pp. 276, 282).
6. The failure rate of Amish enterprises during the five-year period is 5%, while that of non-Amish enterprises is 65% (Kraybill et al. 2013, p. 303).
7. The Parliament of Estonia database (http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=advsearch) was used for the analysis. Combinations of the words Old Believers; culture of Old Believers; Old Believers’ tourism; Old Believers and tourism; influence of tourism on Old Believers; influence of tourism on Old Belief; influence of tourism on the Old Believers’ culture were used to find any records about tourism of Old Belief.
8. Old Believers baptize by immersion (rather than pouring a little water on the baptized), make the sign of the cross with two fingers (rather than three), process liturgy in Church clockwise (rather than anticlockwise) and sing double Alleluias (rather than triple), to name just a few differences between the Old Believers and the ROC (Paert 2010, p. 884).
9. The EOB belong to the priestless sub-division of Old Believers. Compared to priestly Old Believers, they have less sacraments, and they practice lay ministry. The EOB are divided into two historical affiliations: Fedoseevy (the Raja and Viike-Kolkja villages) and Pomory (the rest of the settlements). The former accept three Sacraments: confession, baptism, and marriage; the latter have only baptism and confession.
10. According to the National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act (LCANM 1993) § 1 national minorities are citizens and residents of Estonia; have longstanding ties with Estonia; are distinct from Estonians ethnically, culturally, religiously, or linguistically and are motivated to preserve their culture, religion, or language. In this vein, Estonian national minorities are Jews, Germans, Swedes, and Russians. To specify, only Russians including the EOB who have been living in Estonia since the First Republic (1918–1941), e.g. 37,500–50,000 persons by 1989 (see Mihhailov 2007, pp. 2–3) fully fall under this definition. The majority of Russians who migrated into Estonia in Soviet times are thus considered rather an ethnic minority.
11. All translations from Estonian and Russian are by the author except where otherwise noted.
12. Such sympathy can also be explained by the idea that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, i.e. similarly to the EOB, the Russian Empire and Soviet Union threatened Estonians, their culture and identity (see only Mertelsmann 2005).
13. Estonia is one of the most secularized societies with the most liberal religious policies in the world (Ringvii 2008, p. 181).
15. This is a life-time unpaid lay ministry. In 2006, three congregations had their preceptors, in 2013 only one is left.
16. The generation gap, the decline of traditions and secularization were documented already in Soviet times among all Old Believers including the EOB (Vorontsova and Filatov 2000, p. 59, Plaat 2005, p. 18).
17. For example, Enterprise Estonia (EAS) is a government agency responsible for the allocation of money to tourism projects.
18. The total number of visitors in the settlements of EOB is fewer than 10,000 persons (see http://www.positum.ee/eas_keksused/). The exact number of tourists is unknown. According to the statistics, on average 1375 tourists visited the worship house in Raja annually between 2005 and 2010 (Jõgevamaa Turisminfokeskus 2011). In 2012, 8000 persons visited Kolkja Museum (Portnova 2012). The total registered population in Raja and Kolkja is, respectively, 542 and 400 persons.
19. Thanks to this practice, the congregation bought firewood for heating their worship house in the amount of €800 and a new baptistery in the amount of €1200 (Antropova 2012).
20. These are official tax-levied jobs.
21. Sanctums should be open to the visitors on weekends from 15 May to 15 September at least five hours a day for five years after the end of the project (see Ministry of Interior 2011, 2012).
22. The Setu are an ethnic group living in the South-Eastern part of Estonia. Estonians believe that the Setu are an Estonian regional subgroups. However, the Setu consider themselves an Finno-Ugric nation, stressing their linguistic and cultural differences from the Estonians. The Setu have their own flag, anthem, epic and representative bodies. The total of the Setu is 5000–6000 persons (Jääts 2000).

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All web links used in this article were valid as of 16 July 2014. Links cited in the text are not referred here.


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Appendix 1. List of projects on tourism in EOB settlements as of the end of 2013

1. **The Fish and Onion Restaurant** is located in the village Suur-Kolkja. It serves the traditional food of fishermen. While not promoted as such, it is well known as the Old Believers restaurant (www.hot.ee/kolkjarestoran).

2. **Museum of Mustvee Old Believers Local History.** The permanent exhibition on local history includes one section related to the EOB (www.hot.ee/mmuus).


4. **Onion Route.** Network of tourism service providers from Tartu up to Kallaste, including the Old Believers’ villages Varnja and Kolkja. The network offers tours visiting Peipsiiver to see the culture of Old Believers, Estonian peasants and Baltic German Manors (www.sibulatee.ee).
(5) **Kolkja Old Believers Museum.** The permanent exhibition displays Old Believers’ clothes, crafts, religious items etc. ([www.hot.ee/k/kolkjamuuseum](http://www.hot.ee/k/kolkjamuuseum)).

(6) **Peipsimaa Visitor Center.** The center is run by the NGO Piiripeal and is located in Kolkja. It offers active vocation opportunities in Peipsiveer, organizes workshops on Old Believers’ traditional handicraft, provides information for tourists etc. ([www.peipsimaa.ee/projektid](http://www.peipsimaa.ee/projektid)).

(7) **Varnja Museum of Living History.** This small museum is located in the village Varnja with an exhibition about the life of Old Believers ([www.sibulatec.ee/varnja-muuseum](http://www.sibulatec.ee/varnja-muuseum/)).

(8) **Wayfarer Churches** is a project organized by the Estonian Council of Churches. The aim is to introduce Estonian churches, i.e. a description of the church, contacts, visiting time, time of religion services. In 2012 the Mustvee, Kallaste, Raja, Kükita and Varnja congregations participated in the project ([www.teelistekirikud.ekn.ee](http://www.teelistekirikud.ekn.ee)).
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