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THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S REGIONAL POLICY

Master’s thesis
International Relations, European-Asian Studies

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I declare that I have compiled the paper independently and all works, important standpoints and data by other authors have been properly referenced and the same paper has not been previously been presented for grading. The document length is 14 359 words from the introduction to the end of summary.

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ABSTRACT

South Korea has been caught between the security concerns posed by North Korea and competing interests of China and the US within the Northeast Asian region. President Moon Jae-in took the leadership position of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2017 amidst national confusion and political uncertainties. He quickly sought reconciliation with China to work together towards establishing closer political relations and opening a regional dialogue for peace.

To give a calculated assessment whether the prospects for better political relations between South Korea and China are positive or negative, the thesis is focusing on determining first the geostrategic role(s) South Korea currently pursues in the Northeast Asian region through its policies and status positioning by its leadership and then assess the implications for China, analyzing whether South Korea’s current role(s) corresponds with China’s expectations for that role.

A content analysis of the leader’s speeches paired with foreign policy analysis resulted in determining that South Korea currently enacts the roles of a ‘conscious developer’, a ‘bridge’ and a ‘mediator for peace’, however, the geostrategic role it pursues is identified to only be the latter. With this, it is concluded that based on the current geostrategic environment in Northeast Asia and the South Korea-China relations, the building of stronger political relations is supported by rather positive prospects by the assumed roles.

Keywords: role theory, foreign policy analysis, South Korea, China
INTRODUCTION

The former conservative President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment sowed instability and uncertainties about the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) foreign policy, as well as regional and global directions. Amidst the transition to a new centre-left leadership with current President Moon Jae-in assuming power, more questions and speculations were raised. In particular, President Moon’s move to express a higher level of sensitivity over concerns of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) than his predecessor President Park had – in attempts to warm up the bilateral relations with China – raised questions of South Korean incentives (Work 2017). Is this a step towards mending relations with China? What would closer China-ROK relations mean for the United States (US) or, for that matter, for the Northeast Asian region as a whole? Could China hold the key for rapprochement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula? This general set of questions represents mixed views of the international community, enhancing the scope of the debate and making South Korea’s importance more visible and vital also within the larger sub-regional context.

According to the timeline presented by Work (2017), relations between the PRC and ROK deteriorated in 2016 when the then President Park made an agreement with the US for the deployment of Thermal High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system onto the Korean peninsula; despite China’s continuous and strong opposition (McCurry 2017). This drifted the two economically tightly linked, but politically weakly connected states further apart – with China imposing a set of economic sanctions on South Korean imports and businesses in China, affecting also the cultural and tourism sectors (Work 2017). According to a report published by the Hyundai Research Institute, the consequences of these actions translate into extensive economic losses, with South Korea’s loss in revenue for the year 2017 potentially reaching up to 6.6 billion EUR (8.5 trillion KRW), while losses for China would roughly amount to 850 million EUR (1.1 trillion KRW) (Han 2017, 10). The current leadership of South Korea, however, sees China as a far too valuable partner to let the relations deteriorate further (Work 2017). In 2017, the two states which first established formal diplomatic relations in 1992 (Renner 2006), decided through several
meetings and discussions on a higher level to lift the economic sanctions and work together towards establishing a stronger bilateral relationship overall (Work 2017).

China has been working ‘overtime’ towards establishing a global leadership role as a “responsible leader of the world” (Zhang 2017). Through the proposal of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative in 2013, which was later framed up as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China prioritized global expansion, setting its sights on Central and Southeast Asian, European, and African regions. However, with the heightened activities of North Korea on nuclear development and missile testing, China cannot overlook the Northeast Asian region and the role of South Korea (Hwang, Gibson 2017; Römer 2018). While China has disapproved and condemned North Korea’s actions, China itself has been disregarded and shown little respect for by the Kim Jong-Un’s leadership, thus, arguably, South Korea has seen a chance to form a stronger political standing with China while still trying to hold true to its position with the US (Kim 2017).

Considering the above, the question of South Korea’s role in Northeast Asia is raised as policy directions change. There have been numerous discussions and writings on which role South Korea should, would or could pursue. South Korea has been labelled with the roles of a junior ally or a “bridge-building” middle power (Hwang 2017), as well as a balancer of great powers in the region or even linchpin by the Trump administration (Work 2017). Nevertheless, whether South Korea actively assumes any of these roles or is there another specific role that South Korea tries to acquire is what the author of this thesis is interested in researching.

The thesis argues that South Korea’s pursuit of closer bilateral relations with China can thrive under President Moon’s Administration if the role pursuit of South Korea equates with the role expectations of China towards the ROK and the Northeast Asian region, because differing role understandings can raise tensions and lead to new disagreements with possibly high economic costs. The primary research question is as follows: **What is South Korea’s current geostrategic role prescribed by its leadership that it pursues in the Northeast Asian region?** Researching, determining and verifying the specific role(s) South Korea holds will significantly help to understand: (1) how its current stance supports the country’s actions and pursuit of closer political relations with China; and (2) what are the implications for China – whether the current role(s) of South Korea positively affects China’s realization of its own Korea policy and strategies for the Northeast Asian region, meaning, does South Korea’s current role(s) correspond to China’s expectations for its role?
According to Renner (2006), the relationship between South Korea and China will be influential to “… the general behaviour of regional states toward each other and how crises are resolved”. The same scholar also stated that “… because of an already established relationship between North Korea and China, a strong relationship between South Korea and China will help to ensure a smooth and peaceful outcome for all situations on the Korean peninsula and subsequently will lead to a more peaceful, stable, and viable Asia” (Ibid.). Therefore, research related to intricate connections between actors and influences affecting the stability of the region is of high value for an overall understanding of the Northeast Asian region in the context of International Relations studies. The thesis seeks to present a novel point of view to the analysis of ROK-PRC political relations through utilization of role theory. The determination and assessment of South Korea’s role(s) and its implications for China will allow to draw conclusions: (1) whether the pursued role is a result of accommodating China's interests or expressed as the leader's true intent and national effort to build stronger strategic bilateral relations; and (2) whether the role can withstand the questions in the US-China relations. Accordingly, an analysis of South Korea’s role(s), and its implications and correlation with Chinese policy interests will help to determine, (3) whether the pursuit of stronger political relations between South Korea and China can be successful with South Korea’s current assumed role(s) in the Northeast Asian region.

In order to assess the importance, limitations and viability of South Korea’s current role(s) in the Northeast Asian region, a research into the ROK’s previous roles is conducted to evaluate the recurrences or contestations in roles. The roles of South Korea are determined through a content analysis of the regional positioning expressed by the President in official speeches and supported by a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Role theory assigns specific behaviours to the enacted role conceptions; thus, it is capable of making predictions regarding the foreign policy options states make ascribed to one or another role (Ifantis, et. al. 2015, 9). Although the thesis would like to provide an extensive analysis on this since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between South Korea and China for a comprehensive understanding of pursued roles and their impact. Due to a significant degree of limitations in regards of accessibility and public availability of necessary resources for this study, the empirical analysis for determining previous roles focuses on the period from 2003, examining separately the policies and declared objectives of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye, and current Moon Jae-in governments. This allows to further assess how its previous roles can support/hinder its current role pursuit and positioning seeking stronger political relations with China. As a final argument, an analysis is conducted on China’s current policies towards the Northeast Asian region and South Korea, to assess whether
or not the ROK’s current role(s) and the pursuit of stronger political relations is aligned with the PRC’s interests and supports the realization of its policies.

In addition to the introductory notes, this research is comprised of two chapters along with sub-chapters, and a set of concluding remarks. In details, the introduction presents the research problem, main aim, research questions and work structure. The first chapter is setting up the foundation for research by presenting a theoretical background necessary for the deeper comprehension of the subsequent contextual analysis in the second chapter. In the first chapter, role theory and foreign policy analysis are presented as the central theoretical concepts. They are defined and explained to present a better understanding of a state’s behaviour in the global and regional political context – how the role behaviour (through a set of policy goals and leadership choices) defines the assumed role of a state. Primarily, this research benefits from the works of Holsti, Thies, and other authors, in the context of outlining a cohesive insight of the role theory and national roles. For an explanation of the FPA, Harnisch and other authors’ works will be featured. Additionally, the methodology of the research is introduced in further detail and the mixed method approach as research design is explained. This approach combines both qualitative and quantitative methods of research for the better apprehension of the research problem than either approach on their own (Creswell and Clark 2006, 5). The specific methods for analyzing the presidential speeches and FPA are explained in the research description sub-chapter. The second chapter focuses on presenting the research findings and their correlation with the theory, analysing the collected data to determine specific role(s) of South Korea and answer the research questions. Furthermore, the new knowledge gained from the analysis and the determined current role positioning of South Korea will be applied in the context of implications for China, to assess the prospects of the ROK-PRC political relations in a continued discussion. The last chapter presents concluding remarks and gives a final assessment whether presented theories and research have been adequate to answer the research problem fully. Further recommendations and suggestions are proposed as seen necessary.
1. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY

1.1. Relevance of the Role Theory for the South Korean context

Role theory was first introduced as a concept in the context of international relations by Holsti in his article “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” (1970), where he defined it as “… a framework for describing national role performance and role conceptions and for exploring the sources of those role conceptions” (Holsti 1970, 246-247). Theories expressed in that article have been widely recognized due to their innovative and forward-looking aspects at the time; later on, many other authors (Wal, Harnisch et al. 2011, Thies 2009, 2013, Cantor and Kaarbo 2016) have built on his ideas, evolving the concept and the foundation of role theory further. In this sub-chapter, the essence of the ‘role theory’ concept and elaborations by various authors will be presented. This will be taken as a basis for presenting role theory framework for empirical research in the thesis later on. Firstly however, a description and its important aspects need to be presented for deeper understanding of the concept.

Role theory originates from sociological and social psychological research, where mainly the affect of role expectations on behavior was studied (Harnisch et al. 2011, 7). It is perceived as a framework, holding descriptive, explanatory, and organizational values (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 3). This means, that role theory can be used for describing the NRCs expressed by South Korea’s leadership, explain the relative role behavior set in foreign policy direction, and organize the information according to role prescription to determine the specific role(s) South Korea enacts and pursues. Role theory as a concept is flexible and can allow versatile research. The research can focus on various areas: on structural and external factors affecting the origin of roles, on role behavior and interactions between the actor and the structure, on role conflicts, on plurality of roles obtained, and even on national role’s influence on foreign policy (Ibid.). The research of this thesis is actor specific and focuses on examining the leadership perceptions and foreign policy behavior to determine the roles obtained. The leadership perceptions for South Korea's role is studied through NRCs expressed by the leadership of Presidents Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in. It is important to verify the versatility and change in roles to
understand their correlations with various pursued policies and distinguishing roles pursued in the past helps to assess the vitality and effective pursuit of the current role(s).

Scholars have been debating on the origin of roles as long as they have talked about the concept itself. There are variety of factors which can be connected with or influential to the origin. Theorists have concluded that structural factors alone are not sufficient enough to explain the diversity of roles in the international system (Aggestam 2006; referenced in Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 4); factors, such as the impact of material capabilities, the size of the state, economic performance, culture, history, identity, and the perceptions of the political elite or the decision-makers are considered important for the origin of roles (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 4), collectively, the national attributes (Chen 2016, 116). Chen finds that national leaders are important in translating these national attributes into national roles through their individual perceptions influenced by their personal character (Ibid.) – their values, experiences, attitudes, preconceptions, etc. Therefore, speeches by the President can be considered as an instrument of their message, the expression of their perception of national attributes and a medium for role conceptions. Furthermore, Aggestam (1999) explained that when a foreign policy-maker delivers a message about commitments, functions, duties and responsibilities, it indicates expectancy of a pursuit of a specific foreign policy performance.

Thies, however, turned his focus of origin on the expectations of the international system and explained the process of role location through socialization, calling it a socialization game, where the external role expectations and influences are high enough to bring on change or set the foundation for the state’s role(s) to emerge (Thies 2013, 2-3, 36-39). Moreover, understanding the origin of roles can help better comprehend the role expectations of ego (the state itself) and alter (the other(s), the international system), and support the further analysis of role location process or role conflicts. (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 3-5) The latter stemming from inconsistencies between the role behavior of an actor and role expectations of significant others (Nabers 2011, 76). Therefore, it is important to study also the role expectations of China in order to evaluate whether there’s a risk of role conflict between South Korea and China or not, and whether the expectations and influence of a significant other in the region, the PRC, are evident in the current role(s) - is the ROK simply accommodating China's interests.

Nabers also said that…“one of the major values of role theory is that it allows the simultaneous analysis of the ego and the alter – and their interaction …” (Ibid., 181). Verifying that national role
conceptions are regarded important and valuable, as they include an actor’s perception of its own position vis-à-vis others (the ego) and the perception of role expectations of others in the international system (the alter), communicated by language and actions (Deitelhoff 2006, Kriste and Maull 1996; referenced in Harnich et. al. 2011, 8). Meaning, that role positioning of a state in the international system is not only affected by ideas and values of the national elite involved in the process of building and enforcing its foreign policy. The views and expectations of the system, affected by other members of it, have an effect on its account – at times supporting the efforts and aspirations of the state and its pursued role, other times afflicting outside pressures towards another role.

Harnisch notes, “today, leading role theorists differ with regards to the sources and factors shaping national roles” (Harnisch et. al. 2011, 7). He explains that American scholars emphasize actor’s material or cognitive characteristics as determining aspects for roles and stability of those roles as motivation for action, whereas European scholars support the constructivist view, exploring language and social interactions in determining roles, asserting that roles themselves determine the action by providing “reasons for action” (Ibid.). Harnisch further emphasizes the important distinction between roles and identity, “changes in roles and role sets are important determinants for both role enactment [behavior of an actor when performing a role] and identity formation” (Ibid., 9) – explaining in more detail that role conceptions are seen as a cause for a certain role behavior by an actor; whereas identity holds the meaning of how an agent defines itself in the perspective of other actors and in regards to the society (Ibid. 9-10). This change in roles can happen in two ways: through adaption (changes in strategies and instruments for performing the role) and learning (change in beliefs and development of new assumptions, skills and behaviors) (Ibid. 10). Therefore it is important to distinguish the change in role conceptions in times when governments turn to understand the underlying reasons for these changes, whether it’s due to changes in strategies or changes in beliefs, as the latter is tightly connected to cultural values and perceptions of the populus, changes in beliefs of eliite in pursuit of national role can bring about discontent among citizens. Analyzing the change in role behavior through FPA and national role conceptions of named ROK leaders is important to understand the reasons for it, to be able to assess the current situation in order to prevent role conflicts and future rows between China and South Korea entailing high costs.

While defining the roles in international relations, which states can enact, authors have presented various sets of classifications. Holsti’s outline of seventeen NRCs was first of its kind, paving the
way for others to follow suit with their interpretations and developments of further classifications. His classification of roles is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Classification of roles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Classification</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bastion of revolution-liberator</td>
<td>a state claiming this role is acclaming themselves to be a liberator of others or act as a supporter of liberation movements in other states/of other governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional leader</td>
<td>a state claiming this role is asserting itself a higher leadership role with special functions in its relations with other states within a specific region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional protector</td>
<td>state claims this role by emphasizing its ability to provide protection to others (in favour of its own interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active independent</td>
<td>a state claiming this role is opting for non-alignment and is free of military commitment to any of the major powers. In foreign policy, national interests outweigh interests of any other international actors. However, such states can hold mediator potential and actively try to expand their diplomatic and economic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation supporter</td>
<td>state claiming this role does not undertake physical support or responsibility for the liberation movement, acknowledging the support only formally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-imperialist agent</td>
<td>state claiming this role sees great threat in imperialism, having to stand against it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>state is claiming this role when it has to defend its common value system against outside influences or attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator-integrator</td>
<td>state claiming this role is seeing itself responsible for reconciling conflicts between other states or groups of states, acclaming it as a continuing task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional sub-system collaborator</td>
<td>state claiming this role is committed to cooperation, to build new international communities or sub-systems (e.g. Communist movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>state is claiming this role when it gives assistance to underdeveloped states, often possessing necessary skills or advantages to do so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>state claiming this role has to carry a special communication capacity, which allows it to convey information and messages between different states and cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faithful ally</td>
<td>state claiming this role is required to assert special commitment for supporting foreign policies of another state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>state is claiming this role through policies of self-determination and neutrality in its perspective and contribution to the international system</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Example state claiming this role finds attaining influence in the international system important, as they focus in their policies on promotion of prestige and exemplary state profile

Internal development state claiming this role is focused primarily on the problems of national development, supporting rather non-involvement within international problems and politics, while not being limited to international cooperation (e.g. economic, cultural)

Isolate state is claiming this role through self-reliance and minimal involvement in the international system, with little to no foreign cooperation and external contact

Protectee state claiming this role is demanding responsibility of other states to protect it, while not holding significant functions or tasks within the international system itself


In addition, Holsti identified a few less prevalent roles, including the ‘balancer’ (a state is claiming this role through creating balance between two hegemonies) and the ‘defender of peace’ (a state claiming this role is dedicated to defending the universal peace within the whole international system; world policeman) (Holsti 1970, 271-272). He concluded that although there is a common assumption among policymakers of a single role a state pursues through policies, states often take on more than one. Holsti explained that the possibility of a state obtaining several roles is justified through the fact that states often establish multiple relations and cooperations with various other states within the international system and regional sub-systems, therefore, they can pursue different roles through their policies in interacting with them. (*Ibid.* 277)

Taking Holsti’s classification of major and minor roles as a framework for this study, role conceptions expressed by the ROK leadership on South Korea in the Northeast Asian region are identified. However, the possibility of extending the list with additional roles recognized through the analysis of South Korea’s example is kept open, because the political environment and culture in South Korea and the regional context of Northeast Asia may hold intricacies not identified by Holsti in his research. Holstis has additionally pointed out that states can assume multiple roles because they establish relations with multiple other actors of the system. Therefore, the research does not limit the assumption of the South Korean position to a single role. By collecting various perspectives, it is determined whether the ROK pursues a single or multiple roles within the Northeast Asian region and what they are.
Rosenau (1987) points out, that it’s not uncommon for decision-makers to have to deal with conflicting role expectations in making foreign policy decisions; which is why they come up with ‘role scenarios’ or scripts of action plans to help determine which scenario is most appropriate and which role to execute. (Thies 2009, 6-7) An important factor that this highlights is the need to find out whether South Korea pursues any contradictory roles and what implications this would pose to China as well as on the overall possibility of building closer political relations.

At large, the opinion of the public is not regarded for in role theory research and primarily the viewpoint of political elite and the decision-makers is considered when defining national roles, therefore, the national role perception could differ drastically between the masses and the elite (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 7-8). Harnisch drew attention to a preconception amongst scholars according to which there is a remaining assumption about the expectations for the role of a state being shared among national political elite (Harnisch 2012; referenced in Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 2), where in fact, the opinions could vary drastically from the role(s) pursued through foreign policy. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) conclude that national role contestations – indicating differing views between the political elite on which NRCs to enact (Walker 2017) – can bring on change in policy directives with the change of power among the political elite and primary decision-makers, who are holding true other role values than was the norm, making it likely to enforce change in security and overall foreign policy objectives (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 70). Therefore, to limit the excessive generalizations and being overwhelmed by the differing opinions within the political elite, only South Korea’s leaders’ (Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye, Moon Jae-in) perceptions together with the published foreign policy directions are used for gathering data. According to what Cantir and Kaarbo suggest, the changes in leadership in South Korea between conservative and progressive governments may indicate changes in overall foreign policy objectives and thus the role behavior connected to NRCs and role pursuit.

1.2. How Foreign Policy Analysis helps evaluate South Korea’s role pursuit

Roles have a high value for foreign policy research as they can help explain national foreign policies and understand connections and patterns within international relations (Harnisch et. al. 2011, 2) about how states converge on the system level through their foreign policy and national roles. Therefore, this thesis notes that understanding roles nations pursue as part of their foreign policy is important for the efficient functioning of the international order. Role theory has been
used for FPA on an individual, state and the system level, and common has been a mix of the first two, where the individual and the state level analyses are often combined to represent the roles of a state through the focus of the leader; whereas the research on the latter, looking at the system as a central factor influencing the NRCs and generating change, subsequently affecting foreign policy behavior, has been a less focal concept of role theory research in FPA (Thies 2009, 13-14, 20). This thesis will focus on the first two, the individual and the state levels in determining the role(s) of South Korea.

Transcribing the concept of role theory into international relations context, the foreign policy analysis is supported through four concepts (Holsti 1970, 240):

1) ‘role performance’, which is comprised of attitudes, decisions made, and actions taken by the government of the state;

2) ‘national role conceptions’ (NRCs), which are defined by the state itself;

3) ‘role prescriptions’, which are imposed by external forces; and

4) ‘position’, which represents the stand the state has within the system of role prescriptions.

At this point, attention needs to be drawn on a distinction as misconceptions could rise easily from misinterpretation of terms. The term ‘status’ in international relations context is more vague in comparison to the term ‘position’ in social context, as ‘position’ entails a well defined and specialized set of functions which is concluded by the specific prescribed role(s), whereas a ‘status’ does not (Ibid., 242).

Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) examine the various uses of role theory for FPA, in particular, they give an example of three ways, how role contestations can be connected with role behavior and foreign policy implementation. Firstly, the presence of contested roles may mean that the roles of the state are not stable, and can help explain changes and inconsistencies between roles the state holds and its foreign policy behavior – “if NRCs [National Role Conception] are not shared, then different political actors may follow different foreign policies simultaneously or foreign policy may change over time due to changes in the dominant political actors or the internal power balance in the country” (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 16). This statement indicates that in a situation where role contestations within the national elite are high, the chances for NRCs and foreign policy aims to change with a turn in leadership are also high because the inconsistent foreign policy behavior of the political elite can raise discontent with the overall national role.
Secondly, the contested roles are relevant for the agency-structure debate, where it’s necessary to view the dynamics occurring within an agent in addition to the structure at large, as it influences the interaction process and evidently the bigger picture – “… proper understanding of the complexity of the ‘ego’ and the ‘alter’ is as necessary as analyzing their interaction” (Ibid.). Affirming once again, that the roles formation as well as change is affected by the agent and the structure simultaneously, while at times, one may enforce its influence on the pursuit of specific roles more than the other.

Thirdly, the implications of contested roles are important in the context of the strategic use of roles because the decision-makers are often quick to emphasize roles which support the policy they are trying to enforce, however, this can be done simply as a strategy to gain attention and support with no intention to actually follow through with applying the expressed roles in practice through the foreign policy behaviour– “how agents respond to structure and employ roles vis-à-vis other agents highlights the fact that structures do not deterministically impose behaviors but rather become part of the domestic political ‘game’” (Ibid., 17). Therefore, the understanding of complexities and intricacies of the domestic contestations is the key for comprehending how the ‘ego’ connects with the ‘alter’ and the international system (Ibid., 183). This thesis is focusing on the Northeast Asian region and South Korea’s role in it, without putting emphasis on the larger picture of the international system because the main purpose of the study is not to define the origin of the roles, but rather analyze the specific role(s) within and the national policy towards the region. First of all, the internal intricacies connected to the roles and foreign policy priorities, as well as emphasis on the pursuit and enforcement of the set roles by the leadership through foreign policy behaviour will be the main areas of research. Second of all, only after determining the specific role(s) South Korea currently enacts, can the complexities between the ‘ego’ and the ‘alter’ be studied though China’s perceptions towards South Korea’s role and the Northeast Asian region.

Breuning has explained how the national role conceptions connect the role perceptions of agency and the material international structure in order to help define and analyze foreign policy behavior of a state (Figure 1) (Harnisch et. al. 2011, 26). Using Breuning’s model, connections between the data gathered on leader’s perceptions and NRCs can be compared and further analyzed with the data gathered from the Diplomatic White Papers, being the source for foreign policy aims and behavior.
1.3. Methodology and methods of research for determining national role pursuit

As Bennett (2002, 27) indicates, “there is a growing consensus among scientists that research programs advance more effectively through the iterative or collaborative use of different research methods than through the use of any one method alone”. Therefore, the chosen methodology is a convergent parallel mixed methods of research. It combines the data collected through both qualitative and quantitative research methods for uniform analysis to formulate a comprehensive understanding for the research problem (Creswell 2014, 15). The reason for choosing mixed methods design for this research is due to the author's opinion that there is a need for further validation and justification of meanings and connections of data that either qualitative or quantitative approach alone cannot cover, whereas a parallel use of the combination can help present explanations, confirm or disprove the meanings and build a stronger ground of validity for the study during the analysis. The flexibility in use and ability to explain patterns is necessary for exploring connections between role performance and position. The merging of qualitative data on leader’s NRCs and role enactment with quantitative data gathered though an analysis of foreign policy objectives and statements will allow to evaluate whether the role pursuit of a leader is
supported by the foreign policy behaviour. The data gathered through foreign policy analysis can thus according to Breuning’s model (Figure 1) be interpreted in the context of validation or discontent between the national roles and role pursuit (behaviour). This is important, because in a situation where the discontent between the data gathered through FPA (quantitative content analysis) and textually established roles (qualitative content analysis) nation’s leaders hope to pursue is large, it indicates that the role pursuit is not shared among the elite who would rather follow a different path through the foreign policy. However, it is also necessary to note that when role contestation within the national leadership is proven, it could make it difficult for the state to pursue cohesive foreign policy objectives, raising chances for emergence of contested understandings about its national role between other states, thus, increasing the possibility for discontent.

1.3.1. Detailed description of the research

This empirical research does not claim that the national role conceptions are mutually shared and perceived by all the decision-makers and the political elite nor the public. It is a research into the prevalent national role(s) advocated for by the South Korean governing administration, led by the President and pursued by the Foreign Ministry through their policy objectives and behaviour. The object of the research is the role(s) South Korea enacts in Northeast Asian region. This is examined through an individual leadership perspective because as mentioned in an earlier chapter, leaders have an ability of translating national attributes into role conceptions. The NRCs are identified using presidential speeches as they are instruments of the leader's message on the role of the state. The parallel role behavior analysis is concluded through FPA using Diplomatic White Papers as primary source materials.

Mixed method of analysis allows for both, textual and statistical data analysis, which adds depth to the research and interpret data on various levels. First, it is necessary to determine the specific role(s) South Korea pursues, which can be done through qualitative content analysis of presidential speeches, determining the national role conceptions after analyzing gathered data; second, comparisons can be made with data gathered through quantitative content analysis of foreign policy documents. The analysis of the data gathered will allow to concretely analyze the specific role behavior following the theoretical framework applied to this context. The pre-eminent advantages of a mixed method study are its ability to achieve a high level of construct validity, justify complex connections and develop explanations supported by factual data.
In the first stage of the empirical research, the author conducts a qualitative content analysis of South Korean leaders’ speeches for NRCs identification. The research sample is purposive to guarantee that the selected speeches address the Northeast Asian region and thus provide useful and necessary information. The sample is composed using two indicators: (1) it is an inaugural speech; (2) it is a speech containing keywords ‘Northeast Asia’ (동북 아시아, dongbug asia) and ‘role’ (역할, yeoghal) or ‘standpoint’ (견해, gyeonhae) or ‘position’ (입장, ibjang). In total, 34 speeches (Appendix 1) by Roh Moo-hyun (10), Lee Myung-bak (10), Park Geun-hye (6) and Moon Jae-in (8) are included in the sample. Due to the turbulent political environment and impeachment of Park Geun-hye and considering the short time frame in office for President Moon Jae-in, fewer speeches corresponded with the set indicators. However, the author feels that the substance of the selected speeches is ample enough and thus allows drawing meaningful conclusions. Next, the speeches are coded based on statements made regarding the region and gathered into themes of proposed roles, objectives, positions/stances, actions to be taken, and promises; few of the statements that don’t suit under these themes are grouped as other aspects. The codes under each theme are reviewed and most recurrent ideas highlighted as characteristics prominent under the specific leadership. Holsti’s classification of roles is applied to the identified characteristics and prevalent NRCs therefore verified. The analysis of findings is present in the next chapter.

In the second stage, the identified roles are compared with the foreign policy behavior identified through foreign policy analysis. The Diplomatic White Papers from 2003 to 2018 are used. The most frequently highlighted interest areas are identified through quantitative content analysis. Firstly, a preliminary set of markers is identified from each of the policy documents in regard to South Korean objectives and actions connected to the Northeast Asian region. After a comprehensive comparison, a conclusive set of 22 markers is established that is then used for collecting quantitative data from all of the White Papers. AntConc text analysis software is used for gathering the statistical data on the established markers. Only the chapters and sub-chapters focusing on the Northeast Asian region and primary foreign policy objectives are processed. The recognized frequencies in policy behaviour are cross-referenced with the special characteristics and roles identified in the first stage of the research and then through a parallel analysis of supporting or contradicting the role performance, presented in the next chapter.

In the third stage of the research, current Chinese policies towards the Northeast Asian region and objectives towards South Korea are analyzed to determine the perception of which role China is
expecting South Korea to hold and pursue, and assess, whether the expectations of China correspond with the role pursuit of South Korea. This will help elaborate on the successfulness of their efforts for building stronger political relations. Relevant data for carrying out this analysis is identified and gathered via a literature research. Both primary and secondary sources are used for added depth in presenting the Chinese position. Primary sources include official government statements and policy documents. Secondary sources include academic papers and media articles. The findings are disclosed in the next chapter.
2. FINDINGS AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ROLE

2.1. President Roh Moo-hyun’s leadership (2003-2008)

President Roh Moo-hyun introduced his Participatory Government upon taking office in 2003. His call for greater participation of the people was followed by his commitments to reforming the economic system and establishing a fair and transparent market economy (Roh 2003a). An area that could support the realization of Roh’s dreams for economic growth is the field of IT, proposing advancements for a “world-class information infrastructure”, to possibly build the logistics and financial center of the Northeast Asian region (Ibid.). His aim was to improve economic competitiveness of South Korea – not to fall behind the global competition posed by other developed countries. President Roh thus put great emphasis on the priority of the Northeast Asian region, calling the 21st century the “Northeast Asian era” (Ibid.). The time for him was right for the ROK to aspire towards gaining greater importance and significance having already overcome the difficult position in a gap between other powers. However, the rapidly deteriorating relations between the North and the South over the DPRK’s nuclear programme issue were clouding Roh’s vision for the region. Expressing serious concern over the nuclear issue, President Roh pledged to form closer cooperation with the US and Japan to reach a resolution (Roh 2003b). The US has been an indispensable ally for the ROK since the division of Koreas. Seeing the reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas essential for allowing South Korea to take a leap forward as a “central nation in the Northeast Asian era”, the ROK leadership deemed securing a denuclearized Korean peninsula a necessity for keeping the peace (Ibid.). In this regard, the President acclaimed the pursuit of “Peace and Prosperity Policy” (Roh 2003a) to promote and safeguard the peace on the peninsula.

President Roh emphasized the arrival and importance of the ‘Northeast Asian era’ in his celebratory address on the 84th anniversary of the March 1st Movement (Roh 2003b). He spread encouragement for his country to work towards becoming the centre of Northeast Asia, imagining an attractive position for South Korea connecting the neighbouring Japan, China and Russia, as a
centre of the region (*Ibid.*). President Roh envisioned Korean Peninsula’s potential as a connective link for the Pacific Ocean and the Eurasian continent; ultimately evolving into a logistics and financial point connecting everything else (Roh 2003g). The big thorn blocking his aspirations was the growing regional imbalance caused by North Korea. Although Roh assured, that frequent contact and dialogue with the North was kept, the threatening nuclear problem had broken the confidence in peace on the peninsula (Roh 2003c). Therefore, South Korea was in need of help, support and assistance from neighbouring partners and the US. The primary condition for the regional counterparts was to resolve the issue peacefully through dialogue. In the light of the meaningful anniversary, the president called on the people for a higher degree of participation, support and trust in the government, to help reach the aims of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia; and the goals of peace and prosperity for the region were expressed by the Northeast Asian leader also to his closest ally, the US, during a state visit (*Ibid.*). South Korea introduced the US audience its aspiration to take on the role of developing peace and unity on the Korean Peninsula, while at the same time, remaining faithful to their alliance and working towards a closer security cooperation (Roh 2003d). In regards to cooperation with Japan, President Roh Moo-hyun called in his speech to the Japanese Emperor (Roh 2003e) for South Korea and Japan both to take on a more proactive role for accomplishing the necessary guarantees for peace and prosperity in the region. Announcing a day later after a meeting with the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, that the two neighbours have agreed on closer cooperation for peace and economic development (Roh 2003f). On a state visit to China, President Roh expressed gratitude over the constructive role China has played in the North Korean issue, further advocating for the continuation of the pursuit for peace and prosperity in the region (Roh 2003g). For President Roh’s visions for South Korea’s future in the region to receive acclamation, it had to be met with clear and supportive foreign policy aims and behavior.

Our Korean Peninsula is the centre of Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula is a bridge connecting China and Japan, the continent and the ocean. This geopolitical position has given us pain in the past. Today, however, it gives more opportunities. It is demanding us to play a central role in the 21st century Northeast Asian era. Korean peninsula should be transformed into a peace zone that will emit peace towards the world in the 21st century. It must be reborn as a peaceful gateway to Northeast Asia connecting the Eurasian continent and the Pacific Ocean.

According to the speeches expressed by President Roh Moo-hyun, he sought to “build a bridge” (Roh 2003a), a connection, a centre for the Northeast Asian region. South Korea was to become a gateway where the ocean and the ancient silk route were to meet. As such, the prominent
characteristic recognized is a regional revisionist. If South Korea was to become a centre of Northeast Asia, it had to step up against the rapid growth of other developed countries. Economic reforms stipulated his vision for national development, paired with advancements in information technologies and science. As such, another characteristic is an economic opportunist. Above everything else, North Korea’s nuclear issue was growing out of hands. The establishment of Six-Party Talks (Roh 2004) as a medium for dialogue with North Korea to reach a peaceful resolution was one example of South Korea’s leadership keeping to its words in taking on a leading role for restoring peace on the peninsula. The ROK strengthened cooperation with regional neighbours – Japan, China, and Russia – and worked tirelessly on taking the alliance with the US further. By the end of President Roh’s term, South Korea and the United States had concluded their free trade agreement negotiations for KORUS FTA (Lee 2008b). The continued expression of peace and commitment to its alliance omitted characteristics of a beacon for peace and committed ally.

According to Holsti’s classification of roles (Table 1), under President Roh Moo-hyun’s leadership, South Korea entailed national role conceptions of the bridge, the faithful ally, and the patron of peace. Firstly, South Korea assumed the role of the ‘bridge’ through its continued cooperation and commitment to dialogue, bringing together neighbouring countries and its ally through Six-Party Talks to work unified towards a resolution. The original author’s description of the role is rather broad and can be translated into South Korean context through more than one example. However, the analysis notes that the special commitment to this role by the leadership is what helped South Korea follow it through its foreign policy behavior. Although President Roh envisioned the role of the ‘bridge’ as rather materialistic, incorporating economic advantages, then his actions voicing the commitment to the role and resolutions for peace are which helped him carry the message. The actions of bringing together countries for communication and cooperation are which solidified the role of the ‘bridge’. Although in the foreign policy documents the role of a ‘bridge’ was not as frequently emphasized as by the President, the meaning was still carried through with various actions prioritizing building trust and communication between the regional actors and bringing them together via established platforms (e.g. Six-Party talks, Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, etc.), including multiple International Security Organizations meetings, for the purpose of enhancing communication for establishing peace and closer security as well as economic cooperation; and the importance of South Korea in actively participating and working with other involved states via meetings and visits was emphasized in the documents as well. Secondly, the expressed commitment to strengthening the alliance through cooperation was a first indication for the assumed role of the ‘faithful ally’. However, the inclusion of the US into the
dialogue with North Korea for the resolution of the nuclear issue, frequent meetings between the states, security and development cooperations, and the economic joint action of the free trade agreement are all acts of building mutual trust and deepening commitment, projecting support towards the alliance and the policies of the state. The US was also the most frequently mentioned cooperation partner. Lastly, unlike Holsti’s classification of the ‘defender of peace’, South Korea did not assume a role of a world policeman. Instead, it pursued dialogue and cooperation for restoring regional peace. It’s message was clear, the Korean peninsula needs to first become peaceful, before the true realization of the “Northeast Asian era” can take place; before South Korea can truly pursue the vision of a central gateway, a link for the Northeast Asia. Therefore, the ROK assumed a role of the ‘patron of peace’, becoming a state committed also through its foreign policy to act towards acceptable resolution, continuation of dialogue and restoring of regional peace and security. In addition, the most frequently documented interest areas in White Papers were peace and security, followed by cooperation, economic development and threat. In terms of cooperation, the United States, China, Japan and Russia were the top partners. In the concluding remarks on the work done and efforts shown by the leadership of the Roh Administration, the 2008 Diplomatic White Paper emphasized the importance of balance between continuity and change at the turn of the government - important for maintaining strong and successful diplomacy (Diplomatic White Paper 2008).

2.2. President Lee Myun-Bak’s leadership (2008-2013)

Taking on the role and duties as the President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Myung-bak announced that he will bring peace to the nation, invigorate the economy, advance the science and technology, strengthen security, and lay a foundation for peaceful unification (Lee 2008a). Unlike his predecessor, Lee set his main sights beyond the Northeast Asian region declaring, “…I hereby declare the year 2008 as the starting year for the advancement of the Republic of Korea” (Ibid.), expressing his idea of introducing the nation to the world – in order to expand the knowledge of, the interest in, and the desire for cooperation with South Korea globally. He appealed to achieve this through the politics of pragmatism. Economic revival and open trade were to help ROK keep up with the ever increasing global economic development. As means to help the global political arena better notice the growth and potential of South Korea, Lee pledged greater participation in global peace and environmentalism. Support for international peacekeeping, development
assistance, utilization of green energy technologies and agenda were some of the steps by which the ROK aspired to attain global acknowledgement.

Although President Lee was prioritizing the “Global Korea” agenda, the pressures from regional issues and the threat posed by North Korea could not let him lift his focus form the neighbourhood. South Korea, who had already established the Six-Party talks as a platform for peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue during Roh administration, sought to proceed cooperation with Chian, Japan and Russia on this matter, while further strengthening its strategic alliance with the US. During his state visit to the United States, the President expressed his commitment to the continued cooperation between the two allies, relaying confidence in the success of the FTA and calling to join a leading role for enhancing security confidence and transparency within East Asia (Lee 2008b). With an address to the United States Forces Korea (USFK) military, President Lee acknowledged the achievements of the alliance, praising the joint security efforts and US military presence in South Korea as means that have maintained the peace on the peninsula (Lee 2008c). On his state visit to the PRC, President Lee Myung-bak expressed admiration for China’s economic reform and growing development while additionally appreciating China’s contributions to the North Korean issue, relaying an invitation for future joined cooperation on areas such as environmentalism and climate change, economic growth, continued trade and cultural exchange (Lee 2008d).

Opening the market to the foreign sector is an unavoidable mega-trend. Respecting the universal principles of democracy and market economy, we will take part in the global movement for peace and development. Our traditional culture, coupled with our technological prowess, will no doubt transmit to the world an image of a more attractive Korea. By allowing the world to come into Korea without hindrance, we will together create brand new values.

In 2009, President Lee Myung-bak, whose one aspiration was to take South Korea to the global arena, introduced his ambitious “Global Korea” policy to the UN General Assembly. In his keynote speech (Lee 2009), the president conveyed the main strategies of the policy for global cooperation: providing development assistance to the developing countries facilitated by also sharing the experience and expertise on moving from an aid receiver to an aid provider; commitment to continue promoting peace through peacekeeping operations (PKO) and counter-terrorism methods; pledge to respond to the climate change through fulfilment of the Millenium Development Goals and enforcement of a low carbon growth strategy; participation in an active international cooperation to stop North Korea’s nuclear programme, saying, “I want to make it
clear that now is the time for real peace on the Korean Peninsula…” (Ibid.). Furthermore, in 2011, President Lee slightly refocused the „Global Korea“ closer to home, with aims primarily concentrating on the East Asian region, looking for cooperation areas with New Zealand and Australia, while tensions still cover the Korean Peninsula due to continued nuclear development by North Korea (Lee 2011). The tensions rose into questions of uncertainty with a political power shift after the death of the leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong-Il (Lee 2012).

The speeches revealed that President Lee followed a pragmatic attitude in his political agenda. His attention carried far beyond the peninsula and the neighbourhood, setting his sights on a global arena – marketing the knowledge, experience and cultural essence of Korea. Characteristic of a global visionist is recognized through President Lee opening the door of the world for Korea, at the same time opening the door of Korea to the world. His global ambitions covered a variety of areas from economic growth, development assistance and peacekeeping activities, to resolution dialogues, green action and Korean Wave (hallyu) promotions. His pursuit of dispute resolution through dialogue with North Korea, international PKO missions and counter-terrorism activities, enacted the leadership with a characteristic of a peace builder. Not only was South Korea under Lee’s government safeguarding peace with the help of the US at home and in his own neighbourhood; he was ready and committed to support the international PKOs. One of the areas which the president valued highly, was development assistance. South Korea has historic experience with being on the other end of the equation, having to accept aid out of necessity. With the gained confidence from economic growth and establishment of steady diplomatic leadership, Lee sees an opportunity to teach others and help the other Asian developing countries overcome their struggles. Not only through official development assistance (ODA), but also with knowledge, experience and support, extending the helping hand, recognized as a characteristic. Another characteristic of a trade opportunist adheres to South Korea’s economic aspirations for faster growth and development. The revision and agreement on the Korea-US FTA, closer economic relations and trade with China and Russia, potential markets of New Zealand and Australia, have led the nation to actively pursue cooperation and direct investment opportunities for benefit.

The principle roles of South Korea that it pursued under Lee’s government within the Northeast Asian region, but greatly also expanding beyond, were the example, the developer, and mixed aspects of the faithful ally and the defender of peace. Firstly, the mere title of Lee Administration’s foreign policy direction of “Global Korea” calls for attention. It is a statement, requiring reach, will, support and resources to achieve. The role of the ‘example’ prioritizes
achieving international attention and recognition, both of which Lee’s government strived to do. The promotion of South Korea’s image, economic opportunities, culture and technology through the implementation of the Korean Wave, helped promote the “exemplary state profile”. Closer cooperation with regional countries as well as establishment of new opportunities beyond is a good example of pursuit for greater influence. Secondly, the role of the ‘developer’ came naturally for South Korea under Lee. As an exemplary case for a development aid recipient transforming into an aid donor, the ROK has all the necessary credential to share its wisdom. Moreover, with the help of the UN and the international community, South Korea has also the necessary means and access to share its knowledge, skills and experience with the developing world. Providing assistance to developing Asian countries with expanding opportunities for assistance in Africa and Latin-America. An interesting observation was made analyzing the Diplomatic White Papers, a distinct policy objective of “Enhancing Korea’s role and prestige in the international community”, presented strategies and actions how which was a clear indication for Lee’s government’s aspiration for global recognition, but had little to add in the context of Northeast Asia.

Although the previous areas are far from the Northeast Asian region which this thesis is focusing on, it is important to present the foreign policy directions of President Lee Myung-bak’s government, which simply aspired to reach beyond its own neighbourhood. On the other hand, this did not mean that President Lee didn’t have a plan for the region. Willing to take on the role of the ‘developer’ also regionally, South Korea, under Lee’s leadership, had prepared an extensive development assistance plan for North Korea which was to be implemented if the DPRK agrees to resolve the nuclear problem and establish peace on the peninsula; which eventually didn’t happen. Thirdly, President Lee’s government-led South Korea embodies certain characteristics of the roles ‘faithful ally’ and ‘defender of peace’. This paper does not suggest that South Korea has moved away from its traditional allegiance. Rather, basing the conclusion on its role behaviour and policy aims studied, South Korea is trying to endorse ‘committed’ or ‘ready for action’-type of stance towards the US-ROK alliance. President Lee’s appraises for joint military and economic cooperation are a stronger representation of the direction of their alliance than simply ‘faithful’, therefore a committed ally is more appropriate for describing the efforts of the administration. Lastly, the role of the defender of peace, which in itself holds a characteristic compatible to a world policeman, also describes a dedication to defending the universal peace, valuing integrity of the whole system. This analysis does not see South Korea compatible with a role of a ‘world policeman’, nevertheless, its international peacekeeping activities, counter-terrorism missions, peace building strategies for Northeas Asian region and advocacy of peace and prosperity are the
characteristics which show that South Korea under the leadership of Lee also pursued the role of the ‘defender of peace’ to a certain degree. Again, cooperation, peace and development were some of the most frequently documented interest areas, but additionally, peacekeeping, development assistance and trade can be noted as frequent foreign policy actions supporting the NRCs expressed by the leader.

### 2.3. President Park Geun-hye’s leadership (2013-2017)

I want to create a new era of hope, the miracle of the second Han River.

President Park Geun-hye came to office in 2013 with the determination to guide South Korea under her leadership into a “new era of hope” (Park 2013a). Banking on infotechnological developments, she drew attention with promises of achieving economic revival and advancement, led by creative economy (Ibid.). While Lee Myung-bak’s government took the leadership in introducing Korea to the world, President Park aspired to support the continuation of the global reach of the Korean Wave, thus, as her predecessor had, she also sought for further cooperation beyond the Northeast Asian region (Park 2014). However, regional issues, still posing a tangible threat, restricted her from taking much attention off the Korean peninsula, promising, “I will take a step forward to establish trust between the two Koreas…” (Park 2013a), expressing further the need for all regional players to build more trust in order to work towards a resolution. In another speech (Park 2013b), President Park called upon the leaders of regional and international states to actively participate in the process of peacebuilding for the Northeast Asian region, following principles of open cooperation and trust. She noted, that the adverse political environment had to change as the region in itself holds much potential for importance and success. For this, she proposed the Northeast Asian Peace Cooperation Initiative, which aims at encouraging the regional states to assume meaningful cooperation for building mutual trust. Through this, the regional leader hopes that states may be able to alleviate distrust and conflict, because restoring peace is the key for sustainable growth for all. She also draws an example of the European Union admiring its regional integration as something Northeast Asian region could aspire towards. In the meantime, the President promised to work tirelessly towards a new economic framework consulting the platforms of APEC, ASEM, the Asia-Pacific community and the Asian-European community (Park 2013b).

The Korean peninsula has been regarded as one of the most difficult geopolitical conditions in the world in terms of diplomatic security. The Korean peninsula is a key point of
intersection where the Eurasian continent meets Asia-Pacific. If we can make Northeast Asia a common market like the EU, it will bring us tremendous opportunities. But despite its enormous potential, the political and security reality of Northeast Asia has become a stumbling block, rather than a support for regional integration. At this point, we must overcome potential crises and make Northeast Asia a place of trust and cooperation.

During her term, President Park met with more challenges than she could’ve expected. From national distraught and disaster mismanagement, to regional provocations and international challenges. Leading a way for the nation towards a new hope did not prove to become a reality in her time. In office, President Park focused intently on the growing regional crisis posed by North Korea. Her call for even higher degree of cooperation and dialogue among nations for restoring regional peace and denuclearizing the peninsula, entailed South Korea with a characteristic of an advocate for keeping peace. While the crisis and multilateral meeting to find a solution took much of her attention, President Park also championed for economic revival, holding a characteristic of a creative economy. This was to take place through the development and production of information technologies as the demands of the global IT markets were fast-growing. The global economic growth which had slowed down affected the economy and businesses in the region. Despite economic growth slowing down, the President continued championing for the high success of the Korean Wave within and beyond the Northeast Asian region. Her decision to allow US’s THAAD system deployment into the ROK, disproved her efforts for regional trust, as this action seemingly ignored concerned China. As a consequence to South Korea’s rash actions, China imposed economic, cultural and tourism restrictions, striking South’s economy even harder. Throughout her time in office, President Park emphasized trust building and open cooperation and although to enact her efforts with a characteristic of a trust builder taking into account her point of exit from the office seems odd, since that earned her the highest degree of mistrust due to her impeachment, then her continued advocacy in speeches calling for regional communication to build trust and cooperation for finding solutions to the dispute, entail South Korea with this characteristic. Because her status as a representation of the NRCs is analyzed based on the source materials, her speeches - which advocate her message even now, even when she herself is not - are used to determine her preferred enacted role conceptions.

In relation to Holsti’s classifications, the roles that ROK pursed under President Park's leadership don’t really fully match to any of the indicated classes. South Korea’s role could partly be regarded as the defender of peace or established outside the classified roles’ structure, as the trust builder (in theory). The national emphasis and pursuit of trust-building is what adds special emphasis to
the classification of this new role. A ‘trust builder’ state initiates communication for the purpose of establishing open and meaningful cooperation aiming at alleviating distrust and preventing the conflict from turning into a military stand-off. Although President Park’s ultimate decision to agree to the deployment of THAAD system does not necessarily solidify claims for peaceful resolution through dialogue as building up military assurances for “just in case” can portray a message of consideration for military alternatives. Additionally, she contradicted her advocacy for trust with this named action also from the point of view of China. To China, the accommodation of US military equipment in its neighbourhood, disregarding the clear opposition and loudly voiced concerns represents overstepping trust. Therefore, it is difficult to determine a specific national role the ROK performed as the foreign policy behaviour and actions of the President herself did not match the national role concepts she was voicing and advocating through her speeches. Elaborating on this, President Park Geun-hye’s actions and national interest management is a clear example of a role conflict where the national roles the leader of the state claims through her message to the international system do not match with the foreign policy and role behaviour of the state and with the role expectations of the system, i.e. other states (e.g. China). President Park's term started off strong, having attained enormous domestic support. Her policies towards the region and beyond promised development, growth, problem-solving. Her time however ended in role conflict between what she had advocated for in the beginning of her term, vouched for as her time in office advanced, and realistically achieved by the end. Her example is the biggest mismatch between promoted role conceptions and executed role behaviour across all examined cases.

2.4. President Moon Jae-in’s leadership (2017- )

During his inauguration in 2017, President Moon Jae-in expressed the fruitful knowledge and expertise South Korea possesses, pledging to share its experiences of economic development and peacekeeping with the world. The future vision for South Korea according to President Moon is to contribute to the development of Asia, to assist and support other developing countries, looking further outside of the Northeast Asian region (Moon 2017a). President Moon highlighted the development assistance the ROK has been able to provide, expressing his desire for continuing cooperation with other Asian countries, further emphasizing the importance of environmental consciousness, the use of sustainable infrastructure and renewable energy development for supporting the progress (Ibid.). Although President Moon values the strengthening of South Korea’s traditional alliance with the US, he also highly regards for restoring relations with China.
This reflects in his determination to finally find a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue and achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (Moon 2017b), for restoring peace in Northeast Asia. To achieve this, restored relations with China and assurance of commitment to cooperation and dialogue are step one. His aspiration towards closer cooperation and relations between Asian countries was inspired by his belief in the regional potential to lead the global economy and one of the important tools he saw for achieving that was Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as means for infrastructure development in the developing countries within the Asian region (Moon 2017c). Together with the commitment of South Korea’s continuous support to the cause of development assistance, Moon pledged to work closer with regional large players to accomplish the increased support and overall growth for the developing countries (Ibid.). One area President Moon was not willing to compromise on was the integrity of the environment in the process of development. He also called others to join him in his pledge to environmental consciousness (Moon 2017b). During his administration, South Korea is to regard more highly of its own environmental impact, as well as focus on providing development assistance through building sustainable infrastructure, promoting renewable energy use and constructing eco-friendly energy towns (Ibid.). As already briefly mentioned, one of his top priorities was reestablishing relations with China, which in turn can help and support the communication with the DPRK for finally establishing peace on the Korean peninsula. President Moon expressed his firm stand on finding a line of communication with North Korea on many occasions. He is determined to lead South Korea to the era of peace on the peninsula, which his predecessors have all also pledged to work towards, yet have not been able to accomplish.

The development of democracy and political stability in Asian countries is becoming an important factor in world peace and security. Our economic and social development experience will also be of practical assistance to Asian developing countries. In the future, based on our experience, Korea will be a companion to the economic and social development of developing countries in Asia. We promise to fulfill the role and responsibility as a bridge country connecting developing and developed countries. I hope that peace on the Korean peninsula will contribute to the stability and integration of Asia.

Although President Moon Jae-in took office under conditions of uncertainties for the whole Korean Peninsula, his fast reaction, expertise and commitment to follow the quest of better overall bilateral and multilateral relations, led him to meet, communicate and express readiness to cooperate with various regional and international players. His commitment for creating stronger relations between South Korea and the international community enacted South Korea with a characteristic of an open communicator. Not only showing the openness to communicate with the global arena, but also
openness to build a working dialogue with North Korea, involving other important actors into the process, balancing the communication between China, the US and the DPRK, with added input from Japan and Russia. The leader declared during his inauguration, that the final resolution for the nuclear crisis needs to be agreed upon so that the peace can finally be restored on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. His efforts for establishing the peace allowed South Korea to follow a characteristic of a determined resolutionist. His determination for meeting by initiating communication with the help of cooperation partners, helped President Moon open a dialogue and keep it open with its northern neighbour.

Following the classifications of roles, South Korea enacts a role of a developer thanks to President Moon Jae-in making it his business to show bigger commitment to development assistance, especially via knowledge and experience sharing. That is thanks to the advantage South Korea possesses, having the special skills and expertise to be able to effectively support and educate the developing countries. South Korea’s readiness for providing development assistance also to the DPRK is clearly stated in its foreign policy. However, this time around in the role of a ‘developer’, South Korea has elevated its priorities and vision. President Moon’s emphasis on the commitment for South Korea to follow a line of environmental consciousness and sustainable development in the process of aid allocation and knowledge-based support called for a new upgraded version of the role to be portrayed, characterized by the green growth aspect in the role execution, which the new leader aspired to go by. Therefore a special role conception of a conscious developer is more appropriate for the ROK under the leadership of President Moon Jae-in. The ‘conscious developer’ is referring thus to a state that prioritizes the environmental awareness and impact into their assistance strategies in order to maximize the effect and minimize the affect on natural surroundings. Additionally, the term indicates aspiration towards sustainable development as well as production and use of alternative energy sources in developing areas for the purpose of long-term assistance relief. The role of a bridge is voiced by President Moon Jae-in in the context of development assistance, whereas, the role is also recognizable in his efforts for opening, continuing and promoting dialogue between the relevant actors for attaining peace in the Northeast Asian region. Furthermore, in his quest for regional peace, prosperity and security, the South Korean leader has committed to pursuing a combination of the roles ‘mediator-integrator’ and ‘defender of peace’. Regarding the first term, rather than pursuing the mediating of a conflict situation resolution for other countries, South Korea is integrating the assistance of other states (e.g. US, China) for the resolution of its own conflict, mediating the peace process by itself. This, paired partially with the role of ‘defender of peace’, introduces in the Northeast Asian regional
context the role of a mediator of peace as in addition to defending and committing to responding to the global keeping of peace, South Korea is determined to establish the regional safety guarantees via integrative dialogue and commitment. In the foreign policy, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation (NAPC) platform is prioritized for mediating and integrating the peace building process; it includes the US, China, Japan, Russia and Mongolia as key participating states and the UN, EU, OSCE, ASEAN, etc. as valuable dialogue partners (Diplomatic White Paper 2018, 73).

2.5. Discussion on implications for China

In its neighbourhood policy for the Northeast Asian region, China has highlighted the motivation for enhanced economic cooperation for mutual benefits and pledged to support the peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue by being engaged in an open dialogue and negotiations (Liu 2017). China however “warned” that it does not tolerate actions threatening to undermine its sovereignty and interests, and won’t therefore hesitate to implement countermeasures (Ibid.); something South Korea has already experienced. In May 2017, President Moon Jae-in was sending a special envoy to visit China and during a regular press conference by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, it was asked, what are China’s expectations for the visit – the spokesperson expressed the visit to affirm the importance of China-ROK relations for the new neighbouring government, stating that China hopes the two can enhance mutual political trust to settle their issues and work together towards developing stronger relations (Hua 2017). The mentioning of trust by a Chinese representative is important as it signifies the breaking of that trust and worsening of political and economic relations due to the previous government’s actions of THAAD systems deployment. China perceived the move as a threat against its own security because it believes that the system allows to spy on its military and the United States’ interests were involved, so to alleviate the situation, President Moon agreed with China’s conditions on the “three NOs”: (1) no deployment of additional anti-ballistic missile systems; (2) no joining of a US missile defence system; and (3) no formation of a ROK-US-Japan military alliance (Volodzko 2017). This in itself sets clear restrictions on what China does not want South Korea to do and therefore helps understand better its expectations for the latter. China additionally advocated the importance of trust during its New Year Reception: “in 2018, we look forward to a world of more trust and less estrangement,” (Wang 2018a) portraying itself as a partner that all sides can trust, making it an ideal consultant for resolving disputes through dialogue, and not only, as China also advocates for the economic integration of the wider Asia-Pacific region (Ibid.). China’s emphasis
on the need for resolving the regional security issue for the overall benefit of the international peace is a shared interest by many members of the Northeast Asian region and also a clear goal of President Moon.

China is South Korea’s top trade partner and since President Moon administration took office, economic stabilization and growth in trade relations between the two countries after the THAAD incident have been effective. China regards South Korea likewise an important economic partner and thus the two have pledged to promote better economic cooperation and bilateral trade (Ren 2018). China finds similarities between its BRI and the ROK’s “New Northern Policy”, which could hold an advantage for China at a time where disparities with the US on trade widen, as the latter policy is oriented towards economic cooperation with Russia, China notes the possibility of acquiring South Korea’s help on the matter (Ibid.). This suggests that China is somewhat expecting South Korea to step up in terms of facilitating communication and interest-sharing, which also correlates to what President Moon is trying to achieve through his foreign policy. Although President Moon has not offered to become an economic opportunities boker for the region per se, he has voiced a desire for South Korea to become a bridge connecting other major powers in the region, sharing the vision of his predecessor President Roh, of South Korea becoming a hub connecting the Northeast Asian region.

In November 2018, on the sidelines of the 26th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, President Xi met President Moon to discuss and assure commitment for deepening of their strategic cooperative partnership. Xi expressed his satisfaction with the direction Moon was pursuing dealing with the peninsula issue. He commended his efforts and strategies, and expressed willingness for further communication and cooperation to advance the process of denuclearization, saying, “the key is that all parties concerned should meet each other halfway, show flexibility, continue their talks and make the talks yield results.” (Xi, Moon meet … 2018). Additionally Xi called Moon for greater efforts to jointly promote the BRI. Following the ROK-DPRK meeting, the State Councilor of the PRC highlighted the significance of the event as the leaders of the two Koreas signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration – a follow-up of practical steps for reaching the objectives expressed in the historically signed Panmunjom Joint Declaration for achieving peace, prosperity and unification of the Korean Peninsula (Pyongyang Joint Declaration) – expressing the support of China for their meetings as they represent steps towards establishing regional peace and stability of the peninsula (Wang 2018b). He added that the peace talks and dialogue towards full denuclearization need to continue through the participation and trust building of all involved
parties: “the positive progress on the Peninsula we are seeing now is entirely in line with the objectives China has been pursuing” (Ibid.), confirming that the actions South Korea is following in its foreign policy are in line with what China expects to see in accordance with its own regional policy.

In its policy objectives and expectations for the role of South Korea, China does not mention its stance or opinions for South Korea pursuing a NRC of a conscious developer. However, China does express concern over climate change and need for environmental protection with its Arctic Policy, which calls for trilateral exchanges of practices and experiences between China, South Korea and Japan (China’s Arctic Policy 2018). In terms of the NRCs of a bridge and mediator of peace, China has more expectations for South Korea. As a bridge, China seeks South Korea to communicate and assist China with its business opportunities in Russia, calling for similarities in the objectives of their economic policies. China regards peace in the Northeast Asia important for its own security and expresses willingness to support and participate in peace talks, however, not once does China mention the will to lead the talks or building of strategies. This suggests that China expects another state to hold the leadership position, while the PRC shows support via dialogue participation. Logical suggestion based on China’s emphasis on the need and readiness to achieve peace in the region and approval of achievements of the ROK President, is to have South Korea take on the leadership role as a mediator for peace, which President Moon already aspires to do.

Despite all of the above, certain intricacies and underlaying issues within the ROK-PRC relations still remain and even with both sides pledging better communication and stronger cooperation, these factors could still pose hurdles for building a successful political bilateral relation. First being the US-China competition of regional influence and international supremacy; and South Korea’s geostrategic position juggling or balancing between them. President Moon’s role enactment suggests that he hopes South Korea to be a mediator of peace in the Northeast Asian region, but in the current situation of growing concerns over the US-China trade disputes, South Korea is left to possibly play the middle-man, as that would require the ROK to become a ‘balancer’ of great powers in the Northeast Asian region. In the introduction, it is wondered, whether South Korea’s current pursued role is to accommodate China’s interests or expressed as a true intent of the leadership. Work (2017) described President Xi’s openness towards amending the economic and political relations with Moon-led South Korea due to the ROK leader being viewed as more accommodating than his predecessor for amenable compromises and less eager to simply follow
the US. President Moon however assured in an interview that it perceives the alliance with the US upmost important and will continue strategic cooperation for peace; at the same time, he also emphasized the importance of China for resolving the nuclear issue and expressed intent to pursue a balanced diplomacy in relations with China and the US (Lim 2017). This indicates that in the case of worsening US-China relations, South Korea is left to accommodate the interests of its two “big brothers”, juggling between them, trying to balance their interests. This certainly would hinder South Korea’s ability to fully perform its other preferred roles and change the geostrategic environment in the region.

Additionally, China’s own geopolitical interests towards North Korea may hinder the denuclearization process. Snyder (2018) considers several limitations China’s interests may pose: as a close ally to North Korea, it may allow the stalling of denuclearization; the economic interests of China may reorient it towards securing its economic influence over possible South Korea’s access onto the North Korea’s markets; and the US-China trade war may negatively affect China’s plans for the region. Especially if China finds that it has already met the peace talks halfway without yielding acceptable results and thus it wants to pursue another direction. The security limitations China’s moves could hold in stalling or possibly even overlooking its sanctions without guarantees and finalization of denuclearization could prove to be a terrible setback for South Korea and the US, in addition to the international community supporting the denuclearization. Finally, although the bilateral relations between South Korea and China have neutralized and both work towards continued cooperation, the THAAD question in their relations remains unresolved and may rise as an issue again (Snyder, Byun 2018, 86), therefore the issue requires a definite solution.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The importance of understanding national role conceptions that the states hold and pursue within the international system is embedded in the fact that the particular role a state advocates for presents the observer with a description of what type of policy they most likely pursue. The limitation of a simple observation of the enacted role however is that the national role conceptions are not always shared and thus, the states encompassing vast role contestations (or even role conflicts) tend to not follow the role behaviour otherwise inherent to the NRCs it enacts. This suggests that the foreign policy behaviour of this particular state can be unexpected and therefore a degree of mistrust and caution is kept in relations with the state. However, this is not always the case and often states choose for the sake of peaceful cooperation and trust-building within the international system, to follow the line of actions they advocate for via the role they hold.

The thesis recognized three distinct role conceptions that South Korea presently holds: a ‘conscious developer’, a ‘bridge’ and a ‘mediator for peace’; with the latter being the most widely advertised for and evaluated in the context of the research question as the only geostrategic role South Korea pursues. The study does not recognize the determined roles to be contradicting. In order to assess the importance, limitations and viability of the current roles of South Korea in the Northeast Asian region, its previous roles were evaluated. The author notes that major role conflicts were present only in the case of President Park’s administration. The author further notes that there are similarities between the role conceptions of President Roh and the current President Moon, in terms of advocating for regional peace and strategic resolution of the nuclear issue, as well as the economic bridging, although in Roh’s case it was more aspiring towards establishing South Korea as a regional centre, whereas President Moon is putting a higher degree of emphasis on economic consciousness, innovative economic solutions and viable future. In terms of regional cooperation and strategic integration through dialogue for establishing regional peace, ‘mediation for peace’ seems to have evolved through set strategies and effort put into achieving them. However, all the credit cannot be given to the President, because the political context, regional relations, the international system at large and knowledge, experiences and good practices for conducting foreign policy have evolved. South Korea’s previous roles were also researched to assess whether
a role contestation is a reoccurring factor in South Korea’s foreign politics, as that would suggest that there are vast disparities between the political elite on the understanding or support towards the role(s) advocated by the leader. That in turn presents a caution that the domestic role conflicts can also spill over onto the international arena and result in political distraught, hindering South Korea’s geostrategic role and position in the region.

The thesis sought to find out whether the current roles of South Korea can positively affect China’s realization of its own regional policies and match with the PRC’s expectations for the ROK’s role. In conclusion, it can be said that yes, the current role conceptions South Korea holds and pursues according to its role behaviour assessed through FPA, are shared by China through it’s aspirations for regional peace and security and quest for economic cooperation with South Korea, and with its help, with Russia. These certainly are not the only policy areas where China and South Korea have promised cooperation, nevertheless, these are the priorities assessed within the scope of this thesis and the correlation can be positively confirmed. However, the China-ROK relations are far more complex and it was also wondered, whether the pursuit of stronger political relations between the two can be successful.

The success of the ROK-PRC bilatral relations is dependent on more than one factor, which South Korea ultimately doesn’t have a control over, e.g. the United States, North Korea or even China itself. If this factor was purely dependent on the interests and actions of South Korea, closer political relations would be feasible, however, the unexpected and uncontrolled factors in the equation have unpredictable, yet undeniable impact, and therefore need to be taken into account. The limitations expressed by Snyder alone question the success possibility. There are also no guarantees that South Korea won’t decide towards alienation from China for the benefit of its alliance with the US – although this would have major economic consequences for the ROK. In sum, there are many influencing factor which affect the pursuit of closer political relations and need to be taken into account; but in the current situation, following the priorities South Korea currently holds for performing its regional role, without a change in the present equation, then the bilateral political relation could be successful and stronger mutual understanding could be built for establishment of better cooperation. While a major falling out between the US and China would bring along possible role change and obstacles in the ROK-China relations. In such equation, the building of close ROK-PRC relations with negative input from the US would be very hard and unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the calculated evaluation of the author is that at the present situation, the prospects for better political relations between South Korea and China are rather positive. The
notion is regardless made that with the change in the political situation, this prospect can also change.

The author’s suggestion in the current political situation, having determined the role conceptions South Korea holds and analyzed its role performance, is for the ROK to continue its strategic pursuit of denuclearization and building peace-oriented relations with North Korea; pursuing its geostrategic role. The establishment of concrete and mutually acceptable strategies for enhanced dialogue and political relations can support this cause. The growing concern over the effect of worsening US-China relations for the policy objectives of South Korea, the Northeast Asian region and establishing peace and security on the peninsula can be alleviated by President Moon keeping true to the enacted roles of a ‘bridge’ and a ‘mediator of peace’, as by doing so, he could avoid falling into the juggling trap of a ‘balancer’ between the US and China, having to accommodate their interest over his own.

Within the scope of this thesis, it could not be substantially researched, evaluated and further elaborated on the origins of roles the leaders enact, as there can be various identity-related, value-based or cultural influences affecting nuances why some roles over others emerge. The systems level influenced can also have a considerable impact. This is one of the further research areas to which this paper could be a foundation to build new research on. Another suggested area of research could be the level of role contestations either within the agent (e.g. political elite) or systems (among various other states) level. Both of these research perspectives support further development of the field of role theory within international relations.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. List of sources for sample and the FPA

List of speeches comprising the sample

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>“Message to USFK Soldiers on the Memorial Day of the United States” by Lee Myung-bak, 12 August 2008c</td>
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<td>“Speech by US House and Senate Assembly” by Lee Myung-bak</td>
<td>13 October 2011b</td>
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<td>“New Year’s speech in 2012” by Lee Myung-bak</td>
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<td>“Presidential Inauguration – We will open a new era of hope” by Park Geun-hye</td>
<td>25 February 2013a</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>“Presidential Congratulations on the Global Conference for the 50th Anniversary of the National Diplomatic Academy” by Park Geun-hye</td>
<td>14 November 2013b</td>
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<td>“The 95th Anniversary of the March 1” by Park Geun-hye</td>
<td>01 March 2014a</td>
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<td>“The 69th Anniversary of Independence Day celebration” by Park Geun-hye</td>
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<td>“Congratulations to the Asian Leadership Conference” by Park Geun-hye</td>
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<td>“President Moon Jae-in, oath of office” by Moon Jae-in</td>
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<td>“FEALAC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Opening Ceremony” by Moon Jae-in</td>
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<td>“National dinner banquet hosted by President Macron” by Moon Jae-in, 10 October 2018b</td>
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<td>“ASEAN+3 Summit remarks” by Moon Jae-in, 15 November 2018c</td>
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Source: Korean Policy Briefing

List of Diplomatic White Papers used for foreign policy analysis

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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea